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PREFACE
This work is the outgrowth of an interest in French Diplomatic 
History and 1848 which I experienced under the questioning encourage­
ment of Professor Brison D. Gooch. I have especially appreciated the 
helpful suggestions of Professor William Savage. I am indebted to 
Professors William H. Maehl and Kenneth I, Dailey for their demanding 
insistence on detail and fact which balanced an earlier training in 
broad generalization by Professors H. Stuart Hughes, John Gaus and 
Herbert Spiro. For the idea of the French missionary feeling to 
export liberty, which characterized Lamartine and Bastide, the two 
French Foreign Ministers of 1848, I must thank the stimulating sem­
inar at the University of Munich with Dr. Hubert Rumpel, To all of 
these men I owe a deep gratitude in helping me to understand history 
and the men that have guided politics.
I want to thank the staff of the French Archives of the Min­
istry of Foreign Affairs, which was always efficient, helpful and 
friendly even in the heat of July. Mr. P. H. Desneux showed me 
every courtesy in Brussels at the Foreign Ministry Archives where I 
was able to work under ideal conditions. In Vienna, the archivists 
at the desk of the reading room of the State Archives were most help­
ful in aiding me to locate exactly what I needed. Dr. Branig of the 
Prussian Secret Archives rendered me an invaluable service in helping
iii
me to locate the political correspondence I needed in Berlin. I wish 
also to thank the helpful staffs at the Federal Archives branch at 
Frankfurt/Main and at the Stuttgart State Archives, and Mr. Hochmuth 
of the State Archive Administration of the German Democratic Republic 
for the permission that was so generously extended to me to work in 
the German Central Archive at Meresburg, which I was unable to take 
advantage of because I had to return to the United States.
I wish to acknowledge the librarians that helped me with 
speed and patience at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, the Uni­
versity Library in Tubingen, the Library of the Technical University 
and the City Library of Brunswick, the State Library of Hanover, the 
New York Public Library, and the University of Oklahoma. I am 
particularly thankful for the help of the inter-library loan staffs 
at the Universities of Oklahoma and Tilbingen for their patient help 
in locating books and articles. For special aid I want to thank 
Dr. Karl Hammer of the German Historical Institute in Paris and 
Dr. Karl Keim of Reutlingen, Germany.
All translations from German and French appearing in the text 
are my own. All italics reproduced in the quotes were in the original 
unless otherwise noted.
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INTRODUCTION
French foreign policy toward Germany in 1848 chose between two 
major alternatives; a larger, Grossdeutsch. or a smaller, Kleindeutsch. 
German state.^ The possibilities in Central Europe reflected the divi­
sion in France between the liberal and traditional views of foreign 
policy. French Liberal-Romantics upheld the notion of the mission of 
France and the Republic to spread liberty, equality and fraternity.
This Girondin credo predominated in the opposition group to the July 
Monarchy, among men like Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin and Victor Hugo.
They opposed the restrained foreign policy of Louis-Philippe that was 
"boring" France, favoring instead an active support for national move­
ments in Italy, Poland and Germany. In Germany they favored a strong 
unitary state under the liberal leadership of Prussia a Kleindeutsch 
policy.
The traditional policy feared German unification, preferring 
to divide and rule, wishing to protect the "liberties of the German 
princes." The traditionalists mistrusted gallophobic sentiment in 
the German nationalist movement, which might claim Alsace and Lorraine. 
This group coveted the Rhine frontier for France, and they were ex­
ponents of reason of state, not idealistic nationalism. Important
^In this study Grossdeutsch will be the position of French­
men favoring divided leadership and a federal structure and weakness 
of individual German states. The Kleindeutsch principle meant a 
smaller unified state under Prussian domination, similar to the 
borders of 1871-without Alsace and Lorraine.
2leaders of the traditionalists were Thiers, Guizot, Edgar Quinet,
and the Due de Broglie. Their ideas were expressed in the newspapers
and periodicals of Paris, particularly the Revue des deux mondes, and
they propounded a Grossdeutsch policy of federalism and weakness in 
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Germany.
Historians of the diplomacy of 1848 have not differed widely 
on the policy attributed to the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Lamartine and Bastide toward Germany. Friedrich Ley, Wiàlawa Knapowska, 
A. J. P. Taylor, Eberhard Meyer and Alexander Scharff all believed that 
the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs were national Realpolitikers, 
unemotional traditionalists seeking a Grossdeutsch. weak Germany.3 
Alois Mertes and Pierre Quentin-Bauchart differ slightly from these 
historians in that they saw a contradiction in French policy under 
Lamartine, who was unable to choose between the traditional and
^Rudolph von Albertine, "Frankreichs Stellungnahme zur deuts- 
chen Einigung wahrend des zweiten Kaiserreiches.Schweizerische 
Zeitschrift fur Geschichte. V, (1955), 305-10.
^Friedrich Ley, Frankreich und die deutsche Revolution 1848- 
49. (Kiel University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1923);
Wislawa Knapowska,"La Prusse, la France et la question polonaise in 
1848," in La Pologne au VI^ Congrès International des Sciences 
historiques 'k Oslo, (Warsaw; Société polonaise d'histûire, 1930), 
p. 150; A. J. P. Taylor, The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy: 
1848-1849. ("Publication of the University of Manchester, Historical 
Series,"LXVII; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1934) p. 6;
Eberhard Meyer, Die aussenpolltischen Ideen der Achtundvierziger. 
("Historische Studien," vol. 337; Berlin; Ebering, 1938), pp. 78-81; 
-Alexander Scharff, Die Europ’àischen Grossmàchte und due deutsche 
Revolution: 1848-1851. (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1942),
passim.
3romantic viewpoints.^ Mertes and Otto Pfisterer thought that under 
Bastide, Foreign Minister after May 10, 1848, all inconsistencies were 
removed from French policy, which was purely realistic and supported 
the particularism of the various German States.^
This study will re-examine the contention of the vast majority 
of historians that Bastide and Lamartine were Grossdeutsch opponents 
of German unification. A major consideration will be the degree 
French policy was "prudent," as most historians have claimed,^ and 
to what degree it was shaped by a genuine sympathy for nationalism 
in central Europe.
The failure of previous writers on 1848 to use all major 
sources of information raises serious questions about their con­
clusions. The basic studies on the attitude of the French in 1848 
toward Germany have been Otto Pfisterer's unpublished dissertation 
written at the University of Tubingen and Friedrich Ley's typed 
dissertation for the University of Kiel.
^Alois Mertes, Frankreichs Stellungnahme zuc deutschen Rev­
olution im Jahre 1848. (Bonn, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1951), 
pp. 29-30; Pierre Quentin-Bauchart, Lamartine et la politique étrangère 
de la revolution de février; 24 février a 24 juin 1848. (Paris:
F. Juven, 1908), pp. 41-52; _çf. Alexander Scharff, "Konig Friedrich 
Wilhelm IV., Deutschland und Europa im Fruhjahr 1849," in Geschicht- 
liche Kraft und Entacheidungen: Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag
von Otto Becker. (Weisbaden: F. Steiner, 1954), pp. 165-99.
^Mertes, pp. 30, 51, 54-56; Otto Pfisterer, Preussen und 
Frankreich im Jahre 1848. (Tubingen, unpublished doctoral disser­
tation, 1921), pp. 99-102.
^Knapowska, p. 151; Taylor, Italian Ouestion. pp. 6-7;
Emile Bourgeois, Manuel historique de la politique étrangère.
(llth éd.; Paris: E. Berlin, 1948), III, 311.
4Both were published soon after World War I in a spirit of hatred 
toward France. They were based on the newly-opened Prussian Secret Arch­
ives, and neither writer visited the Vienna or Paris archives. For in­
formation on French opinion they supplemented the Berlin archive with 
French and German newspapers. Pfisterer especially was most indiscrim­
inate in failing to distinguish between newspaper opinion and official 
policy. Ernst Birke's excellent study of the French press and foreign 
policy warned that the newspapers in 1848 reflected the traditional 
anti-German foreign policy ideas of Guizot and Thiers, The disserta­
tions of Ley and Pfisterer suffered from the limits and biases of their 
sources.7
The most important published work on French foreign policy in 
1848 has been done by Alexander Scharff, Professor of Modern History at 
the University of Kiel. Unfortunately he wrote his great work of syn­
thesis in 1942, when travel to Vienna and Paris was difficult because of 
the war. When he was able to visit the Paris archives after World War II, 
Scharff somewhat altered his view of the extent of French hostility to 
German unification. However, his interests have shifted to the history 
of Schleswig-Holstein, and he has not written a study of the entirety of 
French policy in 1848. Scharffs earlier work suffered most from its re­
liance on Ley and Pfisterer and lack of archival materials; his later 
study focuses on only the Schleswig Question, a very minor', segment' of 
French policy toward Germany.&
^Ernst Birke, Frankreich und Gstmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert; 
Beitrage zur Politik und Geistesgeschichte. (Koln: Bohlau, 1960)
passim; Ley, Frankreich; Pfisterer, Preussen.
^Alexander Scharff, Die Grossmàchte; "Schleswig Holstein Erhe- 
bung im Spiegel franzosischer Akten" in Festschrift fur Volguart Pauls. 
(Neumûnster; Wachholtz, 1950), pp. 172-94.
5The most complete work on FrenchrGerman relations in 1848 is 
the unpublished University of Bonn doctoral dissertation of Alois 
Mertes written In 1951. Because circumstances did not permit him to 
travel to Berlin or Vienna, his work is based on one archive. In Paris, 
he was able to see only documents in the Quai d'Orsay archive up to 
June 30, 1848 because of a lengthy strike of French civil servants, 
including archivists. The failure to use more new material gravely 
limits the value of his work. The result was that, like previous
9
writers, he was able to gain only a partial view of French policy.
The present dissertation is based upon the political and con­
sular files of the archives of the French Foreign Ministry and the 
reports of irregular diplomats and secret agents,a new major source 
of information.^^ The consular reports have never before been quoted 
on this subject; thus the economic motivation of French policy is trea­
ted here for the first time.^^ The Prussian Secret Archives, the 
Austrian Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv and Belgian Foreign Ministry 
Archives were all extremely helpful as well as the published docu­
ments from the archive at Dresden.
^Mertes, Frankreichs, see Introduction for explanation.
lOsee Chapter VI.
Usee Chapter XI.
^^Helmut Kretschmar & Horst Schlechte (ed.) Franzosische und 
Sachsischen Gesandtschaftsb'erithtec aus Dresden und Paris; 1848-1849, 
(Berlin: Rut ten & Loening, 1956), (hereafter, Saxony).
CHAPTER I 
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
Louis-Phiplppe's abdication on February 24, 1848, led to the 
proclamation of the Second French Republic, Foreign policy during the 
Provisional Government, until the formation of the Commission of the 
Executive Power on May 10, 1848, was formed principally by Alphonse 
de Lamartine. He was replaced by Jules Bastide who directed affairs 
until the election of Louis Napoleon as President in December.
During 1848, the personality of these men had a profound influ­
ence on the direction of policy. The romantic predisposition of the 
poet Lamartine affected his outlook causing him to reject what-wasddis- 
agreeable. "Illusion was his native element" since he was a "sworn 
foe of reality."^ His own account of 1848 must be read with caution, 
because he was an unreliable witness. He altered and distorted the 
most basic elements of the narrative. He used poetic license when he 
wrote of his own life. He changed his date and place of birth according 
to its relationship to the story; the data of his life was changed ac­
cording to his whims. William F. Griese wrote, he "treats the facts of 
his life as a novelist treats the ingredients of fiction, solely in
^William F. Griese, "Lamartine: A Portrait," (University
of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature," XX; Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1924), 182-83.
7accordance with aesthetic laws. Facts change from day to day. He was 
born in 1790, 1792, 1793 and 1794 at 'Macon, at Hilly and at St. Point.
Alexis de Toquevi.lle wrote similarly of Lamartine. He had "never 
known a mind less sincere, nor one that had a more sincere though com- 
tempt for the truth. . . .  When speaking or writing, he spoke the truth 
or lied without caring which he did, occupied only with the effect he 
wished to produce at the moment.
This Government policy in early 1848 was directed by a man with 
a "thorough contempt for the t r u t h , a n d  it. could easily suffer from a 
lack of consistent logic behind policy. He was surrounded by a world of 
chimeras, conceptions of his own fancy. Lamartine was more than a naive 
dreamer; he lived in a dream world in his daily concepts, unaware of 
what was really happening.
Such an unbalanced optimism in forming policy is extremely dan­
gerous. Lamartine was capable of seeing his most extreme and irrational 
goals on the verge of total victory. It is not in the least surprising 
that these goals themselves were changing and even conflicting from 
time to time; nevertheless, the ideal of the moment was "inevitable," 
"predestined" with little or no action on his part.-^
2Ibid.. p. 193.
^Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de 
Tocqueville. translated by Alexander Tiexeira de Mattos, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 118. Peter Amann called 
Lamartine's History of 1848 "a completely unreliable apologia."
"Writings on the Second French Republic," JMH, XXXIV (1962), 409.
^Griese, "Lamartine," p. 209.
5lbid,
8It is a mistake to confuse inactivity with "prudence" as so many
historians have done.
He was a very fervent if somewhat quixotic lover of liberty 
and an advocate of undefined and perhaps undefinable ideals.
. . . His life was thus a continuous tribute to chimeras 
and false gods because Lamartine refused even for the brief­
est interval to live on terms of understanding with the 
realities of life, . . . Truth is the thing he least cared 
for.6
This study will explore whether it is possible to call Lamartine 
or Bastide "realists." Was the policy based on more than romantic no­
tions of Germany and Europe? Was Bastide really less a dreamer than 
Lamartine? What was the real cause for French inactivity in 1848? 
Defeatism or overconfidence?
There were five important characteristics of French policy in 
1848; order, peace, nationalism, republicanism and French self-interest. 
The last was felt to be the culmination of the first four. When the 
world was peaceably reorganized into national republics, all of the 
sources of tension and conflict would be removed from international 
relations. The new state of things would eliminate wars, which had been 
caused by dynastic rivalries. Serving the true interests of France 
meant serving the real interests of civilization, furthering the pro­
gress of man. If any single proposition had priority, it was peace.
War was felt to be a barbaric vestige of another age when men were less 
enlightened. Moreover, the first republic had been destroyed by a fore­
ign coalition which had prevented civil disorder by a crusade against 
France with the promise of reforms to Germans and others as a reward 
for their fighting. After the war, little if anything was done in
Gibid
9carrying out these promises, but they had been used to thwart the real 
thrust of the revolution.
France's national interest would also have been served by changing 
radically the diplomatic complex of Europe. The center of the new order 
would be Paris as much as the old order had been St. Petersburg, Vienna, 
and Berlin, the "Three Northern Courts." Future conflicts would be 
settled by congresses, by conciliation, by diplomacy. Lamartine saw for 
himself a role similar to Metternich's in earlier years. France as the 
oldest and most experienced republic would naturally have a special 
prestige in the new world. The errors of treaties of 1814-15 would be 
redressed, and the world would enter a new age of peace on the basis of 
national self-determinism and democracy. The French saw their motives 
as unselfish in bringing liberty, equality and fraternity to the world. 
After 1848, Europe had to wait for Woodrow Wilson to champion many of 
the same ideas at Versailles.
Since other European countries had a very different view of 
French intentions, there was a fear of Invasion by France's neighbors 
after the February Revolution.^ Lamartine, in his letter to the dip­
lomatic corps of Paris, shortly after assuming power, promised that the 
republican form of the new government had not changed the place of 
France in Europe, not its loyal and sincere disposition to maintain good 
relations with the powers who, like France wished the independence of 
nations and the peace of the world. He expressed his wish to cooperate
^For the best discussion of the fears of French invasion among 
the neighbors of France after the February Revolution, see Brison D. 
Gooch, Belgium and the February Revolution. (The Hague; Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1963).
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with all means in his power for the concord of peoples with reciprocal 
dignity, claiming that both the principle of peace and the principle of 
liberty had been created in the French Revolution,®
Lamartine simultaneously posited national liberation of "oppres­
sed peoples" and peace. He implied that the freedom of peoples could 
be arranged without war, that is by mutual respect, in a general con­
gress of Europe. A few days later, he told French diplomatic agents to 
stress the themes of liberty for nations and the French desire for peace 
in a circular addressed to French diplomats abroad. The historian of 
the Girondists dwelt on the differences between 1792 and 1848, the 
changes since then and difference between the two republics. Failing
to see a conflict of principles, he thought that the differing forms of
9
governments could peacefully live together.
Lamartine immediately impressed the members of the diplomatic 
community in Paris as the most capable member of the Provisional Gov­
ernment. He was labeled as a man of peace and order from the beginning. 
Arnim praised, 29 February, all the measures taken by the Provisional 
Government as most "energetic" and as "most appropriate to the circum­
stances." The new government seemed to him to be showing intelligence 
as well as force.
The greatest part of this praise returns to M. de Lamartine.
During the first days when the government had no material 
force at its disposal, he, by his moral force alone and the 
prestige of his word on the masses, contained the popular
^Lamartine to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps in Paris, 
February 27, 1848, Charles Pouthas (ed.). Documents diplomatiques 
du gouvernement provisoire de la Commission du pouvoir exécutif.
(Paris: Imprimerie National, 1953), I, 1. (hereafter DDF)
9
Lamartine to Diplomatie Agents, Parts, March 2, 1848, DDF, I, 7.
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wave which menaced overflowing. One can say that he 
saved Paris from pillage and conflagration at the peril 
of his life. It is he who is again the soul of the
government and the man of the p e o p l e .10
Armin indicated the precarious character of the revolutionary 
regime. "He exercises for the moment the sovereignty of genius. But 
this little cannot suffice for long; all governments need material 
force to maintain themselves." The government of Paris was also in­
creasing the strength of the National Guard with workers and young men 
from the schools. No one knew if there might be a future competition 
between the revolutionary government and the army.11
The Austrian Ambassador wrote the same day of a conversation 
that Normanby, the English Ambassador^had had the day before with Lam­
artime. Normanby, like Arnim, was impressed with the moderation and
good sense of the new director of French foreign policy. Lamartine made
12the most categoric assurances of moderation and peaceful intentions.
In Arnim's first interview with Lamartine, "as a private party," 
Lamartine gave assurances that not only he, but all of his colleagues, 
sincerely desired to maintain peace. Lamartime said, "The manifesto 
which will appear tomorrow or the next day will demonstrate this."^^
^^Arnim to Berlin, Paris, February 29, 1848, Germany Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv, Berlin, III. Hauptabteilung, vol. 855, p. 54 
(hereafter GSA).
l^ Ibid.
l^Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 1, 1848, Austria, Haus- 
Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Politisches Archiv, IX Frankreich,
Kart. 29, vol. Ill, p. 212. (hereafter HHSA).
13
Arnim to Berlin, Paris, March 1, 1848, GSA, vol. 855,
p. 57.
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Lamartine told Normanby that the Provisional Government was try­
ing to support the ideas of order and moderation and would combat anarchy 
with all its powers. He declared at the same time that the government 
desired ardently to maintain peace and good relations with all Powers, 
that it would never be an aggressor, and it would not intervene except 
on the request of the sovereigns or the governments. Though it was 
impossible in the present situation in Paris to speak openly of the 
maintenance of the treaties of 1815; nevertheless, the republican form 
of the new government had not changed the place of France in Europe. He
promised that France sincerely desired to conserve the peace and would 
not attack anyone. His only hostile reservation was that France would 
repel. the attack of an army of intervention directed against the 
peoples who wished to defend their independence and their liberty.
The immediate effect of the February Revolution in the German 
Diet was fear. Another invasion across the Rhine was expected, and the 
forces there were reinforced. The French charge was told by a member 
of the Diet that their declaration had been purely defensive, and the 
military precautions were not aggressive. It was with more apprehension 
in Frankfurt than anger that they followed the events in France. Bill­
ing, the French charge, warned that "the cause of political progress .
. . in Germany would be compromised, if the apprehension . . .
of France concentrated the energy of the German nation in the thought 
of repulsing a new invasion of her territory by force.
l^ Ibid.
ISsilling to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 2, 1848, DDF, I, 13.
13
The most singular reaction was in Munich, where the King of
Bavaria came to the home of the French Minister, something which the
Minister thought had never happened before. The King told Bourgoing;
He desired to maintain peaceful and friendly relations 
with France; that if they did not attack Germany, she 
need not fear attack. . . .  It would be a dangerous 
mistake to believe closer relations with France would 
cause Bavaria to leave the German Confederation. The 
King of Bavaria, like all German sovereigns is animated 
by the most sincere and exalted sentiment of German 
nationality.16
After the Paris Revolution, General Radowitz was sent by Prussia 
to Vienna to explain her policy. He was instructed to tell the Aus- 
trians that the King of Prussia desired to maintain peace and wished 
to contribute as much as he could to its conservation. He would not 
consider mixing into the affairs of France or adopting a system of 
aggression against her, but he could not tolerate the slightest aggres­
sion against her, by the French or infraction of the treaties in Ger­
many or in the Italian provinces of Austria. Only defensive action 
was contemplated by the Prussians.
The championing of nationalism by France threatened Prussia less 
than Russia or Austria, because Prussia had a smaller proportion of 
non-nationals in her population than Russia or Austria. Prussia was 
the most popular state in Germany among liberal circles and seemed 
likely to gain by the national reorganization of boundaries. The few 
Polish subjects the King of Prussia might lose would be more than 
off-set by the possibility of becoming the leader of Germans.
l^Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 4, 1848, DDF, 1, 31.
l^Trautmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, February 28, 1848,
HHSA, III, Preussen, Kart. 31.
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The Prussian cabinet was unenthusiastIc about forming a coalition 
against France,^®
The difficulties caused Austria by Italy would place Prussia 
"providentially" between the constitutional states and the absolute 
states of Germany. "Prussia would not be merely a power to mediate, 
but her attitude could be recognized as a c o m p r o m i s e . T h e  diplomats 
of the July Monarchy noted the opportunity for Prussia in Germany with 
Austrian preoccupation in Italy. The natural alliance of any French 
government would have been with Prussia against Austria, since a weak­
ening of Austrian influence in Italy would necessarily mean an in­
crease for France.
The Belgian Ambassador in Berlin wrote that the Prussian Minister
of Foreign Affairs had assured him on March 2, Prussia would leave
France to constitute her government as she wished.
Prussia had no wish to repeat the mistake of 1792.
Prussia refuses all aggression against France, under­
standing that she, on her side, abstains from all ag­
gression against not only the German states, but all 
states constituted by existing treaties.^0
Arnim in Paris aided the French by assurances to the Belgian
Ambassador, Firmin Rogier, of the good intentions of both the Provis­
ional Government and public opitiion. "Until now, the ideas of propa­
ganda and of conquest have not appeared here."^^
^®Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin, March, 1848, Belgium,
Archives des Affaires Etrangères, correspondence politique: Legations,
Prusse IX, 35. (hereafter AEB).
l^Billing to Guizot, Frankfurt, February 12, 1848, France, 
Archives des Affaires Etrangères, correspondence politique, vol. 805, 
p. 14, (hereafter AEF).
^^Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin, March 2, 1848, AEB, Prusse IX,
35.
^^Arnim to Berlin, Paris, March 3, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 62.
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Lamartine told Arnim of the Manifesto the day before its appear­
ance. Lamartine said that he had submitted it to his colleagues, who 
had found the language too diplomatic and had added a few "gros mots." 
Lamartine told Arnim of the most important parts, especially the passage 
concerning the treaties of 1815; "France does not recognize in right the 
of 1815; but she admits them as facts, as a base of territorial circum­
scription and as a point of departure to arrive peacefully and with 
common accord at modifications."
Austria and Prussia’s ambassadors had different views of the 
danger to Germany of Lamartine's peaceful assurances. While Arnim im­
mediately reassured the King of Prussia that they had nothing to fear 
in Germany from France, the Austrian Ambassador, Apponyi, warned that 
the goals of French policy meant the destruction of the Austrian Empire, 
Arnim tried to convince Berlin that Prussia should do nothing to give 
the French cause for concern. The main territorial goal of France was 
Italy, not Germany, and even an invasion on the Rhine would be launched 
at Vienna, and not necessarily against any of the other German states.
On February 28, the Prussian Ambassador, Baron von Arnim, re­
ported to Berlin in a cipher message that the republican government of 
France must seize the first pretext to expell Parisian radicals. There 
was a need to discharge them abroad. Shortly the government could be 
forced to final expedients to keep the unruly population busy. To 
avoid social reform, the malcontents might be encouraged to make con­
quests among the neighbors of France. He warned that if Frederick 
William IV replied to the proclamation of the republic in France by a
22lbid. pp. 62-63, Underlined in Berlin.
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hostile alliance or by a reinforcement of troops along the frontier,
"C est la guerre sur le Rhin."
Arnim wrote his government about the most pressing interest of 
French policy, the key to the understanding of French actions in 1848. 
The first thought of the republicans was not toward the Rhine, nor 
against Prussia, but in Italy, and against Austria. France would 
send armies readily to the Rhine, because it is easier to reach than 
the Adige, and because they wish to make a conquest and destroy the 
treaties of 1815.
The German Question was closely allied in French policy with the 
Italian Question. One of the stronger members of the German Confeder­
ation was Austria and her Foreign Miinister, Metternich, was a symbol for 
reactionary policy in the penninsula protecting her important possess­
ions .
Apponyi believed that the assurances of Lamartine, far from 
offering some guarantee for the conservation of peace, seemed to an­
nounce, on the contrary, that the "irrestible force of things" would 
force France into a general war. In reflecting on conditions in Italy, 
Switzerland, and Germany, Apponyi thought it hardly possible that peace 
would be maintained. In late February, he thought that the movements 
for "independence and liberty" among these peoples would lead to a 
resistance to Austrian authority. The Austrian Ambassador saw the 
national movement as an inevitable enemy of the multi-national Austria, 
He feared war would be necessary to insure the maintenance the empire 
of Metternich, but in the immediate future, he noted a peaceful atti­
tude in Paris.24
23
Arnim to Berlin, Paris, February 28, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, pv 51,
24-Apponyi to Metternich, Maris, March 5, 1848, HHSA, III, 230-31.
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On February 29, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Meyendorff, 
returned from Schwerin, and he met with the Austrian Ambassador, 
Trautmansdorff, at the home of the Prussian Foreign Minister, Canitz.
The Ruffisfani recalled 1830, and, fearing a precipitous recognition of the 
French Republic, he spoke firmly. He declared that the Emperor would 
never recognize the republic, and that if Prussia decided to, she could 
count on no Russian ever again coming to the aid of the King. There 
also existed, he added, an engagement taken between the three courts 
allied in 1830, by which they excluded forever the recognition of a re­
publican regime in France. "Recall what I tell you today," he said,
"you will have in two years from now a war on the Rhine, and be certain 
that 200,000 Russians will be more useful to you than the English fleet. 
He thought that the danger of French aggression necessitated an entente.
General Canitz tried to calm the Russian envoy, and observed that 
the present condition of France was highly provisional. There would soon 
be another government, "the republic being, in the long run, impossible 
in that country.
Trauttmansdorff, on March 9, wrote to Metternich of his reactions 
to the Manifesto ofc Lamartine. He found the language half diplomatic, 
half poetic, and he was most disturbed by its ambiguity on the mainten­
ance of peace. The total effect that it produced was not reassuring for
the future. The real policy would not be seen until the government
27was definitely constituted by an election.
Z^Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, February 29, 1848,
HHS&, II.
26lbid.
^^Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, March 9, 1848, HHSA,
III.
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Apponyi wrote that the Great powers should wait on events. For 
the moment, they should not mix themselves in the internal affairs of 
France, in any way. They must abstain from all hostile overtures against 
her, but prepare themselves to repulse vigorously any attack. He found 
that the "sympathy and support for the oppressed" was more a manifesto 
of war than a guarantee of peace. He thought that France might resort 
to war to draw attention from internal conflicts, particularly the 
social question. He concluded that if war came it would be in Italy.
Normanby, however, was satisfied with the dispositions of the 
Provisional Government, and had no fear of aggression in Belgium. He 
thought that it was only in Lombardy that a war might break-out with 
France. He told the Prussian Ambassador that public opinion in England 
was unfavorable to Austria. Berlin underlined heavily in the margin of 
Hatzfeldt's dispatch the statement that Palmerston was opposed to a 
conference of the powers, because it would be mistrusted in Paris. The 
English thought it was necessary to avoid any hint of a coalition 
against France, and they must at all costs fortify the party of peace 
which Lamartine headed,
The attitude of Appomyi to the Manifesto contrasted sharply with 
Arnim. The Austrian did not find the passage about the treaties of 
1815 significant, Guizot had often said that he regarded the treaties 
as violated by the incorporation of Cracow, but that France would con­
tinue to maintain the treaties and that she did not desire them to be
^®Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 10, 1848, HHSA, III,
255-56.
29
Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 12, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, pp.
91-92.
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broken. Apponyi did not find Guizot's declaration different in essence
from Lamartine's; however, the passage which guaranteed Switzerland.and
Italy French support reversed completely all peaceful meaning.
I understand perfectly that Mr. Lamartine, although he 
desires ardently the conservation of peace, could not 
speak differently, but I see equally only one inter­
pretation . . .  to the cited paragraph-the avowed 
impossibility by the French Republic to avoid war.^0
Lamartine told Normanby that if Austria confined herself to
defending her own territory, and if she did not cross the borders of
her Empire to invade the other states of Italy, she would be left
alone; but in the case where her army entered the adjacent states,
France would be forced by the state of opinion to come to the aid of
31the attacked to oppose her intervention.
A conflict between Austria and France seemed inevitable in March.
30Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 5, 1848, HRS^, III, 230. 
^^Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 1, 1848, HHSA, III,
212.
CHAPTER II
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND WORLD REVOLUTION
While Lamartine wanted peace, because war could destroy liberty 
and lead to a dictatorship, he created tension by openly offering pro­
tection for the "reconstruction of oppressed nationalities of Europe," 
and specifically mentioned Switzerland and Italy. Is this a key to 
understanding the policy of France in 1848? Lamartine tended to see 
things in extremes; for every thesis, such as peace, there was an antith­
esis, like war. The contradiction itself between these ideals, has 
never been recognized as a policy. There was never an attempt by 
Lamartine to resolve this crude dialectic, and this tended to perpet­
uate instability, the terror in foreign capitals which is the essence 
of a revolutionary foreign policy. The consistency of French policy 
is that is was always contradictory; it never failed to have.a polarity 
of concepts. A policy could be unclear, because its main goal was 
obscurity, fear of France's true aims, conflict. The creation of some 
conflict and clash was necessary for the maintenance and progress of 
the revolution. Lamartine's style, intentionally or not, created the 
maximum of stress and instability abroad. His relationship to Ledru- 
Rollin and the radical clubs in Paris suggests such a conclusion. While 
Lamartine posed as the opponent of disorder and anarchy, he always had 
Ledru-Rollin, as well as Louis Blanc and Albert in the Cabinet to warn 
of the alternative of more extreme revolution if he fell. When the
20
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National Assembly met in May, Lamartine demanded that the new ^'Commis­
sion of Executive Power" include Ledru-Rollin. Did Lamartine believe 
that revolution was dependent on the tension created by conflict?
Without conflict there was no place for Lamartine the "mediator." He 
did use the contrast to show the value of "prudence" and "caution," and 
without a colleague like Ledru-Rollin there was no need for Lamartine.
As important as the policy of peace was the policy of nationalism and 
liberation which threatened Europe and created the climate necessary 
for the triumph of the revolutionary foreign policy. While Lamartine 
promised peace he always warned that war was inevitable anyway. When 
he spoke of order there had to be a danger of anarchy to make the state­
ment meaningful. Without the antithesis there could be no dialectic and 
tension.
Lamartine’s special agent in Berlin, Circourt, failed to under­
stand the essence of his chief's policy. He looked for consistency, 
stability and clear direction from Paris. He felt that his position 
had been undermined because of the absence of any "direction" in policy. 
He suffered in anxiety because of the "morose silence" from Paris. 
Circourt thought that Lamartine had a "correct conscience," but had
been deceived by his cabinet and especially, Ledru-Rollin.^
2
Lamartine was "perfectly unintelligible" in instructions to his 
agents, because he had nothing to tell them. Uncertainty itself was
^Adolphe de Circourt, Souvenirs d'une Mission a Berlin en 1848. 
Georges Bourgin (ed.) (Paris; A Picard, 1908), I, 247-48.
Zibid.. I, 401.
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central to his program. His immediate goals changed with events, and 
his view of the world was one without stability, shifting sands, on 
which nothing so stable as a formal entente could be contemplated with­
out the risk of ending the revolutionary process. French declarations 
should be vague, leaving room for maneuver.
It is difficult to explain satisfactorily the actions of Lamartine 
in the fiasco of the violation of territory of Savoy, Belgium and Germany 
by freebooters in March and April, unless we accept him at his word 
(highly suspect in the case of Lamartine) or believe that he was de­
lighted with uncertainty and tension for its own sake. He allowed the 
radicals to enter Germany, knowing that they would be crushed. Perpaps, 
he had more than one motive; nevertheless, the result was certainly 
confusion.
If one accepts the innocence of Lamartine, the incident of the 
circular of Ledru-Rollin, that Hatzfeldt learned of March 14, is im­
portant. Ledru-Rollin, who was Minister of Interior and responsible 
for public order, purged the Prefects by sending commissars to the 
departments to "protect public safety." When the British Ambassador 
learned of the new order, he went to Lamartine and asked for an ex­
planation. Normanby claimed to fail to understand how this did not 
contradict the Provisional Government's promise for complete liberty 
in elections. Lamartine replied that he knew nothing of the circular 
and did not hide his personal disapproval of it to Normanby. Hatzfeldt 
concluded that there was no unity among the members of the government, 
and that each "followed the way of natural tendencies as they inspired 
him."3
^Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 14, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 101.
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The Belgian Ambassador, de Ligne, wrote two days later that the 
circulars of Ledru-Rollin had displeased the National Guard. The rumor 
of conflict in the cabinet was wide-spread. Ligne feared that there were 
two opposed parties in the Provisional Government, that of Lamartine 
supported by the National Guard, the other of Ledru-Rollin, speaking 
for the progressive and extremist elements, marching with the aid of 
the clubs and the people of the streets. Ligne feared a civil war.^
If this was true, if Lamartine was really in danger of a move­
ment to unseat him by the clubs, then the "invasion" of Belgium and 
Southern Germany could have been unavoidable.
March 17, Schweitzer, the diplomatic representative of Baden 
saw Lamartine and Bastide, the first Under-secretary. They gave the 
German the confidential information that a German democratic club in 
Paris had resolved that a band df 5-6,000 workers would leave Paris to 
invade the Grand Duchy of Baden, and that this column had made pre­
parations to depart the 22 or 23.
Schweitzer wished to send this information to his government by 
the telegraph, but Lamartine told him that the telegraph depended on the 
minister of Interior, Ledru-Rollin, who could pose obstacles to such a 
message. Schweitzer, therefore had to send the information by courier 
to Baden.5
Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador, doubted that the expedition 
would ever depart. He noted that such ridiculous and emphatic
^Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, March 16, 1848, AEB, XIII, 87.
^Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 17, 1848, HHSA, III, 280.
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announcements were'frequently reproduced without ever being carried out. 
But he thought Lamartine's confidential information about Ledru-Rollin 
outlined the situation of the moment in the Provisional Government.
Apponyi hoped that there would be a small violation of territory. 
"I wish that the adventurous expedition take place; it would produce a 
very salutary impression of fear in Germany, and let them know the real 
charm and advantage of having a republic as neighbor.
Since the alarm was given flo long in advance, could Lamartine 
have thought or wished that the expedition would be successful? The 
fiasco of the German Republican expedition was increased by the timely 
warning of the French government. Lamartine worked against the clubs 
and their plans to "export" republicans.
The villian, Ledru-Rollin, was possibly less guilty than usually 
believed. Hatzfeldt characterized him as an ex-deputy, lawyer, posi­
tivist, pushed into the extreme party rather by a desire to be a leader 
than by conviction, possessing more firmness of spirit than of charac­
ter. After having been the most violent in the first days of the rev­
olution, he seemed by March 9, to Hatzfeldt, to be more moderate. He 
was capable of doing much evil, but this would be more because of his 
tendency to let things go and by his rudeness than by design.^ Ledru- 
Rollin hardly impressed the Prussian observer as a plotter or even much 
of a leader. He was more likely to be moved by events than to be their 
mover..
G i b i d .. 281.
^Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 1, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, 
p. 81; Toqueville, Recollections, p. 121.
25
Two days after the French warning, Apponyi was more concerned 
about the German clubs, sending for the first time a description of 
them to Vienna. He wrote that the two main clubs in Paris, Herwegh and 
Bornstedt's and the less violent club of Veneday had 6,000 members to­
gether. After a large meeting of the German clubs in the Place de 
Madeleine, Lamartine told Schweitzer that the Provisional Government 
had enjoined the Minister of the Interior to take the most energetic
Q
measures to prevent all violation of German territory.
The official promise of the inviolability of German soil given 
by the French who charged Ledru-Rollin to carry out the act makes unclear 
the government implication before the invasion. The government was re­
lieved that some of the worst trouble-makers, the Germans, had left 
Paris, They also seemed to have feared the power of the clubs espec­
ially in the fiïst weeks after the revolution.
When Apponyi saw Lamartine on the afternoon of March 22, they 
spoke of the situation in France. Lamartine was very despondent, and 
said that he could not count on 100 men among the National Guard who 
would defend the government. "We have nothing but our naked breasts 
to oppose to our adversaries.'" He thought that it was not only possible 
but probable that in a few days the government would pass under the in­
fluence of the leaders of the National Guard, who were for the most 
part the leaders of the clubs. He believed that they would still 
re-elect him as premier, as a hostage. He did not think that the
^Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 19, 1848, HHSA, III, 
vol. 337, 282; Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 19, 1848, GSA, 
vol. 855, p. 128.
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National Guard would protect the government, and he feared being over­
thrown by 100 to 150,000 workers, led by the chiefs of the clubs.
Lamartine, thought that the danger existed for 20 more days. He told 
Apponyi that he regarded Ledru-Rollin, not as the leader, but solely 
as the "instrument" of his party, and except for a few nuances of 
opinion among the members of the Provisional Government, there was 
accord between them at this time,^
The feeling of relief was predominant in the conversation of 
Hatzfeldt and Lamartine a few days later. Lamartine was most content 
with the change since his last conversation with Apponyi. He said 
that the most perfect accord existed among the members of the Provisional 
Government. He thought that the great majority of the working class 
was now animated by good sentiments toward the government and he felt 
the cabinet that had been menaced by the clubs was no longer in great 
danger. According to him,even in the clubs the most extreme opinion 
was losing ground. The bands of Belgians and Germans which had left 
had caused havoc in the outskirts of Paris. After these excesses they 
had been very badly treated by the French people.
The expedition of the German workers did not come without a pro­
test from the German diplomats in Paris. Apponyi was sent to Lamartine 
as a representative of the Germans to object to the expédition. He and 
Hatzfeldt were met by the Foreign Minister, who told them that he had 
just seen Herwegh and Bornstedt at the Hotel de Ville. He had replied 
to their requests for aid by saying that the government not only would 
give them no arms, but would oppose the departure from Paris of armed
^Apponyi to Chancellery, Paris, March 23, 1848,HHSA, III, 286-87.
^^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, March 26, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 133.
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columns of republican voluntaries. The government would not allow the 
declarations of peace made in the Manifesto changed into a lie, nor 
could they make France a base of operations against Germany. If the 
Germans living in Paris wished to return, individually, the government 
would furnish them with assistance and would be happy to get rid of 
them, Lamartine had said that the Provisional Government was firmly 
resolved not to furnish voluntarily to the German democrats a single 
rifle nor. any other aid. He said that he could not prevent their leav­
ing Paris, but hoped in three weeks to deal with the matter with more 
energy.
Not only the Belgians and Germans, but the Poles also embarrassed 
the French Provisional Government March 25 and 26. Lamartine told these 
delegations of his warm sympathies for the reestablishment of Poland, 
but that France was hardly at war, openly or secretly, with any exist­
ing governments, and that she could not voluntarily permit any act of
12
aggression or violence against the German nation.
The Austrian, Apponyi ,sympatheticly explained to Vienna the 
problems of the French Government. He wrote that Belgians, Germans, 
and poles were daily departing from Paris. Their passage had been 
paid by the French government who could hardly find work.for the French 
workers. The internal problem of mass unemployment, which had led to 
the institution of the national workshops and the Luxembourg Commission 
now affected foreign policy.
On March 25, Lamartine politely refused the Polish deputation's
Upose to Dresden, Paris, March 26, 1848, Saxony, p. 64.
l^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, March 27, 1848, GSA, v6T, 855,
p. 134.
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request for arms, munitions and clothing. This resulted in a violent
scene, the Polish deputation becoming extremely insolent and making
increasingly menacing suggestions. A few hours later, the Poles came
in a large body to the Hotel de Ville, where a certain Godebske talked
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in their name. Lamartine was able
to make a reply that calmed them, and they resolved to leave March 28
without arms. "The Provisional Government showed a great satisfaction
13to see all the foreigners leave Paris."
In Lamartine's conversation with Apponyi, he said that Germany 
was in turmoil, and that there would be revolutions all over the country. 
The Minister was self-confident and even smug about the improvements in 
the internal situation of France during the past week. He felt much 
stronger, since the "spirit of the people is excellent and all members 
of the government are in excellent a c c o r d . W a s  Lamartine so con­
fident after the March Revolutions in Germany that he thought the 
Republican rising in Baden might succeed? He told Apponyi that he 
foresaw a "completely democratic reorganization of all governments in 
Germany. "
Lamartine felt himself prepared for any eventuality; but he still 
denied wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of other lands, 
because the republican form of governments was suited only for the most 
advanced nations.
l^Apponyi to Chancellery St. K. Fr. K., Paris, March 27, 1848, 
HHSA, IV, 297-98.
l^ ibid.
^^Apponyi to Vienna, Paris, March 25, 1848, HHSA, III, 296.
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While Lamartine was confident that Germany was on the eve of 
democratic revolution to culminate the earlier March Revolutions in 
Vienna, Berlin and other capitals, he failed to warn his diplomats of 
the approaching storm in Franco-German relations. Although Lamartine 
told the German diplomats that the German Democrats were leaving Paris, 
his own agents had to learn by hearsay, and his charge in Frankfurt 
stated that, though he had no instructions, he doubted that the Pro­
visional Government would permit such an attack.
Circourt, on special mission in Berlin, felt that he had been
betrayed .by Lamartine by his actions. The special envoy thought that
the "capitol point" for the Germans was that France must oppose by
administrative measures or by force, if necessary, the formation and
the departure of the Freischaren and other armed adventurers menacing
Baden and the Bavarian Palatinate. Lamartine was clearly to be blamed
for these demonstrations. Lamartine told Hatzfeldt that he:
promised to give to Strapburg formal orders by which 
the danger would quickly disappear. . . . The King 
of Prussia and his ministers thanked me that M.
Lamartine by that act of loyalty which rendered them 
an eminent service I . . . But, in reality, nothing 
was done.17
Circourt accused, without evidence, Ledru-Rollin of having given sec­
ret orders opposed to Lamartine's. The extent of French aid to the 
few hundred German Idealists will remain a mystery, but there is no 
doubt that the name of France Republic was not aided by the reaction 
in German public opinion which tended to blame France.
The result of the action or inaction in Paris was a distrust 
of France along the Rhine. Bernays, accompanying Lefebvre, from
l^Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 27, 1848
DDF, I, '439.
17circourt, Souvenirs, I, 249-50; II, 49.
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Strasbourg to Carlsruhe, wrote, April 29, that his superior, the French 
Minister in Baden, and he decided that he should travel around for a 
few days to observe conditions after the "First Baden Revolution," 
Bernays saw troops everywhere, all the trains were armed concentra­
tions ready for action. Southwestern Germany was an armed camp. No 
one thought of a war with Russia. Everyone he heard, in contrast, 
awaited a great attack from France. In the first 24 hours he spent 
in Baden he wrote that he heard over a hundred times that this invas­
ion was possible if Lamartine were unable to dominate Ledru-Rollin.
"It seemed to.Ae that this is the password, because I found the same
18
phrase on all lips."
The Prussian Foreign Minister told Trauttmansdorff, the Austrian
Ambassador in Berlin, that there was no reason for large concentrations
of Prussian troops in the Rhine provinces, because Germany had "nothing
to fear from that direction." He seemed entirely reassured in this
regard, and thought that the security reposed in the "honest character
of M. de Lamartine, of whom he made to me the most positive praises,
as well as in the circumstance that the republican system would con-
19
solidate itself by the decisions of the coming National Assembly."
When the Austrian remarked that some people thought that France 
would sooner or later have to seek her preservation (salut) '.tn spread- 
ing into the neighboring lands, Arnim disagreed. Arnim said that the 
attention of French government was directed elsewhere, because the
l°Bernays to Lamartine, Carlsruhe, April 29, 1848, AEF, 
Mémoires et documents, Allemagne, vol. 170, p. 24. (hereafter MD and 
AlU).
^^Trauttmansdorff to Ficquelmont, Berlin,April 16, 1848, HHSA, 
IV, No. 77 A-B.
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republic was worried about the Due de Montpensier in S p a i n . W h i l e  
Lamartine's projected "Array of the Rhine" and "Array of the Alps" have 
received attention by historians the "Array of the Pyrennes" and the 
specific reference to Spain and the Spanish Marriages by the family 
of Louis Philippe in the Manifesto of March 2 are usually ignored.
Arnim was most likely correct that France feared most a royalist plot 
in southern France supported by an array from Soaln, led by the brother- 
in-law of the Queen of Spain and son of the former King of France.
The claim of Circourt that his position in Berlin was made im­
possible because of the "rejection" of the alliance offer by Lamar­
tine seems unfounded. Arnim is almost overly effusive in his praise 
of the French Foreign Minister, and the issue of the Freischaren that 
Circourt called "the capital point for Germany" apparently hardly 
worried the Prussian Foreign Minister. He was confident that Germany
had nothing to fear along the Rhine, and that the present troops were
21
more than enough to deal with any eventualities.
The next day, the Prussian Foreign Minister spoke with the Bel­
gian diplomatic representative in Berlin and expanded on what he meant 
when he told the Austrian that the republican system would "consolidate 
itself" with the meeting of the National Assembly. Arnim thought that 
the treaties of 1815 existed between powers as facts fixing the territor­
ial state of nations. Changes could come in the ruling houses of a few 
states; Austria, for example, might lose Lombardy and Venetia, but the
ZOlbid.
ZlCircourt, Souvenirs. I, 249.
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twû countries would remain in Italy, without the King of Sardinia's 
necessarily becoming the ruler. He drew a distinction between what 
he called the "territorial" or "national" parts in the 1815 treaties.
The same reasoning could also justify Prussia's "absorption" into Ger­
many, a favorite idea of Arnim. He assured Nothomb that Prussia would 
protect Belgian neutrality in case of French attack, and maintain the 
treaties of 1831 and 1839, but Belgium would not be in danger when the 
French National Assembly met. "The Assembly will be pacific." The 
Belgian concluded, "Baron d'Arnim does not believe that a general war 
will come.
In another conversation with Trauttmansdorff, April 28, Arnim 
reiterated that France was not as warlike as generally believed. He 
added that they had passed in the past two months, the "most danger­
ous epoch, and the pacific disposition of the nation would be even 
more apparent when the Constitutent Assembly met in Paris." When 
asked by the Austrian if he feared war, Arnim replied in the negative, 
then qualified it, "At least not with France."^3
In all of these conversations there is not the slightest indi­
cation that the Prussians associated the risings in Baden with the 
French government or that the "rejection" of the alliance offer had 
put a shadow on French-Prussian relations. Arnim seems to be anything
Z^Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin, April 17, 1848,.. AE9,fX,
152.
23Trauttmansdorff to Ficquelmont, Berlin, April 29, .1848), HHSA, IV, 
No. 87B.
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but dejected about the conduct and policy of the French.
With the German radicals gone, the French government restored
confidence quickly and the party of order completed elections for
officers of the National Guard. The Prince de Ligne reported that the
National Guard was prepared to maintain order. By April 26 and 27 it
was clear that the National Assembly elections would be an immense
victory for Lamartine and the moderate party of the Provisional 
25
Government.
At the same time, the Moniteur published a decree, dated April
19 dissolving the bands of German workers. Lamartine told Normanby
that he had only obtained the assent of his colleagues with a great
deal of trouble and at the cost of concessions on his part for cer-
26
tain internal political and administrative measures.
When Apponyi saw Lamartine, the Foreign Minister told him that
the delay in publishing the decree had been caused by the elections
27
and the wish of the Provisional Government not to lose popularity.
Z^Nearly all general accounts assert that April 15, 1848 the 
French "rejected" the Prussian alliance offer; see, for example, 
Alexander Scharff, "Revolution und Reichsgrundungsversuche,"in Peter 
Rassow (ed.), Deutsche Geschichte; Im Uberblick; Bin Handbuch 
Stuttgart: Europaischer Buchklub, n. d.), p. 433. I find it highly
unlikely that Arnim thought the reply of Circourt was negative. If 
Russia had attacked, the French were committed to defend Germany.
Z^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 25 & 28, 1848, GSA, 
vol. 855, p. 195 ff. Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, April 26, 1848 
AEB, p. 147.
^^Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, April 27, 1848, HHSA, IV, 83. 
2?Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, May 1, 1848, HHSA, IV, 85.
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Lamartine himself never understood the alarm in Germany. He
saw only a few hundred unemployed workers who wished to return home.
He steadfastly refused to admit that the men were more than a group
of tourists that had spent some time in Paris and had privately and
individually decided to return home. He denied that the republic was
ever capable of ulterior motives, because it was guided in its policy
by the "Declaration of the Rights of Men." He was indignant when the
German Diet insinuated that the French were allowing armed bands to
cross their frontier. The French were incapable of such action which
was below the dignity of the republican honor.
The communication that you have received from Colleredo, 
relative to the military measures adopted by the Diet in 
view of an invasion of Germany by German and Polish 
workers coming from our territory to revolutionize there, 
arms in hand, show all the exaggeration of the rumors 
that have been circulated on this subject. It has trans­
formed into an army a few hundred Germans that lack of 
work has forced to return to their country. The Govern­
ment of the Republic did not in the least oppose their 
depart; but, in any case, her sincere respect for the 
rights of men was a sufficient guarantee that no action 
leaving France would be tolerated and still less favored 
from her side against Germany. The workers were sent 
without arms: I did not give them more than the Belgians
and Savoians, that circumstances equally forced to return 
to their homes. . . , Finally, Monsieur, I have proclaimed 
loud enough and often enough the principles of loyalty 
which form the basis of our foreign policy. My language 
in that regard has been, I think, resounding enough that 
doubt can exist of the spirit of the government towards 
peoples. These principles exclude on our part all ideas 
and ulterior motive of propaganda which would be hostile 
to them. The French Republic, you cannot repeat too often, 
will always regard such means as unworthy of her, and does 
not have the taste or the need for recourse to t h e m .28
It is possible that Lamartine was telling the truth. He claimed 
that the Government was far too weak in relation to the radical clubs
^®Lamartine to Salignac-Fenelon, Paris, April 4, 1848, DDF,
I, 610.
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and refugee groups to make a public stand. There was probably an ele­
ment of truth in his claim that he feared for his own life in the sit­
uation, and he was probably relieved to have the worst "anarchists" 
leave Paris. This changed an internal problem of order into an inter­
national incident. Lamartine may have thought that he could afford an 
international incident more than a rising in Paris.
April 12, Schweitzer, the Minister from Baden, went to see 
Lamartine about the expedition of corps francs. Lamartine told him 
that the government found itself in a difficult and dangerous position.
In Paris the most menacing argument of the violent men 
against the government is that it had little sympathy
for foreign enterprises for liberty and gave them little
aid. He himself and several of his colleagues lived 
under the continual menaces of assassination.29
Apparently his claims of "violent and menacing" language have
some substance. The Military Commander of the Lower Rhine sent a
telegraphic despatch to the Minister of Interior, April 18, that in
Strasbourg and other large cities petitions had been received with an
"immense number of signatures'.' asking the government to give 50,000
rifles to the Polish refugees. "The refusal would bring serious 
30manifestations."
Lamartine claimed that he must first gain control of the elec­
tions of officers to the National Guard and use them to help him in the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly. This met with varying degrees 
of credence by the diplomatic corps. At least one person who believed
Lamartine's protestations of innocence was Arnim, the Prussian Foreign 
Minister.
20
Bose to Dresden, Paris, April 13, 1848, Saxony. tp',. gl.
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dated "Strasbourg, April 18," marked "received 10; 30 April 
18," in, AEF, MD, France No. 2125, p. 127.
CHAPTER III 
POLAND AND THE PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE
A major cause of French inaction and lack of effectiveness under 
Lamartine was a fatalism inherent in the thinking of the Foreign Min­
ister. He tended to "forsee" that certain events were "inevitable" 
and would "necessarily" come about. In his conversation with Apponyi 
he showed this fatalistic characteristic and seemed less a pacifist 
than usually assumed.
Lamartine told Apponyi, March 25, that the internal situation 
had improved over the last week. The spirit of the people was excellent 
and all members of the government were in perfect accord. He felt that 
he was stronger than the clubs. He believed that after the events of 
the past week, the fall of Metternich in Vienna, the Berlin Revolution, 
and risings over Germany, that there would be a "general upheaval" 
in Germany. This would not be a social, but a governmental revolution, 
that is, a "completely democratic" organization of all the governments. 
The principal danger he saw for Germany was the emancipation of Poland, 
which would be "the object of all wishes."
That ought, according to him, "inevitably and necessarily" lead 
to a war with Russia, "a power so unpopular and so detested in Germany." 
France would be forceably called to take part in this war. He foresaw, 
without going into the reasons, that this war would not be very bloody.
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and it would be of short duration. Lamartine thought that the danger
I
of an invasion of Lombardy by the Sardinian troops was immediate, and 
he feared that Austria would be unable to defend Lombardy-Venetia, 
and it would be reduced to retreat to an occupation of a few strong­
holds.^ ~
Lamartine's lethargy in sending instructions, complained of by 
2
Circourt, could have been caused less by a "lack of clear policy," as 
Circourt believed, than Lannatine's feeling that his enemy-"reaction"- 
was on the verge of total defeat. His explanation of policy to his 
agents was "perfectly unintelligible," because Lamartine was totally 
"expectant."^
The French confidence worried the Belgian chargé', the Prince de
Ligne.
■fhe proclamation of the King of Prussia was felt to be the 
first application of the idea of German unity and the re­
arrangement of Germany. Just as encouraging for the French 
was the rising in Vienna, which Paris saw as meaning that 
the principle of the dissolution of the Austrian Monarchy 
had triumphed and that each state would separate itself by 
the power of facts. France would be triumphant, because all 
possibility of coalition against her would be impossible.4
In Germany, Lamartine awaited the many democratic revolutions 
which would demand the liberation of Poland, consequent Russian inter­
vention, and the call by Germany for French aid. All of this seemed
^Apponyi to Vienna, Paris, March 25, 1848, HHSA, III, 292-96.
^Circourt, Souvenirs. I, LXVIII.
^Ibid.. I, 401; Gustav %lsner-Mommerque, Drei Missionen; 
Politische Skizzen aus Paris. (Bremen: Schlodtmann, 1850), pp. 3-6.
^Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, March 22, 1848, AEB, XIII, 96.
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"inevitable" to the Frenchman. In the resulting war, the principal 
fighting would be done by the "nation in arms," not the professional 
armies. The nations quickly would triumph over the dynasties, because 
the reactionaries were fighting a losing battle with historical forces. 
This is why Lamartine saw every rising after late February as a tri­
umph of French policy. The eventual break-up of Austrian Monarchy on 
national lines and the rearrangement of Germany were basic to Lamartine's 
concept of the new order in Europe.
The optimistic French policy toward the Great Powers was out­
lined in a circular despatch of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
diplomatic agents attached to the Governments of the North, March 11.
It dealt with the Polish question, and it stated that the cause of 
the reestablishment of a Polish nationality was a cause of France her­
self, one of the causes that she would not desert, nor ever forget.
Poland would be offered the assistance of French diplomacy, and later 
her active help when time and circumstances were favorable. France 
waited for a "sensible combination," of "natural auxiliaries" to in­
tervene with her in the cause of the independence of Poland. The 
French desired peace with Prussia, Austria and Russia; they even 
wished an alliance on terms equitable to all, beneficent for the inter­
mediary nations. "But the first condition for the solidarity of that 
peace, the intimacy of the alliances, is that usurped Poland, oppressed 
without a proper nationality, without civil and religious freedom not 
rise up between you and us." The Northern Courts must restitute, 
emanicpate, organize in concert with Poland herself, in concert with 
all the interested Powers, guarantors of the treaties of 1815.
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France stated that the new order in Poland would be the price 
for friendship and peace between the French Republic and the Northern 
Powers. The alternative would be a precarious, false, hostile source 
of embarrassment, wars and snares. "The durable repose of the world 
is the price.
Under such terms, it is hardly possible to understand why a 
French alliance with Russia necessarily worked against German; unity, 
as Mommsen believed. Lamartine’s conversation with Apponyi of March 
25 demonstrates that German unity was essential to his view of the 
future. The democratic revolutions in the states of Germany would 
prepare the essential condition for the liberation of Poland, the 
demand of the Germans for Polish liberties. The French expected the 
Germans to fire the first shot against the Russians; France would then 
be called to help fight Russia.
The instructions to the new French Minister attached to the 
Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt, Salignac-Fenelon an­
nounced the policy toward Germany. Lamartine referred him to the 
Manifesto, which he thought left no doubt concerning French policy.
Germany, like all of Europe,knows the character and tenden­
cies of the foreign policy of the French Republic. Peace 
and fraternity, these two words are the sincere expres­
sion. The Republic only aspired to form with the other 
states fraternal bonds, . . . which would unite all the 
members of the great family of peoples. The Republic of 
France was pacific and moderate, pure of all abbition and 
all spirit of conquest, France gave . . .  to Germany her 
moral support and example and the power for necessary 
expansion to claim the liberties which could no longer be
^ h e  Minister of Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Agents attached 
to the Governments of the North, Circular, March, 1848, DDF, I,
145.
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denied her. France could meet in the great German nation 
only a friendly people, sympathetic to her institutions 
and her destinies, confident in elevated liberalism.&
Future relations with Germany were seen in terms of states uni­
ted into a "great family of peoples." Germany should obtain her liber­
ties and build a liberal state as friendly to France as the old Confed­
eration had been friendly to Russia and legitimacy.
The instructions for Lefebvre, French Minister at Carlsruhe, 
expressed the wish that fears of a French invasion would dissipate as 
France showed to the world her moral, pacific and disinterested nature, 
the great principles of moderation, of liberty, and of international 
fraternity which ruled her foreign policy. He wrote that the French 
Republic was the ally and friend of all the States, who, like she, 
wished the independence of nations, the maintenance of peace, the 
respect for all laws, the free and legitimate development of the ideas 
of national progress and of civilization.^
Similar instructions were given to the charge in Vienna, Lacour,
but they also expanded on the Circular to the Three Northern Courts
of the day before. Lacour was told to prepare the way for the estab­
lishment of good relations between the two states. The French Republic 
was the friend and ally of all states which, like she, wished the 
maintenance of peace, independence of peoples, the respect for all 
the laws and all the forms of government, the harmony and the frater­
nal; union of nations. She admitted, in fact the treaties of 1815 were
^Lamartine to Salignac-Fenelon, Paris, March 15, 1848, DDF,
I, 214-15.
^Lamartine to Lefebvre, Paris, March 13, 1848, DDF, I, 173-74.
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established and she would take loyal account of them in international 
relations. France would be pacific, but not neglect her major inter­
ests. He specifically mentioned Italy, but not Germany or Poland, in 
the instructions, a good indication of the relative importance of the
O
three questions to France.
Lamartine felt that the efforts toward German unity would lead 
to liberalism and a favorable climate in Germany for Polish liberation. 
France would only benefit by the "political and social transformation" 
of Germany.
I read with great interest the details that you gave on 
the deliberations of the notables at Frankfurt. They 
open for Germany an era of political and social trans­
formation which will belong to the future German par­
liament, their Estates General of the Confederation, to 
prepare and to accomplish the work, if the great task is 
not above its p o w e r .9
The thinking of Lamartine is clear from his language: "futur
parlement germanique, ces Etats généraux de la Confédération"; he ex­
pected the Great Revolution to repeat itself in Germany. Now that an 
"assembléîe des notables" was meeting at Frankfurt, the next step could 
only be their Estates General. The iron law of history, in his miqd, 
was merely working itself out. It was impossible to try to fight the 
forces of history, the liberal trend in Germany. He expected sooner 
or later, that the Powers would realize this and capitulate on his main 
point of policy, the nationalities.
Salignac-Fenelon wrote that:public opinion favorable to a
^Lamartine to Lefebvre, Paris, March 13, 1848, DDF, I, 173-74.
^Lamartine to Salignac-Fenelon, Paris, April 4, 1848, DDF, I,
610.
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republic existed among many of the inhabitants of the German provinces 
bordering on the French R e p u b l i c . N e a r l y  all of the Diet had been 
"renovated," or would be. All of the "retrograde" envoys had been dis­
missed. While the opinion at the Diet was still for constitutional 
monarchy, liberal and republican opinions were expressed every day in 
newspapers. "The workers, and peasants adopt them with avidity."
This could only have pleased the French, as well as the news of the 
interest of the Diet in foreign policy.
During the last two days, jthe Die^ changed a committee 
to examine if it would not be in the interest of the 
Confederation to bind all of the cabinets which compose 
it to proceed against Vienna to renounce Lombardy.
Several ministers of the Diet think that Germany will be 
much stronger if it separates itself from annexed ter­
ritory which belongs to other nationalities. Germany, 
according to them, ought to be composed of a country 
purely German. . . .  On the other side, the partisans of 
Austria in the military.coraraission and others, maintain 
that it is suicide for a great country to permit one of 
its provinces to be detached, that the conduct of Sardinia 
merits a punishment . . .  if Austria must sacrifice one of 
her most beautiful provinces to avoid a general war, the 
peace seems to them too expensive at that price, and she 
will draw the sword with the hope of having a powerful 
coalition come to her aid.11
The interest of France in Italy was to strengthen the "German" 
party, the nationalists, and weaken Austria in Italy, The long-run, 
primary goal of France, driving Austria out of Italy, demanded a 
strong nationalist unification movement in Germany, and her best, most 
obvious potential ally was Prussia. A Prussian, national movement in 
Germany "solved" not only the Italian Question, but also the Polish, 
or so it seemed in early April.
10
‘•Ibid., I, 653-54
■Salignac to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 6, 1848, DDF, I, 652.
11,
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The question of the liberation of Poland has not. ceased 
for an instant to preoccupy the spirits. I have been 
assured that most of the ministers of the Diet, excited 
by the advice of the Permanent Committee of 50 .will 
declare themselves frankly in this sense. They see a 
satisfaction governed, not to the ephemeral passions of 
the multitude, but the real and permanent interests of 
Europe . . .without a doubt, it is hard for Prussia to 
render freedom to the Grand Duchy of Poznan . . . but 
she can buy at that price the ^riving back of Russia to 
the Orient; if Courland, Livonia, German provinces, were 
to be incorporated in Prussia, that country would gain 
by the change. At the same time, if Austria renounced 
Galicia, she could in the near future, find a compen­
sation in the beautiful principalities of the Danube, 
whose possession would be worth for her that of Lom­
bardy and Galicia together. Those are, . . . the gen­
eral views of the majority of the Ministers of the 
Diet. . . . The universal wish . . .  is to remain a
friend of France, to conserve with her the relations of
national confidence.12
Germany was the key to the Polish Question; Austria and Prussia 
could be compensated at the expense of Russia. A neutral Poland as a 
buffer state between Germany and Russia would lessen the influence of 
the reactionary power in central Europe, and proportionately increase 
the influence of revolutionary and republican France. Compensation 
for Prussia in the Baltic would decrease the power of the Russian Em­
pire, removing the Baltic Germans that constituted such an important
part of the Russian military and bureaucratic personnel.
Austria, pushed into the Danuabian Principalities, would have 
poor relations with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and she would be 
dependent on France for military support. This was an important aim 
of French policy in 1848, to get Austria into Moldavia and Wallachia. 
If Austria were no longer in Germany, and gave up her interests in 
Italy, this would leave Italy open for France and would open a new
IZlbid.. I, 654.
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era for French influence In Europe. If Austria concentrated her atten­
tion of the Danube, embroiling herself with Turkey and Russia, she 
would be forced into dependence on France and Prussia, the "liberal" 
powers, and Austria would have to be internally more liberal.
Prussia's new policy of alliance with France for the aid of Pol­
and was proclaimed by her Foreign Minister, Alexander von Arnira, who 
had been the Prussian Ambassador in Paris during the February Revolution, 
in a significantly entitled pamphlet, "The political Memorandum of 17 
March 1848 concerning the French February Revolution and its conse­
quences for Germany," which was published in Berlin, March 20. He gave 
two important acts that Prussia should carry out as soon as possible: 
increase :the* German military potential and declare German neutrality.
This should be in the name of United Germany through 
Prussia, and it should be sent in a circular despatch 
to the four great courts. It must say that Germany in 
the present Situation rejects any alliance with one or
more of the four Great Powers....... Also Prussia can
declare that she, in the name of united Germany or in 
her own, neither directly nor indirectly will take part 
in the battle of Austria which might develop through her 
non-German provinces. The same rejection is awaited from 
the other Great Powers. Lastly, Prussia for herself 
might send at once a secret explanation concerning Pol­
and to the courts of London and Paris. The present, con­
dition of Poland is irreconcilable with the public opin­
ion and with the peace in Europe, so with the European 
balance of power and a healthy policy. The Kipg will 
endanger Prussia and Germany in the near future, if he 
does not begin today to take the reconstruction of Pol­
and into the calculations of his policy. It is better 
to surrender here with freedom and with the usual 
intelligence. This means, in this case, to protect from 
fire in one's own house, to prevent the conflict with 
France and the armed revolution, with the principle of 
sanctity of nationalities, with the general opinion of 
the times. The sacrifice, which Prussia makes from 
carefulness, cannot be compared with what she had to 
gain: . . . the peace alliance (Friedensbandj with 
England and France and a fortress (Vormauer) against 
Russia. . . .  In the interest of peace and the balance
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of power in Europe, Prussia should declare that it is 
ready, on her side, for the restoration of the inde­
pendence and autonomy of old Poland, under the condi­
tion of eternal neutrality.13
The Foreign Minister of Prussia proposed nothing less than a 
diplomatic revolution. In place of the reactionary alliance of the 
Three Northern Courts, he proposed a liberal league of Great Britian, 
Prussia, and France, a "peaceful Band." a Cordon, a ring around Russia, 
the last reactionary power untouched by the revolution in 1848, Most 
important, Prussia refused attempting any longer to oppose the "spirit 
of the age" (allgemeinen Meinune des Zeitalters); in Arnira, France saw 
a new spirit in Prussian diplomacy.
Prussia promised not only to reject help for Austria in Italy, 
but "expected" Russia not to help Austria either. If Frederick 
William TV's statement, "Preussen eeht fortan in Deutschland auf. is 
ambigious, his Foreign Minister's is most explicit; Prussia should 
force "neutrality" on Germany. This liberalism meant, that Austria 
would no longer be able to use the German Confederation to aid her 
against France in'.Italy.
The new principle of Prussian foreign policy was no longer in 
conflict with the principle of the sanctity of nationalities. They 
would no longer infringe on the rights of other nations; imperialism 
was rejected as a goal of foreign policy. The "principle" of nation­
alities had reached the level of international law in the vocabulary 
of Amin, and countries had ‘/‘idiblàCéd" the rights of man by ruling over
13 Alexander von Arnim , Die politische Denkschrift uber die 
franzosische Feb<raar Revolution und ihre Folgen fur Deutschland. 
(Berlin; Wilhelm Herz, 1848), 20-22.
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subject nations. Nationalism (German nationalism especially) was at 
the center of Prussian policy as much as that of the French. Interest­
ingly, Prussia, justified this by the principle of "balance of power," 
which Metternich had used to support legitimacy. France was also linked 
with the "armed revolution"; but to save Prussia from this danger of 
a "fire in their own house," Arnim felt a change in policy was necessary.
The policy was put into effect soon after the memorandum was 
written when King Frederick William IV received a Polish delegation of 
Posen and announced the concessions toward autonomy. "The King promised 
to proceed, with the briefest delay, to the national reorganization of 
the Grand Duchy of Posen.
The special envoy of France in Berlin reported, March 29, that
the King had told the Polish committees and a deputation of Posen he
had done everything for the reestablishment of their nationality that
depended on him.
I implored the Emperor of Russia in the most pressing 
manner, to follow my example, but I foresee that he 
will refuse. . . . Take infinite care that you do not 
commit yourselves too far. I will not aid you to op­
erate by the force of a revolution on the territories 
that the treaties have assigned to the authority of 
the Emperor of Russia.15
In a private conversation, later, the Prussian Foreign Minister 
told Circourt that their offical relations with Russia would become 
precarious because of the Poles that had gathered as an army in Prussian 
territory to deliver Poland. While Prussia "was not prepared to offer 
German troops to the Poles to attack Russia, they would not impede
l^Circourt, Souvenirs. I, 272.
15ibid.. I, 307.
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voluntaries, German or others, coming from France or elsewhere, from 
joining in Poznan the banner of national P o l a n d . T h e  only condi­
tion that Arnim made was that the "auxiliaries" while crossing Prussian 
provinces not be in obviously armed and organized units, "For the 
rest, when they fight for the principle of the construction of indepen­
dent nationalities, that will be for a just principle, that will be 
for our present principle that they fight I
The Frenchman concluded that if the Poles penetrated in arms on
Russian territory and were repulsed, Russia would go to war.
The Prussian nation will impetuously ask for a declara­
tion of war; if the Russians, following their advantage, 
penetrate in turn on Prussian territory, that declaration 
of war will positively be required, and the King of Prussia 
will have to fight his brother-in-law, . . . his former 
ally, unfurl the banner of Germany in a crusade for the 
Poles.18
Two days later, Circourt reported that the Polish organization
of the Grand Duchy of Poanan was a preparation for the reconstruction
of the independent nationality of Poland.
The Prussian cabinet has conceded that organization on 
good faith . . .  it is morally impossible, with these 
facts and with the manifestations which will follow, 
that the Russian government does not see an indirect 
aggression, an hostility against her principle, an 
immediate danger for her interests.19
He outlined what Prussia wished from France if they were attacked 
by Russia.
' l^lbid.. Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, March 29, 1848, I, 307.
l^Ibid.. Circourt's italics.
IGlbid.. 307-08.
^^Ibid.. Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, March 31, 1848, I,
325-26.
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Eicst, a solemn declaration of alliance and of political 
solidarity with that which concerns the reconstruction 
of the Polish nationality; that would give her [Prussi^ 
a moral support of considerable value. Second, if they 
asked us, to send a squadron into the Baltic to operate 
as a diversion; two ships with our flag would suffice 
to increase notably the force and confidence of the 
Polish national party and their German auxiliaries.^®
Circourt also mentioned that the governmental situation in Berlin 
was strong enough, but, with the fall of the present cabinet, the mon­
archical government might collapse with it, and this could only logi­
cally lead to a "political dissolution" of Prussia. The Grand Duchy of 
Poznan was already in full anarchy; Circourt thought that the aid of 
France's prestige might bolster the present cabinet, especially in the 
eyes of the Polish radicals. He concluded that the reply of the French 
to the Prussian alliance offer was awaited with anxiety.
The Prussian military alliance proposal must have caused an 
extensive debate in Paris, one stage of which perhaps was the announce­
ment of General Chagarnier, April 10, as "extraordinary envoy and 
plenipotentiary in Prussia."^2
The Paris reply, dated April 4, arrived in Berlin on April 15, 
and it was not new official instructions asked for by Circourt but a 
personal letter signed by Champeaux, the personal secretary of Lamar­
tine. He emphasized the transitory character of the present situation 
and the difficulty of planning. Most important, he stressed the pres­
ent weakness of the Provisional Government.
ZOlbid.
Zllbid.. I, 325-28.
22ibid.. I, 331, footnote.
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Our affairs take each day'a better turn . . . except for 
the financial situation. . . . Each day gained is in it­
self an improvement. We are on the eve of the elections 
for the National Guard, and the National Guard so organ­
ized will aid us in elections for the Assembly. . . .
You will probably not receive the new instructions that 
you desire and have asked for in all of your letters. It 
would be imprudent to build on shifting sands. Also your 
mission is mainly to watch, to estimate and to observe.
If Russia attacks Prussia and invades her territory 
seizing Poznan, France will support Prussia by force.
You can use that phrase confidentally and in conversation 
but without going further; in a time where every 
eventuality can be realized from one day to another, it 
is necessary to work with great reserve and to avoid any­
thing precise not to entangle the future.23
With the information that Circourt had supplied on the precar­
ious situation in Prussia, with the exaggerated hopes of the French 
Foreign Minister for a republican triumph in Germany, this was a very 
positive answer to the proposed alliance of Berlin. It can hardly be 
used as "evidence" of French hostility toward Germany or German uni­
fication. It is rather a reflection of the basic thought in French 
diplomacy of 1848, "a time where every eventuality could be realized 
from one day to another." Everything was possible. Even a revolution 
in Russia, after that in Vienna, did not seem out of the range of the 
probable'. Under such conditions,Lit was not a time for "entangling 
alliances." However, a Russian invasion would have meant the support 
of EkehgbJarhs, but the specific proposal of a French squadron in the 
Baltic depended, not the least of all, on England and on French com­
mitments in Italy. Circourt never understood that Germany was only 
part of the total French policy. It was impossible that France make 
this her sole interest. Under such conditions, it is hardly surprising 
that no more specific instructions were given to Berlin. France had 
her own policy with Russia.
^^Ibid.. I, 329-30, footnote.
CHAPTER IV 
RUSSIA AND FRANCE
Immediately after the February Revolution, the Russian Ambas­
sador In Berlin, Peter von Meyendorff, thought that a war was Inevi­
table, but the Prussian cabinet was hardly ready to accept his offer 
of 200,000 Russian troops to be sent to the Rhine.
It Is Idle to ask If France will recognize existing treat­
ies. They will recognize all, only to agitate for the 
chance of success, they will reorganize their army, estab­
lish order In the Interior, send emissaries everywhere, 
make propaganda for the revolution and will only make an 
eruption of the German soil when It Is mined on all parts.
Against the danger there, only one means Is available, to 
arm and pronounce military judgment on the makers of plots 
and risings.1
He found Europe on the eve of a long war of principles and of 
propaganda with the republic opposing the monarchy, the nations against 
nations, each fighting for Its existence. "For us. It seems to me 
essential not to arrive too late as In 1805 and 1806."^
The letters of the Russian Ambassador show a mirror Image of 
Lamartine, both feeling that the progress of the revolution was 
"Inevitable." In all of Meyendorff's conversation and letters, there 
Is a fixation on the. wars of the first revolution. In the letter
^Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 8, 1848, March 2, 1848, 
In Peter von Meyendorff, Eln russlscher Diplomat an den HSfen von 
Berlin und Wien. 0. Hotzsch (ed.) (Berlin: W. de Gruyther, 1923), II, 
38-42. (hereafter, Mey Corr.).
^Ibld.. II, 39.
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above, 1805 and 1806 are mentioned; later, the "lesson" of history 
would concentrate on 1812 and the defensive power of Russia. No less 
than In France, Russians feared fatalistically that all of Europe 
would turn against Russia.
Before the March Revolutions In Vienna and Berlin, the Russians 
had hoped that Berlin would meet and turn back "the revolution." On 
March 12, the Tsar and the Tsarina wrote Frederick William IV In 
friendly trust that he would "save Europe," and they were painfully 
disappointed, March 26, when the news came to St. Petersburg of the 
Berlin Revolution. Nesselrode wrote that they would be on the defense, 
concentrate as many troops as possible In Poland. With time, the warmth 
for the Poles In Berlin would cool, he thought.^
Meyendorff also wrote from Berlin, "In general, our role Is that 
of an expectant observer. When positions are more clearly taken, we 
will see the situation better."^ His prediction, a week later, was 
that the first act of the social revolution In Berlin with the triumph 
of the bourgeoisie united with the worker would lead to a second act:
"The bourgeoisie will defend their property, the tranquility of the 
city and public order personified In the royalty." This would cause a 
break with the workers which would result In civil war. The army 
would thanuenter Berlin to support the bourgeoisie.^
%llly Andreas (ed.), "Der Brlefwechsel Kodig Friedrich Wilhelm 
IV. und des Zaren Nikolaus I. von Russland In den Jabren 1848 bis 1850,"
In Forschune zur brandenburelschen und preusslschen Geschlchte. XLIII, 
(1930), 131.
^Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 17, 1848, Mey Corr. II, 48.
^Meyendorff to Paskevlch, Berlin, March 25, 1848, Mey Corr. II,
53-54.
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The greatest danger to Russia was the republican'party's com­
ing to power In Germany. This would have meant an Immediate war with 
Russia for the Polish cause.^ "The hole of Russia ought to be to Im­
pede the junction of Germany with revolutionary Poland."? A few days 
later, he thought the situation had Improved for Russia In Berlin, and, 
by gaining time, they had the double chance of a change In public opln-
Q
Ion and a consolidation of government In Prussia.
Kiselev wrote from Paris that Russia should avoid an open split 
with France, because of the exposed position of Russia following the 
events In Vienna and Berlin, which basically "destroyed the political 
system of Europe. Austria has fallen apart and vanishes for us. Prus­
sia no longer exists as a conservative power, as an ally of Russia."9 
This loss of support for Russia In Germany made It most Impro- 
tant to avoid an open break with France at all costs. The Immediate 
danger to Russia was a Polish-German alliance. If France were alien­
ated, then almost the entire continent would be supporting Poland.
Circourt wrote to Lamartine of the Weakness of the Russians:
Their means of resistance In Poland consist only of their 
army on the Vistula and their fleet In the Sund. Hence­
forth, they will have no more allies; . . . Army In the
Gibld.. II, 52.
?Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 29, 1848, Mey Corr.
II, 57.
^Meyendorff to Paskevlch, Berlin, Apt11 1, 1848, Mey Corr. II,
59.
^Klseiev to Nesselrode, Paris, March 29, 1848, quoted In M. N. 
Pokrovsky, "Lamartine, Cavalgnac und Nikolaus I.," In Hlstorlsche 
Aufs&tze. (Vienna: Verlag fur llteratur und Polltlk, 1928), p. 104.
lOlbld.
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Kingdom of Poland today is two corps, each of 50,000 on 
paper, 35,000 in reality. In seven of eight weeks, 
there will be four corps, a real force of 140,000 com­
batants . .
The latest study of Russia in 1848 concurs in the estimation of Russia's
weakness in the spring of 1848.
Because Tsarism was militarily poorly prepared, and the 
troops must have been left behind for the practical pur­
pose of police functions in colossal territories, (for 
example, the Baltic, Kingdom of Poland, Lithuania, a part 
of White Russia and the Ukraine), Nicholas I not only had 
to give up all plans of aggression for immediately fight-■ 
ing the European revolution, but he was also forced, for 
a few months, to wait in a defensive position. . . .  In 
the spring, 1848, because of conditions in Russia itself 
Nicholas Pavlovich really feared an invasion of Prussia,
Austria, and even F r a n c e .12
The plan for invasion of Prussia made by Nicholas I in 1848
that Schiemann thought written in March expressed the hope that "We
march in not as an enemy, but as former friends." At the end of the
first period of fighting the Russians would have paused at the Vis-
1tula, to see if all of Germany joined Prussia.
Against the background of the isolation and weakness of Russia, 
which Lamartine believed, the interview with Kiselev in April is 
comprehensible. Kiselev saw the Foreign Minister to inform him of a 
letter from Nicholas of April 7. He read only the lines which assured 
the French government of the impossibility of Russian intervention in 
the inner affairs of France.
Lamartine was pleased and added his own peaceful views to those
l^Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, March, 1848, Souvenirs, I, 308.
l^A. S. Nifontov, Russland im Jahre 1848. quoted in Ernst Birke, 
pp. 278-79.
^^Nicholas I., "Russian Angriffe und Anschlage auf Deutschland 
vor Nikolaus II., "Theodor Schiemann (ed.), Suddeutsche Monatshefte 
February, 1915, p. 611.
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of the Tsar. He spoke of the public opinion of France and their sym­
pathy for the Poles, and he attempted to pose as the "man of order"
in the midst of the chaos, preventing by his own genius a hasty march
to Warsaw. He told the Russian chargé'that while no one had hindered 
the Poles' leaving France, one had to get rid of these disorderly peo­
ple somehow. This led Lamartine to make the famous offer of the
"natural alliance" of France and Russia.
During my diplomatic career. . . .  I often thought about 
the mutual hostility of France and Russia and came to the 
conclusion that the most natural alliance for France is 
an alliance with Russia. When the Polish Question had not 
produced a certain sympathy in France, this alliance would 
have long ago existed to aid both peoples, whose spirits 
are much more closely related than any other two peoples.
All of this is only a question of time and good circum­
stances.14
Lamartine had a "great trust in the wisdom and the power of his 
majesty the Tsar." He conceded that France, at the time,was in a posi­
tion where a government had been toppled and the new one was not yet 
secure. He thought, however, in a country like France with so much 
"healthy good sense',V such a respect for family and property, the day 
was near when order in Paris would be achieved. He thought that France 
has passed through the worst already. In eight or ten days, the Nat­
ional Guard of 200,000 men would be organized. Already, he had at his 
disposal 15,000 mobiles and 20,000 dependable troops of the line sur­
rounding Paris. They could be marched into the city to put down the 
"criminal element" and the club fanatics.
This was not Lamartine's only attempt for an alliance^, nor were
14pokrovsky, pp. 106-09.
ISlbid.
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his overtures summarily rejected by Russia. Nesselrode wrote to 
Meyendorff, May 20, "Lamartine, is making us enthusiastic advances, 
that one here by all means does not take n e g a t i v e l y . T h e  principal 
Russian diplomatic offensive for a French alliance was in late summer. 
Pokrovsky's article is invaluable for our understanding of Lamartine, 
because it substantiates the Russian side of his policy. The French 
policy had not changed from the earlier Circular to the Three Northern 
Courts and the Manifesto. As before, Russia, Prussia and Austria had 
only one great factor preventing good relations; Poland. "All was 
only a question of time and good circumstances" to Lamartine. As soon 
as Poland was reconstituted, good relations would result with no dif­
ficulties. Lamartine took pains to present his positions as precarious, 
having to please French public opinion which wished a Polish state 
immediately. He, however, felt that time was on the side of France, 
and if France could wait things would take care of themselves.
Lamartine made a crude appeal to the intelligence of the Tsar.
He felt that there was a possibility that Nicholas would realize there 
was no hope for resistance against all of Europe. To hold out against 
history was futile. An alliance with France to give up Poland when 
Prussia was already making plans for the war and when Austria was writ­
ing constitutions for the parts of the realm seemingly in full dissolu­
tion - of what value could this alliance have been to Russia? If 
Russia gitver up at the cost of war, she could also lose the Baltic pro­
vinces to Prussia and the Danubien Principalities to Austria, and gain 
no compensation! Under the right circumstances, an alliance of France
IGlbid.. p. 98.
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and Russia might have been advantageous to Russia, and the Russians 
came to this conclusion during the summer of 1848.
Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg during the last of March, Nicholas 
I had an interview with a special envoy of Austria, Count Thun. The 
Tsar was most friendly saying "Austria was always my most loyal ally" 
and that he would "never abandon Austria." He saw a great difference 
in the revolutions in Vienna and in other states, especially Prussia. 
The ministry in Vienna still had "honest men" as opposed to Berlin 
where they had "hunted in the streets" for ministers. Nicholas also 
showed a flexibility in thinking that is seldom granted him by his­
torians. "Changes had become indispensable, one had unfortunately 
delayed them too long in Austria. . . . You have still elements 
of strength and stability."
Nicholas was concerned with the constitution for the Austrian
Empire, and particularly if it would be unitary or separate for the
different provinces. Count Thun replied that in such a large empire
it would be difficult to make one constitution that would meet the
needs of all the regions. After Thun stated that he did not know if
Cracow would be reestablished as a free state, Nicholas again stated
his friendship for Austria under all circumstances. He began in a
most unreactionary vein.
I know well that the world suspects from me very unconsti- 
tional intentions; however, I understand perfectly the 
power of circumstances of situations that one cannot op­
pose. It would not be I who distanced himself from 
Austria, not I who hindered her development. I cannot 
even comprehend that the policy of Austria and Russia 
could separate and follow different lines, but that is a 
vital question for us. Never and in no manner would I 
allow a Bouxce of insurrection at my door and in contact 
with my Polish friends. If one thought of such a change
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if a revolution broke out in Galicia. . . .  I would be 
forced, in spite of myself, to intervene . . . and I
would not hesitate for a single instant to cross the
frontier of Austria to reestablish order in the name of 
Emperor Ferdinand.
When he spoke of events in Berlin, Nicholas clearly showed great
indignation about the King, whom he referred to several times as the
"PflasterkottAg." He seemed to have been deeply insulted by the perfidy
of Frederick William IV.
I confess . . . that in the time when he was still King.
I, myself, counsëléd him, seeing that all was going badly 
in Germany, that a center of power was absolutely nec­
essary and that Austria could not occupy the place which 
she ought by right. . . .  I said, 'put yourself at the 
head of Germany, not as a usurper, but as an administra­
tor until Austria could or would take her natural place.'
But now that he has made himself king of the street, that 
he has put himself under the protection of the rabble, 
this is absolutely ridiculous.18
The Tsar advised the Prussian King to unify Germany in the in­
terval between the French February Revolution and the Berlin March Days. 
Nicholas was not opposed to German unification, per se, and he was out­
raged by Frussia.'.when the crown mixed with the rabble in the March Days.
The German Liberal unificationists, especially in Frankfurt and 
Berlin, were violently anti-Russian, and a war with Russia was univer­
sally regarded as the only means to unify Germany. The lack of Russian 
hostility to German nationalism in itself is shown in the correspondence 
of Meyendorff, March 19. He favored measures that would fortify the 
unity of Germany.
l^Vicomte Eugene de Guichen, Les grandes Questions europeenes 
et la diplomatie des puissances sous la seconde république française. 
(Paris: Victor Attinger, 1925), I, 76-77.
IBibid.. I, 79. Italics in original.
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In spite of the admitted hatred which would be unleashed 
against us, I do not cease to favor that which can impede 
Ghat Germany not break into pieces, not divide herself
into two great divisions^.......If there is still a means
of saving the unity of Germany, it is here [in Berlin] 
that ought to come the impulse. God help that it succeed 1 
The more that Germany is weak and divided, the greater 
she will be open to influences of the republic, the closer 
the danger approaches our frontiers. Let the Germany,en­
lightened in their true interests, understand that Russia 
can only desire her strong, united, not having propaganda 
to exercise and desiring only that the France of 1848 not 
exercise it to our detriment 119
The myth that Russia wanted Germany weak and divided seems open 
to question in early March,1848. After the March Days, the indignation 
was against the King of Prussia personally; moreover, an Austrian domi­
nation of Germany "reconstituted solidly and with sufficient guarantees 
of stability" was favored by the cabinet of St. Petersburg in Late Marchr^®
The hostility of Russia to German unification was no more "inevi­
table" in 1848, than it ■was in 1871. Nicholas' interest was more in 
the method by which Germany was unified. Some of the violence of his 
language in late March originated from Frederick William's not taking 
his advice to unify Germany, but instead turning towards the liberals.
The Prussian King refused to declare himself the "administrator" of 
Germany in early March.
Nicholas was more interested in Russia than in preventing change 
in Germany or of actively opposing the revolution by fire and sword.
He was disturbed by the russophobia which manifested itself in Europe;
He told Thun, the Austrian charge;
l^Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 19, 1848, Mey Corr.
II, 49.
^^Guichen, I, 79-80.
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I think that we have proved enough that we do not search 
for a war, not for aggrandizements; that which I desire 
with all my heart is the power to build a true Chinese 
wall against the rest of Europe and to cut completely 
all communication with her; also not to allow any more 
foreigners to enter this side of the earth, then I would 
be happy. Unfortunately, we have here a sea port where 
it is almost impossible to watch the entrance.21
On April 10 Nicholas was enraged about Prussia, about Germany,
and the German press in general. He blamed the conduct of the King of
Prussia whom he called "bête" and "lache." The Emperor told the Comte
de Bray, the Bavarian agent, that he had already conquered Poland once,
and that if it was necessary, he would reconquer it. He said that he
did not search for war and certainly would not pass his frontiers until 
22he was attacked.
Russia became more defensively minded, as even Austrians talked 
of a war of Germany against Russia as a "happy diversion" in early 
April. There was no power that Russia could depend upon, and an 
alliance with France had the advantage of the distance. France was 
far from Poland; after the German War was over it could not be certain 
what Russia would actually have to do for Poland.
Later, Nicholas had another rationalization. While the republi­
can party was very small in Russia, the constitutional monarchy party
Zllbid.. I, 80.
^^Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, April 10, 1848,
Ibid.. I, 95.
^^Vitzthum to his Mother, Vienna, April 7, 1848, in Karl F. 
Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Berlin und Wien in den Jahren 1845-52:
Politische Privatbriefe des damalingen K. Sachs. Legations- 
sekretars Carl Friedrich. . . (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen, 1886),
p . 89.
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was a constant threat to his internal position. He could afford to 
have an alliance with a republic like France, while proximity to a 
constitutional monarchy would endanger his place in Russia.
Lamartine was willing to have an alliance with Russia ''under 
the right conditions." The terms were given in the Circular to the 
Three Northern Courts; Poland must first be reconstituted, then good 
relations would automatically follow. He thought that the war with 
Russia was "inevitable", but he also wished to give Nicholas the chance 
to save his throne by compromise before it was too late. Lamartine 
wished to offer Nicholas a Tilsit without Friedland. He thought the 
choice of war was Nicholas' to make.
^^Edmond Bapst, Les origines de la guerre de Crimee; La France 
et la Russie de 1848-1854. (Paris; Charles Delagave, 1912), p. 7.
CHAPTER V 
AUSTRIA AND FRANCE
Austria was alternatively the greatest danger for French policy 
and the finest opportunity for negotiation. She was the stumbling block 
opposing German, Italian and Polish national movements. If Austria 
could be gained for the French program; all was within reach; Europe 
would necessarily be reconstituted on national lines. With Austria 
the French alternately used threats and allegations of friendship.
The goal was always the same. The role of Austria under the Metternich 
system in Italy and Germany was to be reversed and a new direction must 
be given to the Austrian "mission."
The most pressing danger was an Austrian war in northern Italy 
in which France herself could be involved. Lamartine spoke with the 
Austrian charge in dialectical terms, saying he wished only peace, but 
he was unable to see how war could be avoided. He declared that France 
wished to have good relations with the Austrians, but public opinion 
in France and Austrian policy would "inevitably" involve the two in 
war. Lamartine even alleged that he thought the Austrians would be 
fighting for a just cause, but the French were fatalistically trapped 
in a position opposing Austria in spite of themselves.
When he saw the Austrian charge on March 1, he spoke to him 
bluntly.
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It is above all with you, Austria, and relatively to the 
Italian affairs, that we fear collisions. . . .  We res­
pect your rights of legitimate possession of the states 
of Lombardy and Venetia, and recognize your right to 
maintain them against foreign attacks.^
If the Sardinians attacked Lombardy, the French situation would 
be "delicate and embarrassing." If such a war resulted in an invasion 
of Piedmont by Austria, it would be difficult for France to stay out of 
the conflict. Apponÿi protested in vain that such a situation would 
only be the result of an invasion of their territory which Lamartine 
had recognized as just.
Lamartine affirmed the full justice of his statement, but plead­
ed that the Provisional Government could not resist the demands of 
public opinion which demanded help for the oppressed peoples. He said 
that the French regarded the commitment to Italy of long duration.
"This conflict alone worries us seriously. We will search by all pos­
sible means to prevent it."^
Lamartine said that the Italian Question was the only conflict 
that really preoccupied him. He found Belgium tranquil, and even if 
the Belgians wished a republic-which he doubted- he denied that he 
would like to have it attached to the French Republic. He character­
ized the Republic as essentially contrary to all spirit of conquest.
He did not fear the agitation on the Rhine provinces, and denied that 
France wanted anything at all in that area.^
^Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 8, 1848, HHSA, No. 21 
Letter A-B, III, 242-44.
Zibid.
^Ibid.
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Lamartine also told Apponyl that he had great conffedence in the 
reestablishment of order in the country. He said that the Provisional 
Government was very strong and that everyone felt the need to rally to 
and support it. The National Guard of Paris, which had been only 80,000 
at the time of the revolution, had been raised in two weeks to 220,000 
and there were 20,000 troops of the line around Paris. He was most 
worried about the financial crisis, but, in general,he was very confi­
dent.
Apponyi told Hatzfeldt that Lamartine said, "If, unfortunately, 
war should come, I know, at least, that it will be a small limited war 
which will be over quickly."^
As Austria and Sardinia neared war, France also had poor rela­
tions with the government of Charles Albert. During April, there was 
an invasion of Italians and French into Savoy, similar to the Baden 
conflict, which hardly improved the French image in Sardinia.
When Brignole, the Sardinian Ambassador, sent a note complain­
ing to Lamartine about the lack of official action by the French in 
preventing the "corps francs" and from passing the frontier, Lamartine 
replied by letter, inclosing the letters sent by the government com­
missars of Lyon,Grenoble and Bourg. These functionaries asserted that 
they had done all that was possible to oppose the march of these bands. 
They also wrote that they had given no arms to the corps francs and ex­
horted them to disperse and renounce the execution of their project. 
Briginole told Hatzfeldt that he did not think that the French had done
^Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 9, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 76
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much to prevent the violation of Sardinian soil.5
Perhaps Lamartine was not lying? The Prussian chargé wrote the 
next day that the defeat of the corps francs in Savoy was causing unrest 
in Lyon.^ By the ninth, he wrote that "a large part of the population" 
had resolved to invade Savoy because of the mishandling of the French 
citizens among the invaders. Normanby asked Lamartine why he had not 
used the army to prevent the crossing of the frontier. Lamartine re­
plied that he dared not try, because he feared that the troops them­
selves would be dragged into the invasion.^
The French concentration of troops in the Lyon and Grenoble 
region under the title of the "Army of the Alps" caused a great worry 
to Sardinia and to Austria. When Thom asked Lamartine about these 
soldiers, he said that in case of a conflict in Lombardy, the French 
wished to "prepare themselves for the eventualities of war." The 
troops would not participate in any revolutionary action in Italy. He 
assured the Austrian charge that no one in the provisional Government 
was hostile to the court in Vienna in this matter. He admitted that a 
proposition had been made to send an observer to the headquarters of 
Charles-Albert to follow the events of the war more closely, but this 
had been rejected. Lamartine thought that the presence of a French 
officer there would be "falsely interpreted." The second reason for 
the Army of the Alps was the agitation in Lyon and southern France.
^Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, April 7, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p.15?.
^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 8, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 160.
^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 9, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 166.
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Lamartine said, "The Provisional Government not only abstained from all 
interference in the interior affairs of other countries, but also will
O
prevent and reprimand all extra-governmental action in this sense."
This conversation is typical of all those of Thom and Lamartine. 
Lamartine denied all motivation hostile to Austria and actively sought 
better relations. While the attempts in early May to obtain an alliance 
with Russia are well known, the direct offer of alliance to Austria is 
published here for the first time. The territorial offer to Austria 
was renewed by his successor. Bastide, twice and is the basis of French 
policy toward Austria in 1848. Far from an "undeclared philosophical 
war" with Austria that he claimed in his History of 1848, Lamartine 
made every effort to trade territory with Vienna, and, as the margin 
indications denote, these French overtures were taken seriously by 
Vienna.
Apponyi had visited Lamartine for the last time before taking 
a summer vacation, and Lamartine took the occasion to explain French 
policy. He repeated that Italian affairs were the most dangerous 
for the maintenance of peace in Europe. "He hoped that the court of 
Vienna would succeed in resolving peaceably the questions pending to­
day in the peninsula." Lamartine attempted to show his friendship for 
Austria by casting doubt on their support for Sardinia. He was mis­
trustful of King Charles Albert and of his conduct marked by "weakness 
and extreme versatility," and he would not have been astonished if the 
sovereign were mixed-up in secret negotiations with Austria, only mak­
ing a "comedy of resistance." Lamartine then changed the subject to 
possible compensations for Austria's losses in Italy.
®Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, April 9, 1848, HHSA, IV, 32-36. 
italics in Vienna.
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The üourt of Vienna could find in the DanuMan Principalities a 
compensation for the loss of her states in Italy; The French 
government desires that Austria should be strong on this side 
and if it is necessary, it would be prepared to arrive at an 
understanding for that end.9
Lamartine again repeated that the primary interest of France was 
Italy, ignored entirely the Danish war of the German Confederation, 
where Austria is a member. He ignored Poland and the Austrian possess­
ion of Galicia. Instead of talking of old frictions between France 
and Austria, he shifted the discussion to the east, a favorite object 
of Romantic dreaming among poets. How much real reflection stimulated 
this policy decision?^^
On Moldavia and Wallachia the ambitions of the Ottoman Empire, 
Russia, Austria and even the Hungarians-not an unimportant consideration 
in May of 1848 for Austria-came together. The declaration that Austria 
should be "forte de ce coté" could mean a conflict with Russia and Tur­
key, but open new opportunities for the Austrians now plagued by the 
unruly Hungarians and other internal troubles. The control of the mouth 
of the Danube could also involve her in conflict with grain-importing 
England. 16 i<j possible that the entire plan of a Dual Alliance of : 
Bismark had been thought-out over a quarter of a century before by the
^Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, May 1, 1848, HHSA, IV, 86-87, 
italics in Vienna.
lOln a year of French statesmen so selfconsciously trying to 
imitate the "great Revolution," it is possible that the Foreign Minis­
try could have been inspired by an old memorandum submitted to Napol­
eon after Austerlitz, recommending similar compensations for Austria 
along the Danube. See the documents in Pierre Bertrand, "M. de 
Talleyrand, l'Autriche et la question d'orient en 1805," Revue 
historique. XXXIX (1889), 63-75.
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foreign policy planners in Paris? The myth of Pokrovsky that a French 
alliance with Russia must have been at the expense of Germany should be 
rejected. Paris was quite willing to divide the Empire of the Ottoman 
Turks, On such terms as these, even Nicholas I might have been inter­
ested, Nothing was sacred to Lamartine, and everything seemed possible 
by negotiation, The criticism of the Duke de Broglie of Lamartine's 
faith in diplomacy seems to have had a solid basis.
CHAPTER VI
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION
In writing of the French policy in 1848 most authors have assumed 
that most of the information used by the Foreign Minister came from reg­
ular diplomats. Under Lamartine and Bastide, irregular agents and their 
role in shaping the picture of German conditions has been seldom assessed. 
Most of the travelers were radical republicans, and their reports reflec­
ted a political bias; they tended to be far too optimistic about the 
success of the progress of the revolution in Germany, and they consis­
tently predicted greater and more violent uprisings. The agents also 
tended to present Germany as overwhelmingly pro-French and seldom 
wrote of the francophobie among the lower classes.
The finest analysis of Germany at mid-century in the French arch­
ives of the Quai d'Orsay is an unsigned, undated memorandum that cannot 
have been written later than July, 1848. It warned of a hostility 
toward France of the German people who dwelt on the past invasionscdf 
the Rhine valley by the French. The Germans on the Rhine hated the 
Prussians, but they hated the French more. In fact, the central Ger­
mans were much less hostile toward France than the Rhine Germans who 
refused to rebuild the ruins of Louvois. They feared, like the Bel­
gians and Swiss, being absorbed by France and did not wish to be deta­
ched from the "German family." The national sentiment had grown at a
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great rate for the past three years, increasing their hostility toward 
France. Not only was the rejection of France growing but it was a direct 
result of German national movement. Most interestingly, he thought that 
the francophobie was a movement of the people, more than governments.
The governments in the wars with Austria had been more moderate than the 
populations. The memorandum contained the warning that the German nat­
ional movement, while not so barbaric as Spain had been to Napoleon, 
was distinctly hostile to France along the Rhine.^
Bourgoing, the French Minister in Munich, thought that Germany
could do more in a few weeks than temporizing and carehhad accomplished
in ten years, if a war did not break out. He thought Germany was on
the verge of turmoil, and the new governments would be closer to the
2
people and friendlier to France.
The first letter of Salignac-Fenelon as charge in Frankfurt 
assumed that the old cabinets of Germany which had infringed on the 
treaties of 1815 as they had infringed on the constitutions, had been 
reversed. Their successors had been elected by public opinion more 
than by princes and understood that the treaties, violated so often, no 
longer had an obligatory force for France. The princes were pleased 
that France intended to respect territorial limits of Germany, a pledge
%D, Al, vol. 171, pp. 4-8. This document mentions that men 
over age sixty could speak in French in the Rhine area, because of 
their service in the French army. It also talked of the trains that 
connected the Rhine with France, Switzerland and the countries to the 
north. The extreme German nationalist party was called the "Gotha 
Party," so it definitely antedated the Frankfurt Assembly. It seems 
reasonable to condlude that it dates from early 1848, since an average 
age of 24 for soldiers in the Grand Napoleonic Army of 1812 is rational, 
but it cannot be dated later than July, when there were new names for 
the "Gotha Party."
^Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 10, 1848, DDF, I, 124-27.
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of the pacific intentions of France. Germany wished fraternity toward 
France, liberty for all, themselves and the other unfortunate nations,
Q
especially Poland,
A curious source on public opinion in Germany toward France is 
preserved in the Paris Army Archives, a series of "Notes for the mili­
tary operations section," by one Roly Nautier. They are taken from 
morning reports of garrisons and commissars along the German border, 
and record dissatisfaction in Belgium, Luxemburg, and German frontier 
regions and friendly attitudes toward France.^ Their principle im­
portance is that they show the bond that the French thought existed 
between the people of Germany and the idea of democracy in a time of 
flux, March, 1848.
The chaotic nature of March, which so radically transformed 
Germans that their history, 1815-1848 is always referred to as 
"Vormarz", is conveyed in the personal letters of another traveler- 
informant of Lamartine, "Lienard." He recorded the rising in Aachen 
accompanied with violence and disorder, when news came of the great 
risings in Berlin. There were inevitable murmurs for autonomy for 
the Rhine provinces from Prussian domination.^
He thought that the Rhine provinces would only declare
^Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 21, 1848, DDF,
I, 321.
^Archives Historiques de la Guerre, Paris, Mémoires et Recon- 
aissances 1514 Confederation germanique, 1842-1853, (hereafter AHG 
& MR)).
5por the discontent in the Rhine under Prussian rule, see,
Oscar J. Hammen, Separatist Tendencies in the Rhine Provinces: 1815- 
1850. (University of Wisconsin, dbfctoVal dissertation, 1941).
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themselves independent as a last extremity, but, if they did, they 
would ask for the protection of F r a n c e . ^
The greatest fear in Aachen was that the King of Prussia would 
ally himself to the Czar and that they would crush the Poles together. 
By March 25, Lienard thought that, within two weeks, the cities of the 
Rhine would ask for French aid, because the King would never give them 
what they asked. He thought that it was necessary for France to decide 
what they would do if the Rhine provinces sought French protection and
support, in a week or two.^
Another agent writing about affairs in Germany in mid-March was 
a M. Wersaint, who wrote to Dupont de l'Eure, a member of the Provisf 
ional Government, and he in turn sent it to Lamartine. His report gave 
details on the inhabitants of Germany. He contradicted Lié^nard in 
thinking that the Germans across the Rhine loved their nationality and 
were proud of it to the point of giving their last drop of blood for 
the integrity of their territory. Nevertheless, the German people on
the French side of the Rhine were French to the heart, and would be
loyal under all circumstances.
The group to fear were the nobles across the Rhine who were in
danger of losing their privileges and perogatives. They wished to
prevent their ruin, and might have recourse to falsehood and suspicion 
to discredit a republic. Under the mask of liberalism they recalled 
to the peasants and artisans scenes of 1793, the invasions of the 
Republic, the conquests of Napoleon, his ambition, and his despotism.
^Lienard to [bamartini] , Aix, March 21, 1848, DDF, I, 331-32.
^Lienard to Lamartine, Aix, March 25, 1848, DDF, I, 423-24;
March 26, 1848, I, 424-25.
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To keep peace, France needed to repeat unceasingly to officials 
and in the papers that France respected the nationality oi ail peoples 
and the integrity of their territory, that she would not declare war 
on any people, but that if a sovereign dared to deny a nation the right 
to reconquer their liberties or develop more advanced institutions, the 
French Republic, continuing to respect all the national integcity of 
all the territory, would regard the sovereign as guilty of 1 - se- humanité 
and Lese-nation. He thought that proclaiming such a manifesto would re­
assure the people well disposed toward a republic and tetrity the despots.&
While Lienard thought an active military intervention should be 
prepared, Wersaint opposed any hint of military invervention, and he 
thought a manifesto would encourage those friendly to France, but an 
invasion would be met by all the forces of Germany uniting around the 
princes. Wersaint thought nothing could be more dangerous to the in­
terests of France than a show of military strength in Germany.
A third observer was one "de Scey" who also wrote at the same 
time to Lamartine advising on "state of spirits" in Germany and what 
the effect would be if Germany were to proclaim republican institutions.
He, as most other visitors, found a state of flux there, with the people 
undecided on the government to adopt. The people of Germany did not 
know whether they wished to preserve the princes with constitutional 
government or to establish a federal republic. In the state of indeci­
sion, he thought that they would voluntarily follow the inspirations of 
France. "In this state of things, the government of the Republic could
^Wersaint to Dupont de I'.Eure,, marked "Sent to Minister of 
Foreign Affairs," AEF, MD, All, vol. 171, p. 173.
73
be master of the political situation in Germany, if that entered in
Q
its views."
There is little doubt that it was difficult in late March for 
Lamartine to be sure of the true situation in Germany, He sent a.Mr. 
Klein and Alexander Key on special missions to Germany during the 
month. The instructions for Rey show the items of doubt in the For­
eign Ministers' mind, Rey was sent to Frankfurt as a simple tourist.:
to observe from the important vantage of Germany the whole 
of the new situation and an important one for the future.
. , , He should notice the movement of spirits and of 
things, the tendencies, more or less democratic, of opin­
ion, the disposition, more or less pronounced, to connect 
the destinies )of liberal Germany with those of the French 
Republic by a union founded on the common interests of 
liberty, independence and civilization, , , , He should 
apply himself to the degree convenient, to explain 
(faire ressortir) the principles of morality, of order
and .of fraternity .and human.'.dignity that bind the French
Republic to the sympathies of these p e o p l e s ,10
He should work to further relations useful to French policy, 
and inform Lamartine by an exact and frequent correspondence of every­
thing that he learned. In addition to the secret agents, Lamartine got
reports of the growth of the liberal movement from the French diplomatic 
corps in late March. Salignac-Fenelon in Frankfurt thought the general 
spirit of Germany was democratic and liberal, but inclined to consti­
tutional monarchy, rather than a republic. He was told by discerning 
men that the preference for the constitutional monarchy was because 
of a defiance of Russia and France,
9gcey to Lamartine, Waldshut, March 21, 1848, AEF, MD, All, 
vol. 171, p, 174.
^^Lamartine to Alexander Rey, Paris, March 27, 1848, Instruc­
tions, AEF, MD, All, vol. 171, p, 175.
^^Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 26, 1848,
DDF, I, 413.
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Salignac doubted any sympathy for France from the liberal movement in 
Germany, noting that it could be estranged from France as well as Russia. 
He took necessarily strong exception to the prevailing passion for nat­
ionalism, and doubted that this was in France's true interests.
France can only watch with pleasure all that will give 
more liberty, more equality, more happiness in Germany; 
but she ought, I think, to devote serious attention to all 
that, under the pretext of establishing unity of the Con­
federation, tends to confiscate the independence of the 
secondary states at the profit of a single cabinet. That 
would be a real alteration of the territorial delimitations 
that France has recognized, an alteration which will touch 
the equilibrium of Europe.
The same worry about the change the balance of power was manifest 
in his prediction of the coming increase of power with unification of 
Germany. He reported that all the members of the Diet in Frankfurt 
had been changed, by April 2, except the minister for Austria, Colloredo. 
Nationalists would replace the old delegates, and "Everything makes 
one believe that if Germany is able to cross without too much disorder 
the period of transition where it is at the moment, her unity, conse­
quently her power will make giant steps."13
While Salignac-Fenelon worried about a future change in the power 
structure of Europe, Brunet-Denon in Berlin was less sure of the future 
of Germany. He thought that "the diversity of character, of religion, 
of language itself makes it difficult to decide." It was by no means 
clear to him that the small states of Germany would dissolve into the 
larger and stronger.1^
l^Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 21, 1848,
DDF, I, 323.
Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 2, 1848,
DDF, I, 581.
l^Brunet-Denon to Lamartine, Berlin, March 23, 1848, DDF; I, 366.
75
The charge d ' affairs in Munich, Bourgoing, summarized the dom­
inant points of an address of the bourgeoisie of Munich to King Maxi­
milian of Bavaria. The document had a "propensity to regard France as 
a faithful friend of free Germany reconstituted on a new basis, and a 
invincible opposition to all alliance with R u s s i a . T w o  days later, 
he commented more extensively on the German attitude toward France,
He thought that in the past six weeks the dispositions in regard to 
France had completely changed.
In the first weeks after our February Revolution, aggres­
sion on our part was awaited, and the long traditional 
habit of detesting us, because we were feared, was re­
vealed in all the German newspapers. Today, they are 
assured by our declarations of liberty, and they desire 
our friendship.
The examples given are sufficient to show that there was con­
tradictory information on Germany reported to Paris, and the policy­
makers had to choose according to their own experience and their eval­
uations of the.reliability of the information from the various sources. 
Nearly all agreed on the basic friendliness of the German people toward 
the republican form in France, but they were less sure that this gov­
ernment was the best for Germans. The more cautious professional dip­
lomats recalled past hostile manifestations towards the French, and 
Salignac-Fenelon raised the question of the balance of power if Germany 
were unified in a manner unfriendly toward France.
Lamartine read "with interest" the dispatches of Salignac-Fenelon 
and he answered, March 31. He was very confident, optimistic about
^^Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 28, 1848, DDF, I, 463; 
March 31, 1848, DDF, I, 532.
l^Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 30, 1848, DDF, I, 518.
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public opinion, doubting that any hostile feelings existed toward 
France.
The German Diet has not been able to remain apart from the 
liberal and national impulse which is sweeping through 
Germany. . . . Germany, in general is still only in the 
era of constitutional monarchies. That is evident and be­
longs to the nature of things. But, if, ^sayou have said. 
and which I can hardly believe (peine a croire'), the Ger­
man nation, in the middle of the democratic spirit that 
animates it only rejects the republican form because of a 
residue of defiance towards France, that sentiment would 
be asrniijuSt as blind. The French Republic does not nour­
ish any hostile idea, no ulterior motives toward Germany.
She proves it sufficiently by the manner in which she 
practices her policy of fraternity, of peace and of mod­
eration. That policy, so clearly and so forcefully pro­
claimed by me, is not only in words; it is also in actions, 
and that is a fact that you ought to apply yourself to 
establish well. Also, France never aspired to impose on 
any country her principle nor her form. She respects all 
governments, all nationalities, all laws and will not hear 
of mixing herself into the interior regime of other peoples 
that she would not be disposed to permit to intervene in 
her own.17
Lamartine had sent Mr. Klein on a special mission to learn about 
conditions in Germany. Klein wished to communicate with Hecker and 
Struve, the far left of German politics. While the regular diplomats 
in the German capitals maintained a normal relationship with the sov­
ereigns and cabinets, there also existed a network of men like Klein, 
and Kraetzer-Rassaerts with contacts to the underworld of German rev­
olutionary politics, An editor, Heinrich Boernstein, a member of the 
German Democratic Society, presided over in Paris by Herwegh, and the 
basis of the German Legion in Baden was one of the many secret agents 
of the French Foreign Ministry, and his daily reports are in the arch­
ives of the Quai d'Orsay. The network of such agents must have been 
vast, because there also exists in the archives a volume whose index
l^Lamartine to Salignac-Fenelon, Paris, March 31, 1848, DDF,
I, 532-33.
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of names of the members of the "German Secret Societies" covers both 
sides of nineteen folio pages and folio 7-261 is on 1848 along, with 
seemingly complete lists of people present at important gatherings 
of radicals.
Klein reported, April 24, that Germany did not seem hostile to 
him, although there was now a "notable choling" compared tot.the ear­
lier enthusiasm for France.
That which seems to be truly inexplicable to the evil in­
clination which brings the Germans to preoccupy themselves 
without ceasing with the difficulties which could come from 
France, while they never have a word to say about the re­
actionary projects which menace them and which are plotted 
with the aid of Russia.18
When depending on his confidential sources alone it would be difficult
for the agent to understand that the fear of France across the centuries
was more than illogical, especially since the German radicals had been
involved in the recent rising in Baden and wished future French aid for
the republican cause. The problem was that Klein's confidants were
hardly typical of Germany as a whole and gave a false picture of the
country, as of late April; consequently, he was not complete in his
analysis of German conditions.
The French policy in 1848 was imbued with a great optimism about 
the attitude of Germany toward France and of the possibilities of rev­
olt in Germany. The victory of Schwarzenberg was totally unexpected by 
Bastide, and the reaction as a whole was ignored by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. This was a catastrophic blindness by the French when 
optimism reached the degree that it blurred their vision of events.
18Klein to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 24, 1848, DDF, I,
1005.
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The unclear image of the state of Germany was very important in shap­
ing the policy of Bastide in the questions of Schleswig, Poznan, Italy, 
and the conflict of Prussia-Austria. The French were doomed to defeat 
in their foreign policy in 1848 because they let their hopes for the 
future obscure reality. But with such romantics as Bastide and Lam­
artine running affairs, this is hardly surprising; they were contempt­
uous of Realpolitik and reality.
Even when Lamartine had been told of German distrust and hat­
red of France, he rationalized this as "backward thinking," which 
time would change. In spite of warnings by some diplomats, carriers 
of the traditional divide-and-rule policy in Germany, of the danger 
to France in the unification of Germany, Lamartine was confident of 
the friendship of Germans for France in early May, when he wrote in­
structions for the mission of Dr. Kraetzer of the statistical bureau 
of the Ministry of War. The principal concern of the "statistical 
mission" was for him to collect military information on Germany. 
Kraetzer should go at once to Strasbourg and correspond directly with 
the Foreign Ministry. While there was concern for the "very consider­
able movement of troops on the borders of France," he should also 
comment on "political state of Germany."
Great changes are taking place in the institutions of the 
peoples of the Confederation; all aspire for a system of 
national unification which a German Parliament was called 
to conserve the principle and the form; a republican party 
declared itself, which, wishing to impose itself by force 
has already been given a bloody check; and their spirits 
seem inclined by preference towards the constitutional 
monarchy. As for German opinion, in general it is es­
sentially liberal, hostile to Russia, favorable to the 
reestablishment of Poland fin margin "sans trop d'ardeur"
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sympathetic toward our revolution but not completely ex­
empt in our regard from the mistrust which has its source 
in the prejudices of another epoch.19
Lamartine gave Kraetzer permission to travel extensively in Germany,
of course, without title. Kraetzer's reports included detailed plans
of Gejjman fortifications, and in Strasbourg Kraetzer was in immediate
contact with the German republicans and radicals.
Lamartine made a distinction between the "good" and "bad" Ger­
mans, according to the "progressiveness" of their thinking. Those 
distrustful of France were "prejudiced by another epoch," their 
thought-patterns were backward, belonging to the pre-revolutionary 
era. They were also those who were less liberal and luke-warm to 
Polish reconstitution. But even the worst Germans were not all bad; 
the desire for national unity was universal.
Significantly, any mistrust of France had not been contributed 
to by the recent French conduct towards the invasions of Germany from 
French soil. Lamartine merely spoke of the "republican party" that 
had been bloodily supressed, without the slightest hint of French 
collusion. He refused to accept an inate hatred of nations, but 
rather saw history in terms of "ages," and with time the antiquated 
ideas of hostility toward France would be overcome.
l^Lamartine to Dr. Kraetzer-Rasserts, May 4, 1848, Instructions, 
iHÜ, All, vol. 129, p. 4.
CHAPTER VII 
WAR AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
Wilhelm Mommsen's is typical of the accounts of the weakness of
France which prevented their carrying out an active policy in Europe.
They usually point to the "rejection" of the alliance offer of Arnim
as an "indication" of the pacifism in French policy, and many even
maintain that France would have fought to oppose German unity.
France was then not capable of a bellicose policy; she 
also did not wish to carry out a revolutionary policy 
of principle that would aid and bring about German unity.
Only a relatively weak French circle thought of cooper­
ating with German radicals and supporting the refugees 
fighting in the uprisings in the west. The official 
French foreign policy from Lamartine to Napoleon III 
and the great majority of all political groups in France 
were opposed to the German political movement. They 
rejected Arnim's alliance offer and were ready to bind 
themselves to Russia against the German unity. . . .
The will to fight against German unity, an old tradition 
of French power politics, was stronger than the common 
internal political principle.^
Arnim most likely understood the French answer of help in the 
event of Russian invasion to be a positive and binding agreement, al­
though it was given casually and orally. He told the Belgian and 
Austrian diplomatic representatives in late April that the French for­
ces of order, Lamartine's party would be much stronger after the
^William Mommsen, Grosse und Versagen des deutschen Burgertums, 
(2nd ed., Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1964), pp. 109-10.
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meeting of the National Assembly. He also rejected the possibility of 
a league with Russia.^
The Polish policy of Arnim was not ruined by a French "rejection" 
of his alliance offer, but from the Russian refusal to carry out the 
part assigned to them by the Prussian cabinet. Nicholas failed to at­
tack Prussia so that all of Germany and France would come to Prussia's 
"rescue" and establish national-states in Poland and Germany. "It is 
evident that from the end of March, the Prussian ministry had awaited 
a large insurrection in the interior of the Russian Empire. This 
expectation had been frustrated (trompée). Nothing had stirred.
Namier's book suffers from his not having read the article of 
Knapowska who saw the original text of Willisen's instructions when 
he was sent to Poznan. It spoke openly of a war with Russia and 
seriously discussed the necessity of a Polish legion for the Russian 
war. He did not exceed his authority in signing the Convention of 
Jaroslawice and contemplated an army of 15-20,000 for Mieroslawski. 
Willisen was a "decided partisan of a Russian war" and wished to 
accelerate the beginning of such a conflict; he suggested to the 
Poles the idea of a diversion in Galicia or an attack on the small 
fortress of Czestochowa in the Kingdom of Poland to incite a Russian 
invasion of Germany.^
2
Circourt, Mission, 11,47 for the view that Circourt had been 
"betrayed"; Ibid., II, 97-98; see also Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin 
May 8, 1848, AEB, Prusse, IX, 184.
^Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, April 25, 1848, Mission. II, 57.
^Lewis Namier, 1848; The Revolution of the Intellectuals. (New 
York: Anchor Book , 1964), p. 94; Knapowska, pp. 158-59, 154.
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All waited for the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland which 
failed to materialize. "A mournful silence reigned here while all of 
Europe fixed their eyes there with impatience." The cause of the sil­
ence was the prompt action of Paskevich who had discovered the Polish 
plot in Russian Poland in the first days of April and had arrested the 
principal leaders. Many of the conspirators had escaped to Poznan. 
"The rest waited for the army of Mieroslawski and the coalition of 
French and German troops."^
The French and Germans were willing to give their lives for 
Polish liberty, but Nicholas I refused to accomodate them by invad­
ing Prussia and committing suicide. Arnim's Polish plans were upset 
by the failure of Russia to invade Poznan and give the Prussians the 
war they wished.
Instead of a war of the Poles and the Prussians against the 
Russians, an insurrection broke out in Poznan in late April between 
the Polish and German inhabitants of the Prussian province. This 
uprising and its repression by the Prussian army had no repercus­
sions on French policy. They still expected the Prussian cabinet 
to carry out the promises to the Poles made in March.^
If the French still expected a Russian-Polish and Prussian 
war, then the French estimation of their own forces, those of the 
revolution, those of their allies and potential opponents, is im­
portant. The liberal doctrine emphasized the levee en masse, a 
Volksturm, a spontaneous uprising of the population of all nations
5lbid.. p. 159.
^Lamartine to Circourt, Paris, May 7, 1848, DDF, II, 94-95.
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for their liberty. There was a mistrust of aristocraticly structured
professional armies and a preference for "citizen armies."
In the spring of 1848, the French statistical division of the
Ministry of War made the following estimates of the military state of
France and foreign powers.
Population Active Army Militia forces Total Forces
France 33,540, 910 338,732 2500 Bataillons of 1,740,000
National CAiards formed 
of 13-14,000 men (5,000 veterans)
Russia 62,517,000 520,000 "If one deducts as of no value
the troops left in Poland and those employed in the provinces of Cau­
casia and on the frontiers of the Empire, Russia could dispose only 
200 to 250,000 men."
Prussia 14,154,500 100,000 400,000 (Laudwehr) 500,000
Austria 35,000,000 370,312 252,096 622,408
Bavaria 4,370,987 57,814 "Organizati,on of Bavaria was
perhaps carried at the total figure of 57,814, but she has effectively 
under the flag in peace only 20-25,000 men."
German 39,717,621 292,377 Part of the forces of Austria,
Confederation Prussia, and Bavaria.?
One estimate for Prussia was made by N. J. Franz, a lawyer and
<■
former Captain in the Second French Corps of the Moselle. His "politi­
cal and statistical Prussia" lists the Prussian effectives by "peace" 
and "war," the latter category including the Laudwehr.
Peace War
Troops 153,328 490,912
Royal Guard 63,544
Prussia would be able to put into campaign 544,456®
?A11 of these documents are in the AHG in Paris, in a box of 
loose, unnumbered papers for 1848, MR, 1634.
®Ibid.
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A much less favorable view of Prussia was given by M. Bentaboles 
of the statistical bureau of the Ministry of War, March 3, 1848.
Austria with Landwehr was 470,305
Prussia " " " 224,425
English with "eventual army" 241,677
Russia " " " 781,859%
A Colonel Courtigis gave information on Prussian effectives, 
excluding officers.
In peace 97,200
Mobilized 207,700
In war with first band of Landwehr 356,500
With first and second bands 466,500^®
If Lamartine thought that the war with Russia would be "of short 
duration," he hardly thought the Russian Empire would be capable of 
getting a substantial portion of her total forces into the field. He 
must have been calculating with the first figures, drawn on impressive, 
large sheets of paper by the statistical section of the Ministry of 
War, the French intelligence agency with an expert knowledge of mili­
tary conditions in Germany.
The first circular of Bastide to the French diplomatic agents, 
dated May 12, showed the same romantic view of the world and arms as 
Lamartine. He wrote that in foreign affairs the republic had not 
limited itself to proclaiming merely the principles of a pacific and 
generous policy, but had sincerely offered unity to peoples by the 
"sacred bonds of fraternity, free of all ulterior motives of aggressive
*Ibid.
lOlbid.
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propaganda and of conquest." He promised to respect all nationalities
and the governments in their independence and their liberty. These
principles which France had loyally respected would continue to be the
guide of policy. French policy would be disinterested and peaceful.
He did not ignore, as Lamartine had, the role of France in allowing
free-booters to invade Baden, Belgium and Savoy. Believing that the
best defense is a good offense, he refused to admit that France had
acted improperly.
She [Pranc^ had protected the governments against civil 
war, in preventing, as much as she was permitted by her 
own internal embarrassment, the violent attempts against 
their security and in giving decisive measure to impede 
the renewing of attack, when the agression had taken 
place against her will. . . . The Republic had maintained 
order and was combating anarchy, and by that itself she 
gave to the foreign governments another force to help 
them at home.
Bastide claimed that France had followed a "moderate policy," 
the old argument of Lamartine. If the wild men had been in power 
things would have been much worse, he alleged. But he made a new 
allegation that Lamartine had never stated; he had "protected" the 
foreign governments against civil war. He asserted that it was the 
inactivity of France, their unwillingness to see anarchy among their 
neighbors, which caused the uprisings to be crushed. This implied a 
threat that though France had refused to give aid and encouragement 
to the republicans, in the future France could as "easily" allow her 
neighbors to submerge into civil anarchy. France "of course" would 
not like this to happen, and she preferred peace. His warning was 
most explicit recording what could happen later if Europe refused 
to listen to reason.
llBastide to Foreign Agents, Paris, May 12, 1848, circular DDF,
II, 185-86.
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If, by the fault of Europe, the conversation of peace must 
become Impossible, what an imposing force the government of 
the Republic would have at her disposition with the energy 
of that population of men accustomed to combat in the streets, 
dangerous today for them, the Republic fully prepared to­
morrow to become the most useful auxiliary, if it is nec­
essary, to fall on the frontiers; with a million soldiers 
animated with the same patriotism, whose maintenance cost 
an enormous sum and which the war would nourish; and last 
with the great number of friends that the Republic counts 
abroad, who can hold back the elan which would at the first 
signal rise to serve her cause?!^
France had three lines of defense; first,an army of one million 
that was a great drain on the budget and which could be removed as a 
financial liability by sending it abroad, especially with subsidies 
from allies and the Intimidated states. The historical parallel was 
Napoleon's first Italian campaign which solved the fiscal problems 
that plagued the Great Revolution. The forces available were, of course, 
grossly, inflated, and it included the highly questionable National 
Guard, but it is just%as clear that Bastide believed the "patriotism" 
of these citizen sbldiers was an important substitute for military 
training. All historians have accepted Lamartine's claim that he 
thought France was weak and his greatest contribution was to increase 
the French military forces. This claim that the Foreign Ministry under 
Bastide and Lamartine was aware of a weakness in France's armies is a 
later fabrication of Lamartine in his History.
Bastide significantly mentioned first the entire "population of 
men accustomed to combat in the streets." This was the basis of France's 
real strength, the mystique of the lev^e en masse, the revolutionary 
ideal would carry her over all obstacles and tyrants. The third line 
of armies was a "fifth column" of those "friends" of the Republic who 
will "rise at the first signal to serve her cause."
12Ibid.
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Bastide was hardly a "realist" or a "pacifistI" His picture of 
France was of a monolithic legion united behind the idea of the republic. 
He hinted that as the solution to the financial embarrassment could be 
an ideological war, it would also get rid of the troublemakers that 
later caused the June Days by channelling their energies abroad. As 
with Lamartine, the choice of war or peace was "given" to Europe, but 
Bastide in mid-May saw definite domestic advantages in immediate war to 
relieve attention from France's two principal problems, social and 
financial difficulties. He also indicated little doubt of the outcome 
where France made war under the right conditions.
The contemporary picture of Paris in May is Olsner's book that 
described the new military groups everywhere. After the February Rev­
olution the clubs had kept their private armies and individual leaders 
had their own forces. The regular army was needed to keep civil order
in the major population centers and 60-100,000 of the best troops were
13needed for the administration of Algeria. The optimism of the For­
eign Minister was based on a total misconception of France. The country 
was on the verge of the June Days, and the newly-elected National Assem­
bly was luke-warm toward foreign adventures.
The least explainable is the misconception of a powerful "fifth 
column" that would "rise at the first signal" to fight for France and 
the republic. Bastide, like Lamartine, felt that the "spirit of def­
iance" toward France sometimes displayed by their neighbors was a
l^Oelsner-Monmerque, p. 30.
l^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, May 18, 1848, GSA, vol. 856, p. 58; 
Thom to Lebzeltern, Paris, May 20, 1848, HHSA, V, 30-33.
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result of opinions from another "epoch", pre-republican ideas.
The same organic view of development as Lamartine's with the
republic as the highest form of civilization was shown most clearly
in Bastide's letter to the Minister at Berne, General Thirad.
We wish, without doubt for the triumph across the Alps 
[in Italy] of a democracy like ours; we desire that the 
republican party, the most numerous, most able, and the 
most sympathetic to the masses would make their principles 
prevail; we are far from hiding to ourselves the political 
consequences of such an aggrandizement of Sardinia. But 
the French Republic, after having proclaimed her respect 
and her good wishes for the nationalities which seek to 
reconstitute themselves, after having recognized the law 
of peoples to organize themselves as they judge right 
(convenable) with the capacity of their civilization, of 
their interests and of their needs, could she openly 
oppose that which northern Italy today asks for: an
independent nation, welfare and security? We do not 
doubt that there will be undesired results before the 
hour of maturity; in Italy as in Germany, a monarchy 
founded on democratic institutions seems destined to 
serve as the transition to the pure r e p u b l i c .15
Bastide was an ideological republican before all else, like 
Lamartine, seeing the organic development of the liberal idea as the 
greatest goal toward which civilization was striving. Bastide cer­
tainly did not share the opinion of Mommsen, Droz et a^. of the 
military weakness of France. He was sure that the "patriotism" of 
his armies would be matched by the same love of liberty across 
the borders in neighboring lands. "At the first signal" people were 
waiting for the French to come to help them throw off their bonds.
15Bastide to General Thirad, Paris, May 23, 1848, DDF, II, 427.
CHAPTER VIII 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
A major cause of friction between Germany and France, in 1848, 
was the conflict in Schleswig. This was never in French eyes more 
than a very minor matter, and it did not materially affect their at­
titudes toward Germany. It was in the attitude of Frankfurt toward 
Italy, Austria" and the "principle" of nationality that the hostility 
of the French to the Parliament was based, not primarily in the Schleswig 
Question. Alexander Scharff's analysis of the topic is questionable in 
two respects. The French never changed their attitude of sympathy 
toward German unity, and the hostility that was maintained by Bastide 
toward the German National Assembly, was only secondarily caused by 
the Schleswig Question.^ From the beginning of the conflict, France 
thought that the Germans were the aggressors and hoped that Denmark 
would win. Lamartine, however, told Hatzfeldt that it was not of 
"major and pressing importance for France," but warned him that "a 
certain treaty existed whereby France had made engagements vis-a-vis 
Denmark relative to S c h l e s w i g . A  few days later, Lamartine told
^For opposed opinion see Alexander Scharff,"Schleswig-Holsteins 
Erhebung,", p. 181.
^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 24, 1848 GSA, vol. 855, 
pp. 192-93.
89
90
the Danish that France would not Intervene because her "position" did
3
not allow her to.
Lamartine was so ignorant of the précise commitment of France 
under the treaty of 1720 that he referred to the wrong date when speak­
ing of it. While in the mystique of the Great Revolution Denmark had 
been France's "most loyal ally," in 1848 Russia gave repeated assuran­
ces to Denmark, and seemed prepared to use the war in Schleswig as a 
pretext for invading Prussia. Whatever the feelings of France, she 
would not make a clear statement, because of the cipher of Nicholas I.^
To gain allies in the war of principle against Russia, France needed 
a clear conflict of nationalism vs. legitimacy, as she would have had 
in Poland or in northern Italy. France was so disgusted in the Schles­
wig War, because this was exactly what was missing. Both sides up­
held the principle of nationality and liberalism! Liberals thought, 
nations would never fight; wars were caused by dynasties.
France was also gravely misinformed about Schleswig. Bastide
thought that "only 125,000 of 350,000 speak German" in Schleswig.
Actually, the proportion of those living where German was spoken in
church was 2:1 German over Danish. At best, the Danes could claim
that in daily conversation almost as many of the peasants spoke
Danish as spoke German.^  Like Lamartine, Bastide thought that Germany
was the aggressor, and Denmark had to call on Russia to defend her ter­
ritory.
^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 27, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p.198.
^Lamartine to Dotezao, Paris, May 2, 1848, DDF, II, 24.
^Bastide to Arago, Paris, June 29, 1848, DDF, II, 1158; W. Carr, 
Schleswig-Holstein: 1815-48: A Study in National Conflict. (Manchester
University Press, 1963), pp. 70-71, cçf^ . The view of Bastide: "In
alien geographischen Verhaelthisse rausserordentlich unwissend." tflsner- 
ifenmerqué, p. 3.
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Why cannot [the German^ understand that the intervention 
of Russia, in favor of Denmark must give the enemy of 
liberal and democratic Germany one means more to weigh 
on her and make war. It is a singular spectacle to see 
Germany, while democracy is being born there, to fight 
for the cause in Holstein and Schleswig of a tedious 
aristocracy and against a country . . . that just re­
ceived the most democratic institution.&
Germany had violated equity and international law, endangered them­
selves in war with Russia for the wrong cause. France was very doubt­
ful that Denmark was not more liberal than Prussia, under their new 
constitution.^
France refused to do anything for the time, because she did not 
wish to endanger her position with Germany. The violence of the June 
Days also weakened France at this time, making it impossible for her 
to have a very active foreign policy for the next few weeks. There 
seemed also little practical purpose in protest, since Great Britian, 
Sweden and Russia were actively trying to end the conflict.
Meanwhile, May 22, the Prussian government had accepted and 
taken into consideration the conditions of armistice which England 
had given them May 19. General Wrangel was sent van order from Berlin 
to pull his troops out of Jutland, one Ofcthe English conditions, and 
Prussia was humiliated in Germany,^ The provisional government of 
Kiel in revolutionary Schleswig refused to accept any terms which 
included provision for a division of the Duchies of Schleswig and
^Bastide to Arago, Paris, June 29, 1848, DDF, II, 1158.
7Ibid.
Sjacques Droz, Les Revolutions allemands de 1848. D'après 
un manuscript et des notes de E. Tonnelat, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France,]1957), p. 258.
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Holstein; General WKengel, a Prussian in command of the federal army, 
refused to recognize the armistice because it had not been accepted 
by Frankfurt.^ Bastide thought that "The conduct of General Wrangel 
in disobeying the orders of his sovereign, the King of Prussia, to 
take note of those of the Vicar of the Empire proves well enough the 
false and humiliating position of the sovereigns of Germany."^®
The Frankfurt Assembly took up the cause of Schleswig as all- 
important for the German unity. In retrospect, this was undoubtedly 
a mistake. W. E. Mosse feels that it is "certain that it was above 
all German intransigence in the question of the Duchies which provoked 
the hostility of the powers toward the National Assembly and its gov­
ernment."^^ To France the implications of Schleswig were more a cause 
of alienation from Frankfurt that just distaste with such barbaric de­
generation of civilized nations as war. With a French intervention 
threatening in northern Italy against Austria, a member of the German 
Confederation, Bastide did not favor the combined armies of a Germany 
being under the control of the Frankfurt Assembly, whose judgment 
Paris hardly trusted.
The French hostility in Schleswig turned from Berlin to Frank­
furt, because the latter seemed to be causing all the delay in bringing 
peace. Bastide wrote, September 7, that the Prussian Minister of
9lbid.. 304.
lOBastide to Arago, Paris, July 31, 1848, AEF, vol.302, p. 187.
E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question; 
1848-1871; with Special Reference to England and Russia. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 25.
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Foreign Affairs, Auerswald, "was mistaken if he wished to say that 
France was animated in the Schleswig Affair by hostile sentiments 
towards Prussia. It is the contrary that is true." France was only 
hostile tof.the Unitarians of Frankfurt and their Minister of War, who 
wished to accustom the Prussian army to taking orders from elsewhere 
than Berlin; they wished a common expedition to melt the armies of the 
different German states into a national German army. This army might 
then be ordered from Schleswig to Milan by Frankfurt without the con­
sent of Berlin.
France wanted peace in Schleswig, because the Prussian action 
there was as "deadly" for PtBSssia as for her a d v e r s a r y . Bastide 
observed in September that the Schleswig Question could be the cause 
of the death of the liberal movement in Germany. He wrote Arago that 
the vote in Frankfurt over the armistice of Malmo augured poorly for 
the force of the Central Power, and was a symptom of the "disunion 
which henceforth divides into two parties the Parliament that cannot 
be brought together." He thought that the disunion shown in the vote 
of September 5 in Frankfurt rejecting the armistice in the Schleswig War 
was a confirmation that it was "at least premature to recognize offic­
ially the envoy of Frankfurt.
Bastide told Hatzfeldt "Men like Heckscher and Dahlmann at 
Frankfurt can only envenom all the questions that are put in their hands.
IZgastide to Arago, Paris, September 7, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 251.
13lbid.
l^Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 9, 1848, AEF, VOl, 302, pi 261.
p. 28.
^^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, September 13, 1848, GSA, vol. 863,
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Arago was just as short with the Assembly. "The Parliament is the cause 
of the disorder and the instrument of Anarchy which reigns today in 
Schleswig and Holstein.
France remained true to the policy of VoIkerverstândigung. but 
in Schleswig the Parliament had shown a "spirit of ambition and ab­
sorption which, taking unity of race and of language for the base of 
German unity," added to their territory a portion of Poznan, at least 
part of Schleswig and of Limburg, and menaced France itself in the 
possession of Alsace. Bastide found "little sympathetic reciprocity 
. . .  in presence of the declarations of our National Assembly's pro­
clamation of a fraternal pact with Germany."
He instructed the new French charge in Frankfurt, "Our role 
ought to be to observe, to see what comes, and above all to avoid 
forming an opinion (prendre couleur) before this situation clears 
itself up" by a manifestation of the wishes of Germany herself.
Bastide found the situation in Germany highly provisional, and France 
should at all costs avoid taking sides.
M. you ought to present yourself at Frankfurt as the organ 
of a power friendly to Germany, loyally disposed to contract 
with her the bonds of fraternal friendship, having the sin­
cere wish for the happiness of the German Confederation, for 
a reconstruction of Germany in the most favorable sense to 
the development of her welfare, of her civilization and of 
her international relations.17
Above all, in September fully as much as March, Germany was the key to
the reorganization of all of Europe. The myth of French opposition to
l^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 27, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 301.
17Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, September 5, 1848, AEF, For the 
best account of the complexities of the negotiations leading to the 
Armistice of Maim'd, see Volker Weimar, Per Malmoer Waffenstillstand 
von 1848. (Neumunster: Wachholtz, 1959).
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German unification cannot be maintained for September any more than 
for March. The French before August had seen little need to protest 
in the Schleswig affair, because the opposition of Sweden and Russia 
had been more than enough opposition to Prussia. France saw no need 
nor did they find it convenient to add her protest in Prussia.
France though favoring the Danes did little to aid their cause, wish­
ing as much as any other power a negotiated compromise.
Arago wrote, July 15,that France should work diligently to end 
the Schleswig Question as soon as possible. The French should use all 
of their influence on Prussia to end the war because it could embarrass 
the German unity movement. "The centralization of the German power is 
certain, which is indispensable for the continual progress of democracy.''^® 
The news from Frankfurt was anything but reassuring for France
in July. Savoye reported that the decision on a offensive and defen­
sive alliance with France had been put off until the Central Power
21
had been installed.
The head of the new Central Power was a "vicar," a Reichsverweser, 
Prince Johann of the House of Hapsburg, whose cabinet had three members. 
Schmerling was an Austrian, with little to recommend him to Bastide.
l^Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, June 6, 1848, AEF, vol. 670,
p. 106.
l^Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 11, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 152; 
Bastide to Tallengy, Paris, July 10, 1848, AEF, vol. 670, p..224.
20
Arago to Paris, Berlin, July 15, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, pp.
157-58.
p. 210.
^^Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 2f, 1848, AEF, vol. 805,
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The Foreign Minister, Heckscher, was a lawyer named by the rich merch­
ants of his native Hamburg. Savoye thought he loved dispute more to 
show his own brilliance than to clarify the situation. He was also 
not thought to be friendly to French views. The last cabinet member 
was General Peucker, not one of the Liberals of Prussia, but rather 
with a reputation of belonging to the old militarist party. Savoye 
warned against awaiting any sincere sympathy for France from him.
The entire first cabinet was a great disappointment to the French.
Savoye gave little hope for the Parliament.or hope that a new 
more liberal cabinet would be formed soon. "The sentiments of the 
people in.regard to France will never be represented by that majority 
of civil servants, of servants and of partisans of the old monarchical 
system, which doubt and hate France." The army had been increased by 
a vote of 303 to 149. "It is clear that the reason for the increase 
is less fear of Russia than a mistrust in regard to France." The main 
speakers for the bill had been old Prussian militarists: Auerswald,
"a man without capacity imbued with the old Prussian ideas against 
France,"'Lichonowski, "he glories to be the sworn advisary of the 
French Republic," and most importantly. General RadowLtLz-,, who "de-
9 2
tests the system of the government of France."
Savoye was discouraged with the composition of the Parliament 
because of the "absence of representatives from the heart of the 
people," and because of the "prodigious agglomeration out of all pro- 
protion" of salaried functionaries, of titled men and of professors.
^^Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 15, 1848, AEF, vol. 805, 
217-18; July 7, vol. 805, 211-12. The myth that Savoye was more 
friendly to the Frankfurt Assembly than Bastide is hardly supported 
here.
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All of these showed a "certain disdain" of the people. As Bernays 
had said, "this is not the last word in Germany," It is hardly 
surprising that the French were not greatly pleased by the membership 
of the body or of the new-formed Central P o w e r .^3
July 24, Normanby told Hatzfeldt that the French government was 
"not in the least concerned by the affair of Schleswig and of the strife 
which exists in regard to Germany and Denmark. French attention 
radically changed when the Sardinian army seemed in danger and France 
feared the Frankfurt Assembly had become frankly pro-Austrian. With 
the danger of a French confrontation with Germany in Italy, France took 
greater notice of the war in Schleswig. Bastide told the Austrian 
charge that, "If Archduke Johann is not able to make the Frankfurt 
Parliament reasonable, that affair in [schleswigjtould have incal-
p C
culable results.
The same day. Bastide vented his disgust with developments in 
Frankfurt to Arago in Berlin. "This National Assembly of Frankfurt is 
a very sorry spectacle of political morality in the questions of 
Schleswig and of the Grand Duchy of Poznan." Bastide thought that 
"such a state of affairs assured the resistance of discords and div­
isions dangerous for the unitary system of Germany and deadly for 
peace in that country." The conduct of the parliamentarians was lead­
ing Germany into civil war which would destroy the national and liberal 
movement. Under the present leadership at Frankfurt, he did not see
23
Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 7, 1848, vol. 805, p. 211
24
Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 24, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 83.
^^Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, July 31, HHSA, VII 80.
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it in the interest of France to support such a unity led by forces 
hostile to France. This was not the time for France to centralize 
her diplomacy in Frankfurt to support that body.
The men in Frankfurt were not bringing Germany to democracy, 
but were creating a situation conducive to "democratic anarchy and 
perhaps civil war," speculated Bastide.2? Arago was less fatalistic 
and advised against "considering en bloc" the National Parliament. 
"Opinions there are very divided, and the democratic party is sympa­
thetic to France." He also thought that public opinion in Germany 
was itauch more" for the democratic party than any o t h e r . H e  assured 
the Foreign Minister that the Prussian minister was using his influence 
to avoid a rupture and mitigate the "fatal policy of extreme germanism 
which reigns at the Parliament." The Berlin cabinet had just addressed 
to the Vicar of the Empire am energetic invitation to put an end soon 
to the war in Italy, according to a good source. France should look 
to aid in Berlin and "support Prussia against Frankfurt.
Arago again assured Bastide that public opinion was not in accord 
with the "ideologues of Frankfurt, these germanisers," France instead 
should accept help from Prussia, who could rally to her the sympathies 
of those alienated by Frankfurt and peacefully become head of a union 
of Germans which would give France serious guarantees of peace.
2&Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 31, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 187. 
Z^Ibid.
189-90.
29
^®Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 1, 1848, AEF, vol,302, pp.
Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 2, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 192.
JO
194-95.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, pp.
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As late as August 2, Bastide was still very poorly informed on 
the complexity of the Schleswig Question. Hatzfeldt asked for ins­
tructions on the Schleswig War, indicating that France had never be­
fore seriously discussed the question. Bastide admitted to Hatzfeldt 
that he had never read the Treaty of 1720, which is hardly an indica­
tion that the French were as interested in the matter as Scharff would 
31have us believe. Berlin sent Hatzfeldt the circular despatches of
March 30, April 7 and 10 on August 4 which apparently had not been sent
to Paris before because of the lack of interest of the French in dis- 
32
cussing Schleswig. The next day, they sent a cipher despatch that
illuminates the Schleswig Question and the French role.
The government can only see with pleasure that the French 
government addresses her protestations against the entry 
of German troops in Jutland at Frankfurt and not at Berlin.
It sees it as a Q.n original draft "the best^ means of mi­
tigating the bellicose ardor of the Ministry and the Nation­
al Assembly of Frankfurt; it engages you accordingly to 
seek to influence in this s e n s e .33
The "protest" of France was encouraged by Prussial How can this protest 
be called "anti-German"?
Berlin disassociated herself in Paris totally with the Frank­
furt Parliament, their Minister of War, and continuation of war.
The Minister of War in Frankfurt announced in the fifty- 
first meeting of the Parliament at Frankfurt that troops 
would be increased to bring as speedy an end to the war 
as possible. That announcement being in direct contra­
diction with the pacific and conciliatory views that we 
have always professed and that we still profess, it
3lHatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 2, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 103. 
32B'erlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 4, 1848, GSA, vol. 856, p.
234.
33Berlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 5, 1848, GSA, vol, 861, p.
105.
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cannot fail to produce a great sensation, and one could 
easily believe, that General Peucker being a Prussian 
General, Prussia approved in secret of the measures and 
shared in that manner of opinion, although the govern­
ment of the King holds to opposed langauge. To dispel 
the suspicion of duplicity, I think you ought to declare 
that since General Peucker has become a Minister of the 
Empire . . .  we can no longer exert influence on him.^^
While Frankfurt was as unreasonable and bellicose in Schleswig 
as in Italy, Prussia was peaceful and supported the French. While Frank­
furt was increasingly representing the party of reaction, Prussia was 
more liberal. Obviously, a Germany united by Prussia would be more 
reasonable in the Schleswig Question, the Italian Question, and would 
be more sanely..hàtionalistlc. Another important consideration was 
that Prussia's army made up most of the available forces used in Schles­
wig and the available forces that could be used to aid Austria in Italy.
The official position perhaps influenced an article in Moniteur. 
August, 12. It expressed the hope that the German Parliament would 
unite its efforts to those of France to conclude an accord in Schles­
wig-Holstein.
The struggle that has gone on in the Duchies for relativdlv 
secondary interests ought to be halted. The German Par­
liament wishes, we do not doubt, that her first act will be 
an act of conciliation, and it will unite itself to our 
efforts to conclude an accord already long over-due. It 
ought not to forget that the efficacy of its action dépends
on its wisdom.
^^Berlin to Hatzfeldt; Berlin, August 4, 1848, GSA, vol. 861,
pp. 101-02.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 194.
^^Moniteur. August 12, 1848, quoted by Hatzfeldt to Berlin,
Paris, August 12, 1848, GSA, vol. 857, p. 3.
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Bastide wished to conciliate and compromise the pretentions of 
Germany and Denmark^? Hatzfeldt concluded, August 12, that France was 
much less interested in territorial matters and the treaty guarantees 
to Denmark than to the "intentions manifested in Germany for recogni­
tion of certain rights on her frontiers." The French were more 
worried about Italy than Denmark when they talked of Schleswig. The 
talk of Alsace was more a fear for Venetia.
As the tension' grew more serious, the Prussians continued to 
blame Frankfurt for delay. Billow, the Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, told Arago that, if Frankfurt had hot intervened/the 
armistice would have been signed long ago and peace concluded,39 
Meyendorff, the Russian Ambassador, added to the pressure on the 
Prussians by threatening that the imperial fleet would aid Denmark in 
her blockade of Germany, if peace were not soon concluded. Bulow told 
the British Ambassador that in case of the refusal by the Central 
Power"for conciliation the Prussian ministry was contemplating the 
question of a unilateral retreat of their troops from the D u c h i e s .
In this situation. Bastide wrote Tallenay in London that the "ope great 
thing to do is to conserve the peace and leave the peoples the power
to do that which they think is in their own welfare.
^^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 17, 1848, GSA, vol. 857, p.9..
^®Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 12, 1848, GSA, vol. 857, p.l.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 20, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 217.
^^Tallenay to Bastide, London, August 8, 1848,-AEF, vol 671, pp.
30-31.
41 — r- _
Bastide to Beaumont, Paris, August 24, 1848, AEF, vol. 671.
p. 80.
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The Schleswig Question endangered the peace of Europe in August, 
striking at the most vital French interest, peace. France was dis­
pleased about the prospect of a conflict between two such liberal 
nations as the Danish and the Germans, two "natural allies" of France, 
They were alienated in the Schleswig Question by the intransigent at­
titude of Frankfurt toward a matter that the French thought minor, and 
they failed to find any encouragement in the Assembly's attitude in 
the Poznan and Limburg questions.
In the German discussion of the annexation of Limburg, the 
Belgian charge reported that the Meuse and Escaut were considered 
"German rivers." "Regret was expressed that these peoples who wished 
to be Germans had to be abandoned, and speakers formulated the convic­
tion that Belgium, as the other distant branches, would sooner or later 
be united into the German C o n f e d e r a t i o n . S u c h  territorial presump­
tion had its repercussions in Paris. Any Great Power that controlled 
the mouth of the Rhine and Low Countries was an easy train-ride from 
Paris over flat fields. Even Lamartine now opposed the narrow alli­
ance of fraternity of France and the Frankfurt Parliament. He said 
the "principle certain spirits exploit in regard to Schleswig and 
Holstein" could equally apply to Alsace and Lorraine.
The French were not the only ones worried about the pretentions 
in Frankfurt. The French charge in London, Tallenay, wrote that the 
English cabinet was preoccupied with the developments in Germany, as 
manifested in the Limburg Question and the war in Schleswig, which
4%Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, August 7, 1848, AEB, 
Frankfurt, IV, 147.
^^Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, August 8, 1848, HHSA, VIII, 125.
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had caused alarm to English hopes of maintaining a European equilib­
rium.^^ Meanwhile, Prussia worked against Frankfurt for peace.
The Prussian cabinet was encouraged by the decision at Frank­
furt to give Prussia the power to negotiate in the name of Germany, 
writing Hatzfeldt, August 15, that peace was now possible. General 
Below was sent with full power to conclude a convention of armistice. 
Prussia thought that this conduct by Frankfurt showed a promise that 
they had not fully submitted to the "influence of a certain faction 
of the National Assembly of Frankfurt, whose speeches have often 
been of the nature to give birth of apprehensions of the foreign 
powers." Germany was thought of abroad to be occupied only with a 
desire to expand and despoil the bordering countries.
The Prussian Foreign Minister hoped that the new moderation
was a guarantee of general peace in Europe, especially since the new
46
Vicar of the Empire had peaceful views.
Bastide was apprehensive about the Frankfurt Assembly, thinking 
that its attitude was causing Austria to be intransigent in the Ital­
ian war mediation, assuming the Parliament would join her as an ally. 
France, therefore, had to be very careful in the reception of Raumer, 
the Frankfurt Assembly's envoy to France, who would be "greeted in a 
manner that would not in the least offend Messieurs the professors 
of Frankfurt." Paris was careful to use exactly the same terms as 
those for "M. le Baron d'Adrianne" on a similar mission in London.
^^Tallenay to Bastide, London, July 30, 1848, AEF, vol. 670,
p. 286.
^^Berlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 15, 1848, GSA, vol 857,p. 5. 
46lbid., pp. 5-6.
^^Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 6, 1848, AEF vol. 302, p.
247; Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, September 11, 1848, vol. 806, p. 12.
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When Raumer was met by the French Foreign Minister, September 7,
he was told that the Parliament could not be officially recognized
until the "exterior constitution" was in accord with the other German
states, and they they must centralize their diplomacy in Frankfurt.
He then asked Raumer what would be the "territorial circumscription"
of the new empire. Bastide complained:
the elevated pretensions of Frankfurt on Schleswig and 
Limburg caused us scruples in that regard, and that it
seemed to us that the principle of assimilation of all
those who spoke German in the world would well one day 
bring up the unitaries of Frankfurt to us to demand 
Alsace and Lorraine.48
This would sound prophetic, except that Bastide belonged to the 
1848 generation of dreamers, not to the Realpolitikers of 1870. Even 
when he spoke of war with Germany, he thought that the prestige of the 
Republic and liberalism in France make war by Germany impossible against 
her. The French Foreign Minister never understood that German nation­
alism could possibly be a greater force in Germany than the force of
the French revolutionary mystique. When he wrote Arago two days later, 
he showed that he had no notion of a forceful German nationalism hostile 
to France. Bastide thought rather that the "professors" had no backing 
among the people of Germany. The country was "waiting for the signal" 
from France to rise in revolt. France need only to invade along the 
Rhine to draw to her the real German nationalists and republicans.^9
He thought that the Schleswig Question:
48Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 7, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 250.
^^Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 9, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 263.
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had not yet reached the stage where they would be pressed 
to send 15,000 men to Denmark, but, nevertheless, we are 
resolved not to change our declaration of guarantee [pf 
Schleswig that we have renewed at this moment. If it is 
necessary . . .  to make war in Germany, we will attack at 
the same time in Holstein and the Tyrol, simultaneously, 
upholding the revolutionary demons along the Rhine, and I 
think the worse role will not be for France, if all the 
statesmen of Germany are not as deaf as those of Frank­
furt. . . .50
In the Schleswig Question, the French did not "turn against the 
German Party," as Alexander Scharff a l l e g e d . Bastide thought that 
Frankfurt was "deaf" to the true sentiment in Germany. Bastide never 
"gave up (preiseab) the policy of international reconciliation to 
adopt the older tradition of French p o l i c y . "52 Bastide rejected 
totally Frankfurt because he thought that the Frankfurt Assembly 
had "given up" the policy of international reconciliation and re- 
volutionary-democracy. He felt that they had drifted into chauvinism 
far removed from the purity of the "good Germans." Bastide opposed 
the Frankfurt conception of German unity, because he thought it was 
unrepresentative of the public opinion in Germany.
SOlbid.
"^Scharff, "Schleswig-Holsteins Erhebung", p. 181. 
5 2 i b l d . . p .  178.
CHAPTER IX
THE ITALIAN WAR AND THE FRANKFURT ASSEMBLY
In 1848 as much as 1866 the German and Italian unification
questions were intimately enmeshed. In both cases the main impedi­
ment to nationalism was the multi-national Austrian Empire. The 
similarities of the two situations are not as remote as usually 
thought; the most important difference was that Bismark was content 
with Kleindeutsch solution of the German problem, while in 1848 this 
seemed treasonable to nationalists. German unification in Frankfurt 
meant an empire including all of Germany. This was the policy of 
Frankfurt which lost them much good-will abroad when it was applied 
to Limburg, Schleswig and Poznan which some other countries found 
less than 100% German.
It was possible to discuss the German and Polish portions of 
Poznan as it was possible to draw an ethnic line in Schleswig; how­
ever, it was most unfortunate to begin the history of united Germany 
with a war against Denmark which the Germans most assuredly handled 
very poorly from the view-point of public relations and propaganda.
The German opinion was that these areas belonged to the German Empire 
by right because the German language was spoken there more than another.
If the empire began in such a spirit of conquest, and if this "right"
of nationality were recognized by international law, as the Germans
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in Frankfurt wished, what of Alsace, Switzerland, the Russian Baltic 
provinces? In all of these German was spoken; the more extreme 
"germanists" in 1848 claimed them as "German." Would the pattern of 
the Schleswig war be repeated to take Alsace and Lorraine from France? 
These questions were asked in 1848 by Guizot, Thiers, Broglie, Victor 
Cousin and other Frenchmen of the traditional realist-conservative 
school of policy. Their ideas appeared especially in such periodi­
cals as the Revue des deux Mondes.
Later French historians have transformed the rhetoric of Frank­
furt into a "threat to France.'.' Emile Bourgeois wrote that "She had 
seen the French froniter menaced by the Germans in Alsace, in Savoy 
by the Italians."^ Debidour alleged that:
The Germans did not wish our help. They regarded us 
always as enemies and reproached us more acrimoniously 
than ever for having acquired Alsace and Lorraine, which 
ought, according to them, to be returned to the German 
fatherland. . . . Their diverse pretentions. . . were 
loudly maintained by Prussia, who found there the means, 
not only to render herself popular, but to greatly in­
crease her power.%
Ponteil wrote of the "jealous patriotism which the [German^ thought
was affirmed everywhere when their race (confused with language) was 
2
represented." Jacques Droz gives the finest summary of French pub­
lic opinion toward the Frankfurt Parliament. "France saw in the 
principle of nationality and in the attitude of Frankfurt a disturbing
^Emile Bourgeois, Manuel historique de la politique étrangère. 
(11th éd., Paris: E. Berlin, 1948), III, 312.
2
Anton Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe: 1814-78. 
(Paris: F. Alcan, 1931), II, 11-12.
^Felix Ponteil, 1848. (Paris: Colin, 1947), p. 88.
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conception which leads to a policy of usurp ht ionc andc conqoe B t .^
The greatest sin of the German "Forty-eighters.” was their neg­
lect of public relations; instead, they had an ability to show them­
selves in the worst possible light, a naive concept of the problems 
of nationalism in central Europe where language and political borders 
were not coincident. Innocence in Frankfurt sounded like treachery 
in Paris. In areas of mixed-nationality, the Germans made their stand 
in 1848; tacticly, this led to a propaganda defeat, for it always 
seemed that they made their stand on German; nationality and denied the 
right of nation to others. Namier made the most extreme assertion 
that "With 1848 starts the perman bid for power, for European predom­
inance, for world domination . . . This is, or course, highly 
rhetorical, and history is seldom as simple as Namier would have us 
believe, but it does show how the Frankfurt Parliament appeared to 
some people of later generations.
In spite of the attention of some French publicists and royal­
ist politicians in 1848 to the "designs" of Frankfurt, their opinions 
had little influence on the romantic-liberal politicians that directed 
the policy of the Second Republic. Even the moderate National Assem­
bly of May voted for a "fraternal pact with Germany" to free Poland 
and Italy. Most, Frenchmen, like Louis-Napoleon, knew very little of 
Germany and knew nothing of Prussia. "He only attached little import­
ance to events in Germany. Like his uncle, but for other reasons,
^Jacques Droz, Histoire diplomatique de 1648 à 1919. (Paris 
Dalloz, 1952), p. 351; see also Georges Weil. L'Europe du XIXe 
siècle et l'idée de nationalité. (Paris; A. Michel, 1938), p. 149.
^Lewis Namier, "1848: Seed plot of History," in Avenues of
History. (London: H. Hamilton, 1952) p. 153.
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he interested himself above all in Italy. He was prepared to let 
Prussia, or even aid her in unifying Germany. . . . With him France 
continued to march toward her destiny with blindfolded eyes."^
Frenchmen had little knowledge of nor interest in Germany in 
1848; the principal concern was Italy, and Frankfurt's policy toward 
the southern peninsula was decisive for the French policy. In late 
summer of 1848, all eyes were on Italy and the great crisis of Ger­
man history in Schleswig was of secondary interest to Paris.
The Italian and German Questions both opposed the order of 1815 
and ultimately Austria's domination of the countries in the Metternich 
era. The difference was that the Italians also came into conflict with 
all Germans who thought the position of Austria in Italy was important 
for Germany's position in Europe, vital for the safety and indepenr 
dence of Germany. Theodor Schieder believed that, from the begin­
ning, there was a conflict in Frankfurt between two concepts of nation. 
The first was the western European concept of the nation-state; the 
other was that of Herder and Mazzini, an idea of language and cultural 
nation that transcended state borders with the universal ideal of hu­
manity as the most important consideration. Unfortunately, the former 
idea of nation predominated over the Herder-Mazzinian idea at Frank­
furt, which was represented by the far left only.^
In May, Paris learned that Trieste was important for the German 
nationalists, the special agent, Bernays, wrote that France could
^Gaston Zeller, La France et l''allemagne depuis dix siècles. 
(Paris: Collin, 1948), p. 187.
^Theodor Schieder, "Das Italienbild der deutschen Einheits- 
bewegung," Studi Italians. Ill (1959), 146-47.
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have a free hand in Italy, if they left Trieste to Germany. The 
Sardinian Minister at Munich warned his country that the demonstration 
of the fleet of Sardinia-Naples had alarmed Germany. He did not doubt 
that if the stories of the bombardment of the city were verified, the 
Frankfurt National Assembly would declare war on Germany, The politi­
cal consequences of an attack on Trieste would be fatal for Italy.^ 
With Venice in revolt, Trieste was the only port of the German Confed­
eration offering access to the Mediterranean markets. When the news 
reached Frankfurt, May 29, of the blockade of Trieste by the combined 
fleets of Naples, Sardinia and Venice, there was widespread dissatis­
faction. The Belgium chargS warned of thé political consequences of 
the act in Germany.
This measure could well change the dispositions of Germany 
relative to the war in Piedmont, which has been in this 
country, at least until now, unpopular. One desired here 
generally that Italy would be able to constitute herself 
in repose. But touching Trieste, for whose solicitude the 
Council of 50 had sent commissions to Vienna to recommend 
that they not give up the important point, could change 
that goodwill to hostility.!"
He thought that the German feeling for Trieste was as fervent as the
French for the Polish Question.
On June 17, a protest was sent in the name of the German Con­
federation against "all acts of hostility on the part of the combined 
naval forces of Sardinia, Naples and Venice on the port of Trieste
^Berirays to Bois le Comte, Frankfurt, May 19, 1848, AEF, MD, 
All, vol. 170, p. 27.
9pallavinci to Pareto, Munich, May 22, 1848, quoted in Curato, 
I'll Farlamento de Francoforte e la prima guerra d*indipendenza
italiana,V m ,  CX, 280.
lOpriey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, May 2.9, 1848, AEB, All, IV;
88.
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and against all violation o£ the territory of the German Confedera­
tion in general.
The protest of the old Diet of the German Confederation was 
followed a few days later by a protest in the National Assembly who 
declared that "An attack on Trieste will be seen as a declaration of
war against Germany." The Belgium chargé reported that the vote
1 3was unanimous.
The activity of the Diet and National Assembly in Frankfurt 
greatly disturbed the French. A "Note on Germany and Austria" was 
written soon afterward by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which 
investigated whether there was a legal basis for the declaration of 
June 20.^^ Bastide told Hatzfeldt that he had warned the cabinet in 
Turin to be careful about violating the rights of the German Confed­
eration, and France was visibly worried by the possibility of Germany's
15
coming to the aid of Austria in Italy. Ifa late Jptyv Schmerling told 
the Frankfurt Assembly that the maintenance of the blockade of Trieste 
had necessitated the ministry of the Empire to send the envoy of the 
government of Charles Albert a new note much "more energetic" than the 
first.
l^Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt,Jung 18* 1848, AEB, All, IV,102.
^^Stenoeraphischer Bericht uber die Verhandlunaen der deutschen 
constituirenden Nationalversanmltog zu Frankfurt am Main. (Frankfurt/M.: 
Sauerrdnder, 1848), I, 391.
l^Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, June 20, 1848, AEB, All, IV,
102.
14
AEF, MD, All, vol. 162, pp. 352-60. 
l^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 6, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 54. 
^^Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, July 24, 1848, AEB, All, IV,
131.
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Bastide was very worried about the possibility of aid to Austria 
In their Italian War, asking Hatzfeldt, July 28, of a rumor that Frank­
furt might declare Venetia part of the German Confederation. Berlin 
answered that they had heard nothing of such a rumor, but stated that 
public opinion In Germany would be totally opposed If the question 
were raised. "Germany Is strong enough and large enough not to have : 
need to extend her territory." The Prussian Foreign Minister felt 
that such an extension Into Italy "would offer no great strategic 
advantages and would only be a new source of embarrassment."^^
While Prussia was adamantly opposed to any entangling involve­
ment In northern Italy, the Frankfurt Assembly passed a resolution, 
August 12, that the "Central Power of Germany should protect the In­
terests of the Confederation In the Austrla-Sardlnlan War Question.
In the Italian Debate, Nauwerck from Berlin spoke of a "thousand years 
of Injustice," of "violent conciliation," and made an interesting 
observation on German-Italian relations. "Every people must be free 
and Independent." This was the voice of Herder and Mazzini.
I will not go back into the Middle Ages to remind you 
what a misfortune the Germans themselves have brought 
from Italy. You know the saying that 'Italy is the grave 
of the Germans,' Have we any interest in supporting Aus­
tria's tyranny In northern Italy? Austria was the evil 
spirit In Italy.19
The Liberals thought the Hohenstaufen's interest in Italy had been
fatal to German unity In the Middle Ages.
l?Berlln to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 22, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, 
p. 95; Arago to Bastlde, Berlin, AEF, vol. 302. p. 238,
l^Stenographlscher Bericht. II, 1568. 
19lbld.. II, p. 1561.
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The debate on Italy became a defense of historical writing as 
another Prussian, Friedrich von Raumer, author of the History of the 
Hohenstaufens. defended the role of Germany in Italy. He thought the 
foreign domination of Austria there similar to the rule of foreign 
royal houses in England, Sweden, Naples and Spain. He denied the 
possibility of making a present of freedom to another country. "You 
can give a country her freedom as easily as you could give a man cour­
age and a woman her chastity." The north Italians had as good a 
foreign domination as Sweden, England, Naples and Spain.
"Alone, gentelmen, I have traveled through Italy . . . where I 
observed the condition of the people," he noticed how they were gov­
erned, and ;concluded that the "Austrian government seemed to be the 
best in all of Italy." If the government had not pleased all "spirits", 
this was natural; this was the conflict of nationalities,. "As the 
Polésh in Poznan have a better administration under the Prussians 
than they ever had under Polish domination." A few years later Rau­
mer published a book, Zur Politik des Taees. which clearly stated 
the inability of the Italians to create a political unity.
Schieder believed that there was no clear position expressed 
over the Italian Question in Frankfurt. The conservative-RomanfCath- 
olic-universalist party was sympathetic for Austria or a Reich's 
traditionalism. The bourgeois nationalist-liberals were sympathetic 
to the argument of defense and put the principle of military strat­
egy, expressed in the speech of General Radowitz, above the principle 
of nation.
The Radowtiz speech raised another point: He specifically
20
Ibid.. II, 1567; see also Schieder, p. 148.
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mentioned France whose "hegemony" in northern Italy must be resisted
for the "safety of the German Confederation." This speech was greeted
by "stormy applause from the Right and Center." It is highly unlikely
that Paris was pleased by a defense of an imperialistic war fought for
"stragggic" considerations!^^
Sinde wrote that "Raumer was far from sacrificing old lands of
the Reich because of a doctrine. (^rmany was asked to cut of|) . . .
with foolish magnanimity large stretches of land while no one gave
Germany similar generosity, and he especially stressed the importance
22
of the strategic moment."
The Italian Debate brought the German Confederation into open 
conflict with France, shortly after the first cabinet of the Central 
Power had been formed. A few days before, the President of the Coun­
cil, Prince de Leiningen, told the Belgian chargé that he feared that
nothing could be done to impede the Frankfurt Parliament from soon
23
taking part in the war for Austria..
French fears of the "wild men" in Frankfurt date most clearly 
from the Italian Debate which made France fear such a bellicose 
neighbor of 45 millions, A power that stressed military considerations 
in drawing borders in Italy could also favor them in the Vosges as 
well, especially when they coincided with the French-German language 
frontier better than the Rhine.
Zllbid.. II, 1566-67; Schieder, p. 148
^^Guenther Kunde, Die deutsche Revolution von 1848 und die 
italienische Frage. leildruck, (Saalfeld: privately published, 1937)
p. 9.
^^Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, August 7, 1848, AEB, All
IV, 148.
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An important key to French policy toward the Frankfurt Parlia­
ment is the comment of Bernays, "This Parliament is not the last word 
from G e r m a n y . L a m a r t i n e  told the Committee of Foreign Affairs of 
the Chamber, July 18, that the King of Prussia could "throw himself 
in the bosom of his people," or he could "rest in the midst of his 
army" and use an an alliance with the Russian army to vreoonquer his 
own country. He stated that France had "nothing to fear in one or the
other hypothesis about Prussia," and his formula for the foreign policy
of France was still "union of France and Germany at any price.
The first hypothesis of Lamartine meant an alliance with France, 
the second was civil war in which France could also intervene in the 
name of the "democratic" Prussian element, if they showed themselves 
to be strong enough. Clearly, Lamartine was not an "enemy" of Ger­
many, but the natural leader of Germany was increasingly seen as 
Berlin, not Frankfurt. While Frankfurt threatened France with war in 
Italy, Prussia offered themselves as an ally.
The British also saw no possibility of working with the "crazy 
professors" at Frankfurt. Cowley wrote in exasperation to Palmerston 
of the Foreign Minister, Heckscher, who thought nothing of threaten­
ing England and France with war to aid Austria.
What answer can you make to a Minister of Foreign Affairs
who says, 'What do'you think we are of-war? I am not sure 
that war is not the best thing for us. It must at all events 
settle the question of unity at once.' In short, they are a 
parcel of children who want whipping and caressiftg;: alternately.
^^Bern'ays to Bois le Comte, Frankfurt, May 17, 1848, AEF, MD,
All, vol 170, p. 27.
^^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 18, 1848, G8A,.vol., ps 67,
2&Cowley to Palmerston, Frankfurt, August 21 & 27, 1848, quoted 
in Masse, p. 24,
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However, the French also thought that the follies of Frankfurt 
did not destroy the principle of unity. The Prussian cabinet, which 
was "wisely unionist" would "be favorable to us." France had rejec­
ted the old "divide and rule" policy in Germany in favor of a policy
27
of German unification under the leadership of Prussia. "It is not 
necessary to destroy that union; it is merely necessary to arrange 
it; it is only necessary to impede it from going too far. That is 
the work of Prussia; she will not fail in it." Germany would be an 
"impassable barrier" between France and R u s s i a .
German historians have never understood that hostility toward 
Germany on a specific question like Schleswig-Holstein, Poland, or 
Italy did not necessarily mean hostility toward the German unifica­
tion movement. Similarly, when Paris rejected Frankfurt, it was be­
cause she thought the Parliament unrepresentative of the "true"
German national movement; France was always friendly toward German 
unification. Bastide told Hatzfeldt, July 28, that "what was being 
done in Frankfurt was incomprehensible for him." Hatzfeldt still 
thought in late July that Bastide was more favorable than unfavorable
to Frankfurt and felt that it represented the sovereignty of the 
20
German people.
Bastide wrote, October 17, that "She jj’russi^ can march at 
the head of liberal Germany and aid us in terminating the difficulties
2?Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 6, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p.196.
28lbid.. pp. 197-98; see also Arago to Bastide, August 4, 1848, 
AEF., vol, 302, p/ 194.
^^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 28, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, 
p. 90; July 25, vol. 861, p. 85.
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that the ambition of Vienna and that of Frankfurt" had made in Italy. 
Bastide was anything but hostile to German unification, seeing Prussia 
as an aid in Italy against the excessive ambition of Austria and Frank­
furt.
  Bastide believed that the struggle was for Italy and the right
of the sovereignty of peoples. On September 26, Bastide threatened
Austria with war. If the war came, the treaties of Vienna would be:
resolutely torn up and we will call for the war against 
the thrones all the peoples who only wait for the signal 
given by us. . . .It will be easy for us to find allies
not only in all of Italy . . . but also in Germany and
even among the states submitting today, after a fashion, 
to Austrian domination.^1
While Frankfurt threatened France with intervention for Austria,
Prussia "manifests an extreme desire to pacify Italy.... to join us
to attain this end." The French believed that the true voice of 
liberal and national Germany had its spokesman in Berlin.
Frankfurt sent the worst possible representatives on missions to 
London and Paris, and their Foreign Minister, Heckscher, was the most 
unhappy choice, a most undiplomatic German. Instead of placating the 
"specious fears" of Amsterdam, he made the Dutch and Belgians more 
worried when he talked to théir Ministers in Vienna in late July:
He traced the policy to be followed by Germany henceforth 
with vigor and perseverance which she lacked until now, but 
will be given by the new constitution. He developed with 
complaisance the favorite theme of unity and centralization
^Osastide to Arago, Paris, October 17, 1848, AEF, vol. 303, p.
32.
^Ipastide to la Cour, Paris, September 26, 1848, AEF, vol. 436, 
p. 229, bis.
p. 211.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 14, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
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of Germans and traced the map of the new Empire without 
showing the least doubt of the legitimacy of the pre­
tentions of German patriotism.33
When asked by the Dutch Minister if he thought the German Empire ex­
tended to the Texel and Zuider Zee, Heckscher merely answered;
Germany found her patriotism in a sentiment of law (droit) 
and the necessities of her political existence and in the 
power of expansion of her nationals which gave the means 
and will to triumph over the obstacles that she would meet
in her march.34
The representative of Belgium also objected heatedly to the 
"new spirit of usurpation."
Heckscher showed no doubt in the right of Germany to expand to 
her "natural" limits, making enemies among her neighbors, instead of 
allies. The sentiment of the Foreign Minister of the Frankfurt Par­
liament would hardly have caused confidence in Paris and London in 
the common sense of the Frankfurters. It seemed that Heckscher wanted 
a war with anyone; if he could not have one with Russia or Italy, Bel­
gium and Holland would do. Although the language cannot be taken 
seriously, it is easy to understand why Bastide said that what was 
being done in Frankfurt was "incomprehensible." To threaten war on 
all fronts without an army or finances, as Frankfurt did ,was illogical.
When Raumer came to Paris on a special mission to convince the 
French that Frankfurt should be a party to the joint French-British 
mediation of the Austrian-Sardinian conflict, his reception was cool. 
The charge of Saxony wrote that "The principal difficulty
33oe la cour to Bastide, Vienna, July 26, 1848, AEF, vol 436, 
pp. 34-35.
S^ lbid.
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that the Raumer mission is experiencing results from the fear of see­
ing Germany take an active part in the conflict which could arise
35between France and Austria over Italy."
The instructions of Heckscher for Raumer stressed that the 
most important thing for him to do was to gain the diplomatic recog­
nition of Frankfurt for the German nation. "I ask you, please, to do 
everything possible to show the peaceful character of the German uni­
fication desires in the right light and to convince France that she 
should strengthen this."^^ Instead, Raumer told Bastide that "Germany 
will not see with indifference a French Army advance over the Alps, 
and in this case, she would probably not delay in pronouncing herself 
against France." There can be little doubt that Raumer was accurate 
when he told the Austrian charge, Thom, that "These words made a strong 
impression on M. Bastide.
Rather than convince the French of the peaceful character of 
the Zentralgewalt. Raumer threatened the French with an invasion on 
the RhineI Cavaignac was outraged with the historian-diplomat. On 
one side they offered German unity as a political principal but denied 
that the same principal of nationalism applied in the Italian Question. 
Frankfurt claimed to speak for all of Germany, but what of Austria and 
Prussia? Who was the sovereign able to negotiate in the Italian Ques*:'. 
tion, Vienna or F r a n k f u r t . in late August, the Austrian chargé, Thom,
35
Bose to Dresden, Paris, September 7, 1848, Saxony, p. 171.
Heckscher to Raumer, Frankfurt, August 20^ 1848, GÈfniaTiy,. Bunr 
desarchiv, Zweigstelle, Frankfurt/Main, Raumer Papers.
37
Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, September 6, 1848, HHSA, IX, 36.
38
Kbnneritz to Dresden, Paris, September 11, 1848, Saxony, p.
176.
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summarized Bastide's attitudes toward the Frankfurt Parliament. He
thought that the French Foreign Minister had earlier ignored completely
what had happened there, but "today it is the great preoccupation, much
39
more than Italian affairs."'• The next day. Bastide wrote his agent in 
Vienna that "the party of progress is not our enemy in the Italian 
Q u e s t i o n . Bastide was opposed by the "retrograde" element at Frank­
furt and Vienna.
Arago assured him that although :he Frankfurt policy was hostile 
to French opinion, he had been assured in Berlin that it was being mod­
ified from day to day. "The National Parliament will return from its 
errors, or it will soon come under the influence of the Prussian Cab­
inet, which is frankly l i b e r a l . I n  the long run. Bastide was confi­
dent that the real national party in Germany would be friendly to France, 
because while Austria only invoked "the right of property" in Italy,
"We are the representatives of the opposed principle of the sovereignty
of peoples."42
In spite of the imprudent observations of Raumer, Bastide was 
always very indulgent with the professor-diplomat. The Frenchman was 
so courteous, that Raumer thought that his mission was on the verge 
of complete success and that the French would recognize the National 
Assembly as the spokesman for all of Germany1 The Frankfurt secretary
^^xhom to Wessenberg, Paris, August 26, 1848, HHSA, VIII, 201.
I
p. 119.
4®Bastide to la Cour, Paris, August 27, 1848, AEF. vol. 436,
41
Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 8, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 261.
42
Bastide to la Cour, Paris, September 26, 1848, AEF, vol.436,
p. 228 bis.
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of State for Foreign Affairs asked Tallenay, the French charge in 
Frankfurt, about a choice for the "new" post in Paris.
Bastide answered that Raumer had misunderstood the conversation. 
He had said that he would be happy when completely official relations 
could be established between Frankfurt and Paris. But there was only 
a provisional state at present; it was unknown if there would be an 
empire or a republic, if the envoy of Frankfurt would represent at the 
same time Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, etc. or what the territorial lim­
its of the new state would be. Meanahile, he had told Raumer, it was 
improbable that there would be an official recognition of the repres­
entative of Frankfurt. Bastide wrote Tallenay to assure Schmerling, 
who had replaced Heckscher as Foreign Minister, "No hostile thought 
of ulterior motive enter in our reserve." France still wished the 
"pact fraternel avec Allemagne." While the relations were not offic­
ial, the French wished for them to be as friendly as possible.
Bastide used extreme reserve when dealing with Frankfurt. A 
letter of Schmerling coninunicated to him by Raumer posed the princi­
ple that even the army of Radetzsky in Italy belonged to the Vicar 
General of the Empire; that is, the supreme commander of the Austrian 
army in Italy was the Frankfurt Parliament. Another consideration 
that made him hesitate was that while proclaiming the principle of 
nationalities, they opposed the Italian nationality by openly an­
nouncing in advance of the mediation the intention of conserving for 
Austria, Lombardy and Venetia. France might have been more inclined 
to recognition if "in the Italian affairs, Frankfurt presented herself
^^Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, October 2, 1848, AEF, vol.
806, pp. 98-99.
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to us as an auxiliary of the principles of democratic nationalities, 
and not as a defender of the treaties of 1815 and the rights of 
Austria.
The unitary movement in Germany was as poorly served in London 
as in Paris. The special envoy there, Baron Andryan, was as absurdly 
bellicose as Raumer; both utterly failed to carry out their instruc­
tions to show the peaceful mood of Germany. The London papers of Oct­
ober 18 and 19 were filled with reports that the Central Power of the 
German Empire was on the verge of intervening militarily in Italian 
affairs. When the French Ambassador, Beaumont, saw Andryan, he spoke 
of an army of 50,000 men in southern Germany as an "observation army" 
in case of attack if the south Tyrol were menaced by an aggressor. 
"Baron Andryan told me of the great interest that the German Empire 
had in the Italian Question, of the impossibility for Germany to let 
her natural frontiers be cut into in northern Italy, and consequently 
the necessity for her to be near to see what happened." When Beau­
mont said that this action showed no deference for the mediating 
powers in the dispute the German replied that nothing would be done 
if the mediating conference opened, and assured him that on the day 
the conference opened the army of observation would be dissolved.
When the French asked in Frankfurt about this army, Tallenay 
wrote that he and Cowley, the English charg€^, had no knowledge of 
the forming of such a force. The only known troops were those in
^^Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, October 5, 1848, AEF, vol. 806,
pp. 110-11.
^^Beaumont to Bastide, London, October 20, 1848, AEF, vol. 671, 
pp. 268-72.
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Thuringen, Wuerttemberg and Baden used to keep down the anarchist 
elements, Tallenay doubted the report since it would have been 
difficult for the Central Power to dispose 50,000 men at a time 
when Germany hardly had enough troops to keep order at home, to say 
nothing of the e x p e n s e . Andryan's blustering language about 
"natural frontiers" in northern Italy, which indicated that he be­
lieved that Lombardy and Venetia were integral parts of the German 
Confederation, was a grave disservice to his mission to gain support 
abroad for the cause of German unity.
^^Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, October 30, 1848, AEF,
bol, 806, pp. 164-66.
GHABTER X 
POLAND; PHASE II
The Polish Question was the most complicated for French policy 
in 1848. It was the symbol of total victory for the new order ôf 
Europe. With the change in central Europe, all the dreams of the 
French would have been within grasp. It meant a new order in Vienna 
as well as Berlin, with Bastide and Cavaignac taking the place of 
Metternich as the axis of the European system. As before, the suc­
cess for the Poles was impossible without the aid of the Germans. 
First, the revolution must triumph in Germany, then it would neces­
sarily follow in Poland.
The first warning about the character of the new Frankfurt 
Parliament toward the Poles was sent by Bernays, May 19.^ "From 
what I hear here . . .  do not hope for anything at all for Poland.
The Poles are detested by all Germany. For her, Germany, at least, 
the Parliament, will do nothing. . . However, this Parliament is 
not the last word in Germany.
The Saxon Ambassador saw Bastide, May 20, and the new French 
Foreign Minister talked of the necessity of peace for the consoli­
dation of the revolution. He thought that there would be no need 
for French intervention in the Italian dispute, because "The pen
^Bernays to Bois le Comte, Frankfurt, May 19, 1848, AEF, MD, 
All, vol. 170, p. 27.
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is mightier than the sword." He was equally peaceful in discussing
Poland, saying that Poland could only be saved by peace.
She depends on the good will of Germany, which we influence 
by example and by moral influence. The reported victory of 
the people of Vienna--the 15th--will aid the Poles. The 
more the Austrian Empire and Germany break with the old 
system, the more Poland will find support in these nations, 
and I think that it will soon be possible to organize a 
diplomatic intervention of all of the continent in favor 
of Poland.2
Bastide wrote to Savoye, a few weeks later, a similar fraternal mes­
sage stressing the importance of Germany to Polish freedom.
Above all cultivate good and frequent relations with the 
members of the Parliament. It is in their conviction that 
it is essential to make prevail the principle of a narrow 
alliance between France and Germany. It is by the reali­
zation and the sincerity of that fraternal alliance that 
it will be possible to accomplish the fruitful results for 
liberty, civilization and true international law. It is 
from this union that the great inequity of the partition 
of Poland will be redressed.^
Bastide was enthusiastic about the resolution of Drouyn de Lhuys passed
in the French National Assembly, May 24.
The National Assembly urges the Executive Commission to 
take as a rule of conduct the unanimous wishes of the 
Assembly, summed up in these words: fraternal pact with
Germany, reconstitution of independent, free Poland, 
emancipation of Italy.^
Bastide hoped that Frankfurt would "reply to the voice of 
France" by a similar declaration. In other words. Bastide had not 
taken any notice of Bernay's letter concerning the sentiments of the 
Germans towards the Poles, and he seemed ignorant of any change in
^Konneritz to Dresden, Paris, May 22, 1848, Saxony, pp. 101-02.
^Bastide to Savoye, Paris, June 8, 1848, DDF, II, 731.
4lbid.
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German public opinion since the March Revolution. It is as though the 
Foreign Minister worked in a vacuum cut off entirely from events in 
Germany.
Savoye wavt*?d, June 11, that national pride had poisoned the 
question of Poznan, The delegates were afraid to stand up to the 
charge of having "abandoned the cause of nearly a half-million Ger­
mans who live in the Grand Duchy." This seemed "un-German" in the 
atmosphere of Frankfurt, susceptible as other national movements to 
irredentist feelings; however, it was not yet clear that the Germans 
in Poznan would be included in the German Confederation.
The President of the Assembly, Heinrich von Gagern, in an 
interview with Ladislas Plater, a Polish traveler from Paris,'"assured 
him of the good intentions of the majority of the members of the Par­
liament relative to the reconstruction of the Polish nationality."
The German and Polish Questions were still intimately tied.^
Arago wrote from Berlin that the reconstruction of a really
free Polish nation was intimately attached: to the movement for dem­
ocratic unity in Germany. Until this was done, Germany would make 
promises and temporize, but nothing would be done. Only with the 
victory of the radicals in Berlin, the democratic party of German 
unity, would Poland be reconstituted.^
On June 10, Dr. Kraetzer-Rasserts reported to Bastide of a
trip from Aachen along the Rhine to Strasbourg. He found that the
general opinion was anti-Prussian and very favorable to France
5Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, June 11, 1848, DDF, II, 793.
&Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 17, 1848, DDF, II, 963.
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He also talked to Mrs. Hecker, the wife of a leader in the first Baden 
rebellion, who brought news of the great progress of the "republican 
principle" in Germany. At Koblenz and Mainz the people talked openly 
not only of the republic, but the arrival of the French; not isola»' 
ted individuals, awaited the French, but seven-eighths of the entire 
population. Kraetzer thought that the way of life of the German 
Rhine provinces were more French than Alsace and Lorraine. In Baden, 
"except for the intervention of 60,000 foreign troops, it would to­
day be a republic."^ The rest of Germany, though, was very far from 
being ripe for republican institutions.
He spoke with two reactionary deputies in the Frankfurt Assem­
bly, Lichnowsky and Diebenrook, on a Rhine steamer. Both "trembled 
with anger in thinking of the re-establishment" of Poland, and they 
cited the horrors of the Poles against the Germans in Poznan.
Kraetzer asked if Frankfurt would allow a French army to cross Ger­
many to go to the aid of the Poles.
The reactionaries were not afraid that the French would stay 
in Germany, because they had confidence in the German armies, and 
the French could be "chased out." What they really feared were the 
writings and ideas of the revolutionary army which they would spread 
on their passage through Germany and which would not be so simple to 
"chase away."®
Kraetzer also sent the military statistics of Aachen, Cologne, 
Koblenz, plans of the cities and forts of Mainz, Rastatt, and Baden.
^Kraetzer-Rasserts to Bastide, Strasbourg, June 10, MD, All, 
vol. 129, pp. 5-8.
Bibid.
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He mailed tables of statistics of field armies and garrisons of the 
federal German army, the Austrian army, and the Prussian army. He 
warned Bastide, June 19, that the Russians had moved 100,000 men to 
the Poznan border and the Russian fleet in the Baltic was preparing 
for a great blow. Bastide told the Saxon Ambassador the same day 
that he had information that convinced him that an immediate war 
between Russia and Germany was unavoidable.^
The same day, the Belgian charge reported the project of the 
Minister of the Interior for the mobilization of 300 bataillons of 
the National Guard, Lamartine protested that the French had no 
thought of aggression, but the presence of the armaments in north­
ern Europe and the complications of the war in Lombardy forced the 
French to take a defensive attitude,
Arago wrote from Berlin of a cabinet crisis and of the fears 
of a Russian invasion in the Prussian Assembly,
It is evident to me that Russia is only waiting for a good 
occasion to intervene violently in Prussian affairs, or 
rather in German affairs, I believe that the Emperor dec­
lared by a top secret note, that he considered it a casus 
belli for the Prussians to permit a Polish organization of 
Poznan, It is necessary for us to be prepared for this 
eventuality, . , , A great majority of the German nation 
is presently sympathetic to us and shows at the same time 
a profound aversion for Russia, , , the Polish cause is 
odious for Russia, In this question [of Poland] Germany 
is divided. We should support Poland, without letting our­
selves get embroiled with Germany under the menaces of 
Russia, Wait patiently awhile, which will not be long,
Germany, whose ideas come toward us quickly, will throw 
herself completely into the arms of France when Russia 
attacks her. United with Germany, we will reinstate Pol­
and to the applause and with the concourse of all of the
^Koenneritz to Lemaistre, Paris, June 19, 1848, Saxony, p, 118, 
^®Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, June 19, 1848, AEB, XIII, 219,
129
German Confederation. I do not know a single German pat­
riot to whom the unity of Germany does not mean the nec­
essity of the reconstruction of an independent and free 
Poland.11
When the Russian attack came, Germany would have to turn to France; 
meanwhile, France would say as little as possible so the Polish 
Question could remain dormant. Until Russia attacked, the most im­
portant thing for France to do was to avoid all contact with German 
internal questions, not to take sides in the controversies, not ito 
seem to take part in any of the sectional conflicts or cabinet crises. 
France should be unobtrusively promoting Polish interests, waiting 
for the victory of the democrats in Germany.
Bastide answered Arago after the June Days in Paris, June 29. 
He appreciated his observations on continuing to protect the Polish 
nationality without sacrificing good relations with Germany. He 
thought it best to do nothing more now other than the protest to 
the Prussian cabinet that Arago had delivered earlier in the month
against the division of Poznan along national lines. "That protest
1 2
subsists; that is enough for the present." The Poles would have 
to wait for the revolution to run its course in Germany.
Bastide thought this was not far off. He got letters from a 
Heinrich Boernstein, most likely one of the members of the presidium 
of the "German Democratic Society" by that name, a publicist. These 
letters are in the Memories et Documents of the French Foreign Min­
istry, entitled "News bulletins of Germany." A typical "bulletin" 
announced from Berlin on July 29, "The revolution marches with great
l^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 20, 1848, DDF, II, 1036. 
IZBastide to Arago, Paris, June 29, 1848, DDF, II, 1157.
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steps in Berlin. The question of the day is the monarchy or a repub­
lic?" Another one,datelined Vienna, June 26, told of the miscontent 
with Archduke Johann whose powers were too limited to do anything. 
Whatever he did there would be a new and more radical revolution.
The bulletin from Berlin, June 30, warned that "the language 
of the clubs has become more and more violent, the political placards 
and wall posters increase and a great exasperation reigns among the 
workers. The National Guard is soft and indecisive and the garrison 
is very weak and partly demoralized."
He wrote, from Vienna, June 27, that everything was the same. 
There was weakness and irresolution at the top and absolute lack of 
political education below. Neither the government, nor the people 
knew what they wanted. There was anarchy everywhere. The Empire
was falling apart because it lacked a single nationality. The press
13was in a pitiful state mistaking license for liberty.
Under Frankfurt, dated June 30, he wrote that Archduke Johann 
had been elected as Vicar of the Empire, but he would merely be a straw 
man for a small clique of constitutionalists, who directed affairs 
there. A new revolution was coming, guided by the "inexorable force" 
of the idea of German unity. "Not only Johann and his clique would 
vanish, but also the 35 princes ruling in Germany." Germany marched 
inevitably toward the republic; it was only a matter of time.^^
Boernstein warned, July 1, that, the policy of the Prussian cab­
inet was for rapprochement with Russia at the expense of France with
l^All hand-written and signed, "Henri Boernstein" in AEF, MD, 
All, vol. 129, pp. .21-23.
I4ibid., p. 23.
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a "badly disguised distrust towards F r a n c e . K r a e t z e r  similarly 
reported, July 12, that the republican principle was making rapid 
progress in Germany. "The. more Germany is left to herself and that 
France avoids giving the least slight to the existing governments of 
Germany, the more the monarchical system will use itself up in the 
battle of opinion." The friendly disposition towards France was gain­
ing ground in spite of the efforts of the German governments to com­
promise it.^^
Through these rose tinted glasses, Germany was on the road to 
the new national order. If Bastide took these reports seriously his 
conduct of reserve is easily explained; he thought that the world 
would change itself to suit France, there was no need to be too active 
in formulating revolt. Europe was revolutionary enough for France, 
and he even favored strong action in Berlin and Frankfurt to counter 
the more extreme "communists.
The Assembly in Berlin was a consistent critic of the division 
of Poznan along national lines. Namier never mentioned this body's 
decision of July 4 when they appointed a commission of inquest with 
full powers. Arago thought that, "That decision. . . destroys all 
the proposed divisions" of Poznan made until now.
^^Ibid.. p. 25.
l^Kraetzer-Rasserts to Bastide, Strasbourg, July 12, 1848, AEF 
MD, All, vol. 163, pp. 1-2.
^^Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 25, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, 
p. 85; September 13, 1848. v o l . 863,.p. 24.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 142, 
passage underlined twice in Paris.
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Arago claimed, two days later, that the inquest indicated a
"happy change in the influence of France." If Poland were not now
being reconstituted, at least the partitions of Poznan were being
19
questioned. The InquEst could only do good. Bastide was very 
pleased about the inquiry in Poznan, and he thought that France had 
done all that they could, for the present, in making Germany apprec­
iate right and equity in the Poznan Question.^®
A few days later, Mieroslawski, the leader of the risings in 
Poznan in April and May against the Prussian army was released by 
Prussia. Arago thought, this was significant, because it showed that 
the Prussians "wished to have a good solution to the affairé of the 
Grand Duchy.
Bastide thought now that the language of the French in Berlin
had had an effect, on changing the opinion to one conforming more to
French ideals on Poland. "The inquest ordered by the Berlin Assembly
on the events in the Duchy of Poznan is the first favorable symptom!.'
of a change. He urged Savoye to agitate in Frankfurt against the
division of Poznan into German and Polish zones, to uphold justice,
law, and true liberalism; Germany ought to see that it: was in their
22
real interest to reconstruct Poland.
Bastide hoped the instructions for the commission of inquiry 
in Berlin would be countered by a similar proposal in Frankfurt.
Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 6, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 143.
ZOgascide to Arago, Paris, July 11, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 152.
ZlArago to Bastide, Berlin, July 15, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 157.
^^Bastide to Savoye, Paris, July 2J, 18487 AEF, vol. 805, p. 223.
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Instead, they rejected Robert Blum's motion for such a commission 
333 against, 139 for, and 85 absent; the Frankfurt Assembly then 
approved the division of Poznan and admitted its representatives 
342 to 31 with 31 abstaining and 157 registered a b s e n t . T h e  French 
defeat could not have been more crushing, since Bastide had been so 
outspoken on the question.
The overwhelming vote in Frankfurt alarmed the Poles in Berlin,
who asked Arago for the French to publish a protest against the new
division of Polish territories in the newspapers. The Poles thought
that an official document would favorably influence public opinion
in Berlin and perhaps in Frankfurt, but the real reason was to "calm
24
the Poles in their anguish."
Bastide saw the folly of such a document which would be in­
terpreted in Frankfurt as a denial of the right of the Assembly to 
draw the borders of the German Confederation. France should say as 
little as possible on the question of Poznan at this time; Bastide 
had said more than enough before the vote in the Great Polish Debate 
in Frankfurt, and Frankfurt was deaf to French arguments about 
"liberialism," "right," and the "true interests of Germany." He 
wrote at the top of this despatch of Arago, "do not publish anything 
in the newspapers and do not warm things up."25
Although Arago had warned that the election of Archduke Johann
would drag Germany into the struggle with Italy, July 7,2&, the votes
^^Namier, 1848. p. 110.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 22, 1848, AEF, voà»,3D2, p. 165.
^^ Ibid.
26Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 7, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 148.
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on the Poznan Question showed blatantly the weakness of French influ­
ence on Frankfurt. At this time, Bastide began to fear Frankfurt's 
intervention in Italy in favor of Austria, and he took an interest in 
the Schleswig Question for the first time since before the June Days. 
The French saw Frankfurt's stand of the rights of the German nation 
in the Poznan Debate shocking. Even a paragraph protecting the nat­
ionality of Poles living in the eastern provinces of Prussia was 
rejected.
Bastide was disgusted with the "sorry spectacle of political 
morality in the questions of Schleswig and of the Grand Duchy of 
Poznan. . . .  It is even to be feared that an exaggerated and exten­
ded view of the principle of nationality and German unity will go 
directly against the end that they wish." Bastide had not rejected 
the principle of nationality or even of German nationality of uni­
fication. He thought that the spirit shown by Frankfurt in the Poz­
nan Question would ruin the cause of nationality in Germany and in
27Europe.
Arago was still optimistic "in spite of the mistakes of the 
Frankfurt Parliament, the separatist reaction hardly makes any pro­
gress." France still supported the unity movement in Germany. He 
also had a "firm hope" that the Berlin cabinet would "persist in re­
gard to Poznan in a policy more just" than that of Frankfurt.^8 He 
advised sending a precise note to the Prussian government conforming 
to the protest of June 9.
Savoye attributed the vote in the Poznan Question to a
27sastide to Arago, Paris, July 31, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 187.
Z^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 1, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p.
189.
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compromise in the National Assembly between the Prussian party and 
the Austrian party. Prussia was given the extra votes of the dele­
gates from Prussian Poznan in return for approval of the election of 
Archduke Johann, an Austrian, as the Vicar of the Empire. Whatever 
the cause. Bastide thought that the French should protest. The 
protest should be made in the cabinet and not publicly.
Today, that all is over, I see little timeliness : to publish 
in the newspapers, as you recommended the representations of 
June 9. In the general situation of Europe and relative to 
other questions, that of the Duchy of Poznan is of secondary 
interest.29
It is difficult to see how A. J. P. Taylor drew the conclusion 
that Bastide sent Arago to Berlin and "instructed him to drop the 
Polish Question and to keep quiet: 'do not publish anything in the
papers and do not excite people:'"^0 Everything is wrong with this 
statement. First, these words were written on a despatch of Arago's 
in Paris, and not sent to him. More importantly, they only refer to 
the days immediately after the Polish Debate in Frankfurt, not on 
his arrival in Paris. His instructions in June, on the contrary, 
were to make a very forceful protest to Arnim, not to "drop" the 
question. Last, the comment belongs in the context of the danger 
of an intervention of the Assembly in early August in the Ital­
ian War with Austria, with the intransigence of Frankfurt in the 
Schleswig War, and with their behavior in the recent Polish Debate, 
for which Arago wished to publish an official protest in the news­
papers. All that Bastide sent to Arago was the comment that now that
00
Bastide to Arago, Paris, August 1, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 188.
^®A. J. P. Taylor, The struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-
1918. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957) p. 15
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the debate was over in Frankfurt, he could see little aid for the 
Poles in publishing a protest, at that time.
Bastide had not lost sight of the fact that the Poles must 
have German help to reconstitute their nation-state. Now that it
was obvious that Frankfurt was unwilling, as then constituted, to aid
the Poles, a "new ally" was needed. Germany must, be united to free 
Poland, and Prussia was the candidate, since Frankfurt had totally 
betrayed the national principle. Arago understood the despatch in 
this meaning, and reported that Prussia would rally to her the true 
German nationalists, who had been betrayed in the Polish Debate.
Arago disagreed with Bastide that the division of Poznan was
then final, and he thought Prussia would right this wrong.
In your despatch of August 1 on the subject of the vote
in Frankfurt on the Poznan question you said "today all 
is consummated." I do not think this is so. From the 
decision of the Parliament to the execution is distant, 
and the execution can only come from Prussia. It is 
more than uncertain. I believe firmly that the Grand 
Duchy will never be divided.31
Bastide was impressed with Arago's explanation of the disposi­
tion of the Berlin cabinet and National Assembly in the Poznan Ques­
tion and authorized him to give the Prussian government a note in
the sense of the despatch of June 9. He left to Arago the discre­
tion to edit this note along the lines he had indicated himself. The 
instructions to Arago of August 1 to do nothing, for the time being, 
in the Polish Question were rescinded on August 16.
By August and September, the Berlin National Assembly was
dominated by liberal-democrats. September 8, Arago wrote that peace
3lArago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 195.
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in Schleswig had been approved in this Berlin Assembly the day before, 
and he spent the morning of the eighth talking with a great number of 
deputies of all nuances of the opposition, principally those with des­
igns for various ministries. Arago told them "with careful reserve" 
of his fears from the "European point of view," and he stated that the 
policy of the present Prussian government of Auerswald was "prefer­
able to Frankfurt." He said that this policy of the latter "menaced 
at the same time Poland and Italy."
All cried out without exception. . . . They wished to do 
for all Poznan the same as France, first, because it was 
just and right for the Poles, then because they wished to 
be friends of France; as for the war in Italy, in any case, 
they would never join Austria. They added that the policy 
of Frankfurt modified itself from day to day, and the 
Frankfurt Assembly would change from its errors, or that 
it will come soon under the influence of the Prussian 
cabinet.32
Not only was the majority of the liberal-democratic Berlin 
Assembly favorable to France and Poland, but Arago wrote, September 
19, that he had received a visit from General von Willisen an in­
timate friend of King Frederick William IV, who had been charged by 
him with a special mission to tell Bastide that, the King would stand 
by his "solemn promises that he had made in the month of M a r c h .  
Willisen had been sent because "the King would not wish the govern­
ment of the French Republic to doubt his sincerity."3^ In Septem­
ber, Frederick William IV repeated to the French the promise of the 
reconstitution of Poland and that Prussia would be absorbed into 
Germany.
3^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 8, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 261.
33
Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 19, 1848, AEF, vol, 302,
p. 289.
34ibid.
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Bastide was so Impressed with events in Prussia that he came 
to see Hatzfeldt, September 21. The Foreign Minister told Lhlm that 
he was interested not only in a pacific solution of the difficulties 
in Italy, but also in an intimate rapprochement with Prussia. He 
thought that Prussia should take an active part as a Great Power in 
Italian affairs and that France and Prussia should work together. 
Bastide told Hatzfeldt "I will always work in accord with you to in­
crease the position of Prussia and augment her influence, because I 
am convinced that it is in the true interests of France.
Two hours later, Bastide returned to Hat&feldt's house to meet 
him before they went together to see Cavaignac. They again talked in­
timately. Hatzfeldt concluded from the conversations that the "Min­
ister of Foreign Affairs has the interests of Prussia at heart almost 
as much as a Prussian himself." Bastide said that he wished Prussia 
to dominate Germany and not Frankfurt.
Very confident in the support of Prussia, Bastide wrote the 
threatening letter to la Cour, September 26, that in case of war 
"Germany" would be with France against A u s t r i a . P r u s s i a  had re­
iterated her promises of March, and the French policy for the recons­
titution of the Polish state seemed on the verge of total victory in 
late September.
In October, as revolution raged in Vienna, Prussia debated
35
Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, September 21, 1848, GSA, vol.
863, pp. 46-47.
3&ibid.
37Bastide to la Cour, Paris, September 26, 1848, AEF, vol.
436, p. 229 bis-
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the fate of her Polish provinces in a spirit not mentioned by Namier. 
Arago thought that. Arentz, the president of the committee of inquiry 
for Poznan appointed by the Berlin Assembly, opposed all division of 
territory, and that the Assembly itself seemed favorable to his pro­
posal. It would leave intact the territory of Poznan and recognize
Q O
the right of nationality of the Poles in the Grand Duchy.
On October 23, he reported that the Assembly had rejected the 
annexation of part of the territory of Poznan into the German Confed­
eration. "The line of demarcation, the annexation, partition, all 
resolVed and voted in so violent a fashion in the Frankfurt Parliament" 
were rejected by Berlin. After rejecting the partition of Poznan into 
German and Polish zones, they voted on the Phillips Amendment:
The rights which have been recognized toward the inhabitants 
of the province of Poznan, since their union with Prussia are 
solemnly guaranteed. These rights will be regulated in the 
future by an organic law which will be promulgated at the 
same time as the constitution.^^
Arago was ecstatic. "We have attained the result of all our
efforts. The victory is complete. . . . The Duchy of Poznan will not
be German; it will remain intact for Poland. Prussia had not refused
anything that France asked of it."^®
When Arago learned that Bastide had been replaced as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, his first act was to write to Drouyn de Lhuys 
about the Poznan Question. He pointed out the partition of the
38Arago to Bastide, Berlin, October 20, 1848, AEF, vol. 
303, p. 41.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, October 23, 1848, AEF, vol.
303, pp. 44-45.
40Ibid.
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territory "contrary to the treaties and against the interests of 
Germany," had been a v o i d e d , T h e  myth that the French had no in­
terest in Poland under Bastide must be rejected as baseless.
^^Arago to Drcuyn de Lhuys, Berlin, December 28, 1848, AEF, 
vol. 303, p. 149. Knapowska's assessment cf French and Prussian 
policy toward Poland in 1848 is untenable, because she, Namier and 
C. E. Black failed to study the fate of the Polish Question after the 
Frankfurt Polish Debate. This gives a picture of French and Prussian 
intentions that is totally false.
CHAPTER XI
ECONOMIC MOTIVATION OF FRENCH POLICY 
IN GERMANY
The economic motivation of French policy toward Germany has 
been ignored in spite of the existence of long Memorandum personally 
edited by Bastide in the French Archives. The French were highly in­
terested in Franco-German commerce and its growth, giving the follow-, 
ing figures:
1841 149,500,000 Francs
1845 171,000,000 "
1846 168,500,000 " (a year of depression)^
The first part of the document was a history of the rise of the
Zollverein and the economic thought of protectionism in Germany. It 
took special note that the coastal states had refused to join the 
Zollverein and had a privileged status controlling the mouths of riv­
ers in Germany and were the outlets for commerce. Access to the sea 
had been an object of the treaty concluded with Belgium, September 1, 
1844.
In recent years there had been negotiations with the United 
States and Brazil for the entry of German goods at. reduced rates. In 
Germany these attempts to increase foreign commerce had caused a
^Bastide to Savoye, Paris, August 5, 1848, AEF, correspondence 
commerciale, Frankfurt, III, p. 213, (hereafter cd) .
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heated discussion between the proponents of free trade, especially 
In Hamburg, and supporters of "differential duties" among those 
wishing to benefit German Industry and commerce by diplomatic nego­
tiations. The states of the north who were not members of the 
Zollverein and the Baltic provinces of Prussia were opposed to the 
system. The southern states were proponents of the adoption of dif­
ferential duties, using t:o. spread their propaganda the Zollverelnblatt. 
the Gazette of Augusburg, and newspapers of Heidelberg and Cologne. 
Free trade was endorsed by the Correspondent, of Hamburg, the Boersen- 
halle. and the Boersenllste.
In the constitutional states the debate had been carried to the
chambers. Deputy Schatzle In the Bavarian chamber said, "An act of
navigation and a system of differential duties would develop the
direct commerce and would serve as a spur to the abilities of the
maritime cities to facilitate the disposition of our manufactured pro-
2
ducts In the transatlantic countries."
The Hamburg Correspondent replied;,
Our German brothers of the maritime cities are very well 
placed by their Intermediary commerce and are not disposed 
to abandon these ways whose results are certain for the 
advantages and chlmerclal results; one cannot hope to se­
duce them In making an appeal to their partlotlsm. In In­
voking the phantom of commerlcal and political unity In 
Germany. Free trade is the order of the day and Richard 
Cobden Is the man of the day, . . . Your words speak of 
commercial unity of Germany, and you only think of a 
Zollverein!
The language got so violent that the Zollverelnblatt expressed 
the wish that the port of Hamburg be silted over! Clearly, the
Zibld.. p. 221.
3lbld.
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discussion in Germany was far from unified on the means of economic 
unification. However, in spite of the opposition, not only of Hanover, 
but also of certain south German states, according to Bastide,"public 
opinion was pronounced with too much energy in favor of the unitary 
principle for it not to triumph over all resistance."^
Bastide believed that the "new order" was inevitable in Germany 
and would necessarily triumph over economic interests which were so 
opposed to unification. Notice that "public opinion. . . will triumph 
over all resistance," not mentioning the Frankfurt Assembly. In the 
original draft written in July, he wrote, "Now that the unity of 
Germany touches at her realization;" the final form contained the 
same feeling of confidence in the "energy in favor of the unitary 
principle." The attitude in Paris is far from quixotic or dejected 
by the inevitability of unity in Germany.
"Interests do not in the least change for political sentiments, 
and one can predict now with what vivacity the struggle will renew 
which they proceed to organize the economic system of the great Ger­
man union." France should observe how the two views of protection 
and free trade progressed in the debate over principles.
"But above all the industrial product with the growth of pro­
ductive forces in Germany demands our attention." Bastide saw the 
role of the state to protect and extend the commerce of France, to 
extend markets by a diplomatic means. It was axiomatic to the French 
that the interests of France in Germany demanded a Kleindentsch policy 
which would exclude Austria from the economic and political borders
^Ibid., pp. 225-26.
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of the new German Empire. Prussia should dominate Germany because 
French capitalistic interests would be injured by Austrian control 
of the German economy.
Bastide's attention was drawn to the "vast Empire of Austria," 
where a protective policy had created a condition of virtual autarky, 
with powerful manufacturers established in Bohemia, Moravia, Styria, 
the Archduchy of Austria and Carinthia furnishing finished goods for 
the rest of the empire. Very high tariffs assured that the agri­
cultural population of Galicia, Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia would 
trade with the industrial regions within the empire. The Foreign 
Ministry thought it "remarkable" that the division of agricultural- 
industrial zones was precisely those of the border of the German 
Confederation.5
Their accession to the Zollverein would have as an effect 
to increase the element of production and would not fail 
to react on the common policy of the association. In the 
end to assure an outlet for goods, one will naturally be 
led to reserve more and more of the national market for 
national manufacturers by raising tariffs. It is even 
believed that German products will be given a privileged 
position in the markets of Hungary and Italy. These 
measures would be particularly disfavorable to us.
Prussia was favored because she was more economically liberal 
than Austria, as well as more politically liberal. Notice the growth 
on French goods entering the Zollverein in 1846. The total value was 
61,612,157 francs, compared to 38,142,756 francs in 1837. The total 
tariff on French goods in 1846 entering the Zollve.reinwas only 220,500 
francs; that is 1/3 of 1% of the total value. Compare this with the 
French imports from the Zollverein; in 1846, 47,885,215 francs, com­
pared with 34,440,785 in 1837; The French charged tariffs of 5,240,412,
Sibid.. pp. 228-229.
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The French government made a "profit" of over 5 million francs in 
customs duties, charging a toll of 1/9 of the value on German goods. 
Also, France had a very favorable balance of trade making over 
13,000,000 francs, an item thought highly important in the 19th cen­
tury. France shipped 18,954,864 francs worth of products to the 
Hanseatic cities, who were not members of the Zollverein. in 1846, 
paying tariffs of 26,130 francs; France imported goods worth from 
them 6,832,851 and took in 260,861 in tolls.^
The type of goods is also important. Germany was in a quasi­
colonial position toward France in the first half of the 19th century; 
the Germans exported raw materials and imported mainly finished goods. 
One-quarter of the French exports to the Zollverein was silk material, 
another tenth was wool stuff, the next in importance were cotton 
material, wine, unfinished silk, leather goods and paper products.
The Zollverein paid in wool, cattle, grain, coal, hair and bristles, 
ashes and goldsmith waste, and h o r s e s . 7
Germany's relative importance for French commerce was constant 
in the first half of the century. The most important trading partners 
of France during the Restoration were the French colonies, Netherlands, 
the United States, Sardinia, Great Britian, Germany (without Prussia 
and Hanseatic cities), former Spanish colonies in America, and Tuscany.
Q
Austria was number 19 during the Restoration below Haiti.
^Rudiger Renzing, Die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Frankreich 
und Deutschland von der Griindung des Zollvereins bis zur Reichgrundung, 
(Frankfurt/M., doctoral dissertation, 1959), pp. 158^64.
^Ibid.. pp. 161-62.
Bibid.. p..114.
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In 1846, France had the greatest commercial exchange with the 
United States, Great Britian, Sardinia, Belgium, Zollverein with Han­
over, Spain, Algeria, Switzerland, Russia and Turkey. Austria was 
not among the most, important twenty trading partners of France in 
1846. Not only did Austria net trade with France, but the quality 
products of Vienna were a very serious competitor for the "articles 
of Paris." Austria was an important exporter on the world luxury
Q
market.
French shipping interests would have also suffered under 
Austrian control of the new German Empire. Bastide’s memorandum gave
these figures on the ships leaving and entering France from German
^  10 ports.
Total ships leaving France for Number under French flag 
Zollverein 213 12
Mecklenburg 37 1
Hanover 9 0
Schleswig-
Holstein Z 1
266 14
Total ships entering France from
Zollverein 336 15
Mecklenburg 18 1
Hanover 3 0
Schleswig-
Holstein __ 8 1
365 16
l^Bastide to Savove, Paris, August 5, 1848, AEF, cc, Frank­
furt, III, 230-31.
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For Austria they had only the number entering and leaving Trieste.
There were TV Austrian ships and 1_ French coming from Trieste into 
French ports; leaving French ports going to Trieste was a total of 
148. of which 9 were French.
Among the Hanseatic cities, only Hamburg had a significant trade 
with France, but with a very different pattern for the French merchant 
navy. There were 141 ships leaving France for Hamburg, of which 73 
were French, 4 Hamburg, and 64 various; leaving Hamburg coming to 
France were 90 ships, with 71 French, 7 Hamburg, and 22 from various 
countries. The reason was that the Hanseatic cities were the only 
states in Germany where the French ships were treated like those of 
any other country, and they had no special disadvantages. In their 
own parts the French ships profited from special legislation.^^
Bastide thought that is was easy to see the damaging results to 
the French navy of the adoption of an act of German navigation putting 
the Hanseatic ports under the same law as Austria and the Zollverein.
In 1848 there were 160 French ships that carried the French flag to 
the Hanseatic ports; their economic position would be gravely endan­
gered by a uniform code of navigation in Germany. This would have the
12
effect of a surtax on French shipping.
The French diplomatic agents were counseled, "We cannot lose sight 
of any of our essential interests, and in the presence of attacks 
which they seem menaced, it is a duty (devoir) of the legation to
lllbid.
IZibid.. p. 231.
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to redouble its watchfulness and the activity of its information."
French policy was deeply motivated by economic considerations. The 
area of greatest interest to France in 1848 was northern Italy. While 
Sardinia alone was the third most important French trading partner, 
Austria had very little commerce with France. If Venetia and Lombardy 
became independent with their own commercial legislation, there would 
be a very large potential commercial market for France.
In Germany, it was equally important to close out Austrian in­
fluence because the Austrian manufacturers would take the place of 
the French, and cut off a source of French raw materials. French
shipping interests had more hope from Prussia where the cabinet was
13known to oppose subsides for shipping, and the Hanseatic cities 
would have had a far greater relative importance and bargaining 
position in a smaller Germany than a larger. The north German ports 
were also very badly affected by the Schleswig-Holstein War, because 
the Danish were seizing German shipping and had blocaded the German 
ports.
The Prussians were also using commerce to gain the friendship 
of the French. Arago reported, August 14, that the Prussian Minister 
of Commerce and former President of the Assembly of Berlin had talked 
to him. "He told me that he would be disposed to conclude with us a 
great commercial treaty on all the objects of French and German 
factories, a treaty which, according to him, would be equally favorable
Great Britian, Parliament, House of Commons, Sessional Papers. 
"Memorial of the Prussian Department of Trade on the question of the 
projected system of Differential Duties to which reference is made to 
the Report of the Committee of the Senate of Hamburgh on that Question," 
1847-48, LXI, 125-39.
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to the industry of the two countries. At the same time they talked 
about Italy. The Prussian said that he hoped the French-English med­
iation would succeed, and added explicitly that "Prussia would be 
happy to cooperate in it."^^
The Prussians asked to be brought actively into the mediation 
between Vienna and Turin at the same time that they made overtures 
on the possibility of a commerical treaty of gigantic proportions, 
in effect,making France a member of the ZollvereinI Prussia also 
made the French realize the importance of Germany by enacting a
special duty on French goods which amounted to the same amount as
1 Athe export subsidy the French National Assembly voted June 10.
Without a doubt, commercial interests exerted an effect on 
French policy; it is impossible to say in what degree, other than 
that business was very closely noticed in Paris by the Foreign 
Minister personally. He was especially interested in the Zollverein 
surtax which had off-set the French export subsidy on manufactured 
articles and he instructed Arago to proceed with the discussions of 
commercial treaty. But economics is not the only factor in politics; 
Arago wrote:
l^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 14, 1848, AEF, cc, Berlin, 
IX, p. 117.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 14, 1848, AEF, vol. 302,
p. 211.
^^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 2, 1848, AEF, cc, Berlin 
IX, 112; Bastide to Arago, Paris, August 31, 1848, IX, 119-20; 
September 30, 1848, IX, 124, December 9, 1848, IX, 138-39; Renzing, 
p. 42.
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The Legation of the Republic has not lost view for an 
instant all that could interest our commercial rela­
tions with Germany and particularly with Prussia. You 
know. . . that in the state of fermentation and travail 
which operates in Germany and the grave circumstances 
in Prussia, political interests dominate commercial 
questions.17
Arago to Bastide, Berlin, October 4, 1848, AEF, cc, Berlin, 
IX, ,127." The French definitely thought that the German actions 
were economically motivated. During the most important crisis of the 
Frankfurt Assembly, the debate on the armistice of Malmo, Tallenay 
thought that the south Germans voted to continue the war, because it 
was good for business, while the north Germans were for peace, because 
it was damaging their commerce. Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, 
September 14, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, p. 23.
CHAPTER XII
KEEINDEUTSCH OR GROSSDEUTSCH?
In the fall of 1848, the question in Frankfurt as well as 
France was "Kleindeutsch”. a unification of Germany under Prussia 
without Austria, or a return to the loose federal form of the Ger­
man Confederation which would include the German parts of the 
Austria, a "Grossdeutsch" solution to the German problem. France 
supported Prussia because of her stands in Schleswig, Italy and 
Poland, and for French comnercial interests. France favored Berlin, 
because her Assembly was the most democratic in Germany. They hoped 
that she would pressure Vienna to prevent the necessity of a French^ 
Austrian confrontation in Italy.
Bastide as well as Bismarck understood that Austria must be 
given a new "mission" to replace her traditional position in Italy 
and Germany. Bastide spoke with the Austrian charge, August 22, of 
the new role of Austria, professing the friendship of France as much 
as Lamartine had before him. He first spoke about the principle of 
nationality which had been recently abused as a political program.
He complained of the way the principle of nationality had been misused 
by Frankfurt. France did not wish for all the powers which constitua 
ted Germany to be absorbed in that country.
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We wish a Prussia, a Saxony, a Bavaria; we wish above all 
an Austria, an Austria strong not only In Germany, but also 
In the east, where she Is called to develop her riches and 
her power; it Is on that side that we wish that she move 
back her frontiers, making herself the mistress of all the 
Inferior course of the Danube and extending her possessions 
to the Black Sea. If the cabinet of Vienna would wish to 
give this tendency to her policy, It can count on the sin­
cere and energetic support of France.1
This Is the same proposal that Lamartine had made to Apponyl 
the first of May and the mediation In Italy had failed to alter the 
main line of the French-Austrlan policy. The policy was also sugges­
ted In a letter from August Picard, which was specifically aimed 
against Russia, since the revolution was "an antl-Russlan movement.
In the debates of Frankfurt, In late October, for a larger and
smaller German state, Bastlde was pleased by the reserve that Tallenay
had maintained In Frankfurt. "The diverse and often unforseen events
of which Germany has been the theater" made It necessary to use "the
greatest circumspection." France had to be careful;
not to wound the opinion that In Frankfurt tries to cons­
titute a German unity. That opinion has some respectability 
In that It reposes, at least In part. In the Interests of 
the people. On the other hand, we will rls®. giving offense 
to a force that does not concern the Interests of France.
We should leave Germany alone. . . .  I believe. In effect, 
that Frankfurt has lost much of the force of Initiative 
and centralization.3
Henceforth there would no longer be a serious rivalry between Berlin
^Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, August 23, 1848, HHSA, VIII,
p. 184.
2
August Picard, "Note sur la Russie et l'Autriche," June 
21, 1848, AEF, MD, Russie, vol. 43, p. 344.
^Bastlde to Tallenay, Paris, November 2, 1848, AEF, vol.
806, p. 174.
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and Vienna, because of the recent events in using the troops of 
General Windischgraetz. "I think, however, that Austria has ceased 
from now on (dgs à present) to be able to be considered as a German 
power.
The Bohemians and Croatians had put down the insurrection in 
Veinna "More for their profit than for the advantage of the old empire." 
Dependent of Jellavich, Austria "can no longer be more than a Slavic 
power, and she seems to me to have lost all chance to exercise a pre­
ponderance in Germany." This meant two things, Prussia would not fail 
to extend her domination over southern Germany. The secorld was that 
Austria, being for all purposes a Slavic country, would in in conflict 
with Russia, who wished to use Panslavism to extend her influence 
into western Europe.
Austria, having lost her German character, can no longer 
count on the German Confederation to aid her in main­
taining her pretentions in Italy; under these different 
points of view, it indicates that the present state of 
things is favorable to French policy.5
Arago wrote that the separation of Austria and Germany was evi­
dent. Windischgraetz had intentionally killed Robert Blum, a deputy 
of the Frankfurt Assembly, after the revolt in Vienna to alienate 
Frankfurt. "Austria is a Slavic empire. I regarded this tranfor- 
mation for a long time as a necessary fact."^
With the decline of Austria, in French estimation, the French
^Ibid.
^Ibid.. 174-75.
^Arago to Bastide, Berlin, November 18, 1848, AEF. vol. 303.
p. 111.
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awaited the Prussians to take supreme control of southern Germany 
as they controlled the north.^ This process had increased the in­
fluence of France.
Germany was no longer a federation of kings, sovereigns 
and absolute princes; it is the peoples who know and 
want liberty, who will never suffer a war of principle 
to be fought against France. So prudent, so restrained, 
so moderate, until now, France would have an invincible 
force . . . taking in hand the flag of propaganda and 
saying to Europe that the French army had no other watch­
word than the emancipation of p e o p l e s . 8
As Louis-Napoleon came to power, Tallenay reported that the
Frankfurt Assembly had lost all force in Germany. "In the present
q
circumstances it cannot live, but it does not wish to die."
Arago was dejected in Berlin.
Oh, if he [Frederick William had wished to follow the 
advice of the men who sometimes counseled him, if he had 
conserved the Prussian Assembly, if he had chosen his 
ministers from the benches of that Assembly, he would al­
ready have in his hands the government of the Empire.
Prussia would lead the German Empire, and Germany would 
be our necessary ally. But he has made mistakes and 
done otherwise, but all is not lost.10
Arago thought that the election of a liberal chamber in Feb­
ruary, 1849 was the hope of "all intelligent men, the partisans of 
a French alliance." Those who w^pported Frederick William IV as
^Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, November 5, 1848, AEF, 
vol. 806, p. 180-82; November 8, 1848, vol. 806, pp. 187-88.
8Arago to Bastide, Berlin, November 25, 1848, vol, 303,
p. 315.
^Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, December 21, 1848, AEF, 
vol. 608, p. 315.
p. 146.
^®Arago to Paris, Berlin, December 21, 1848, vol. 303,
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the administrator of the German Empire were asking simply for a German 
Council, a council of states, a restoration of the old Diet. "Germany 
does not wish that restoration."^^
As Louis-Napoleon was installed as President of the Republic, 
a phase in French history closed, the rule of foreign affairs by 
Bastide and Lamartine, "ideological republicans" who favored German 
unity for philosophical and economic reasons. Their principal goal 
had been the national reorganization of central Europe, with Austria 
to be given a new role with Poland as Slavic barriers to the expan­
sion of Russia to the west. With the Slavic Austrian Empire extended 
to control the mouth of the Danube, Russia would be closed-off from 
the Balkans.
Bastide based his policy on Optimistic reports of conditions 
in Germany, and his opposition to Frankfurt was caused by a feeling 
that it was "betraying" the German nation, not that the German nation 
had betrayed France. Above all, Prussia and a Kleindeutsch policy 
which excluded the German portions of Austria and Bohemia was seen as 
favorable to French interests. The use of force in Germany was con­
templated only to aid unification, never to hinder it. The miscon­
ceptions of Erich Marcks, Alexander Scharff and Kurt von Raumer are
1 2
historically untenable.
lllbid.
12çf. Alexander Scharff,"Konig Friedrich Wilhelm IV.," 
pp. 165-66.
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